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ABSTRACT 
 
In this dissertation, I examine news media contraflow, flows of news and information 
from historically underrepresented parts of the globe into advanced media systems. I assess 
North American governance of news media flows in light of increased availability of nonwestern 
news organizations. The research in the following chapters examines the cases of the Al Jazeera 
Network (AJ) and China Central Television (CCTV) to more fully account for transformations in 
the gatekeeper roles of regulatory bodies, media distribution industries and communication 
norms that govern North America’s engagement with these emergent news providers. The 
proliferation of foreign news broadcasters makes examining institutions of reception – state 
regulators, public activist groups and distribution industries – increasingly important. Through 
case studies, I look, first, to recent changes in the production of international news in the 
neoliberal landscape of global communication. I examine significant new news content creators 
and identify what I call a hybrid media production model. State media enterprises are becoming 
savvy users of communication networks transformed by neoliberalism. In the second part of the 
dissertation, I outline the inchoate “foreign media policies” of the United States and Canada by 
analyzing the complex of law, norms and market conditions that influenced the reception of 
AJ and CCTV. 
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Introduction 
News Contraflow in North America
1
 
As a result of the globalization of economic 
activity, national governments can no longer 
design domestic cultural policy generally, and 
broadcasting policy in particular, without some 
reference to what is happening in other countries. 
--Armstrong, 2010, p. 223 
 
The “Uprising” of 2003  
I lived in North Chicago in 2003 working as a server and bartender at the Heartland Café, 
a self-styled community center and restaurant. The Heartland’s progressive demeanor was 
earnest; its owners were longtime Chicago residents connected with the late 1960s antiwar 
protests coordinated by Students for a Democratic Society. Most of the staff was made up of 
poor urban types with only vague commitments to liberal politics. The looming U.S. invasion of 
Iraq was a not so much a galvanizing injustice as a matter of resigned eye-rolling.  
It was with the onset of U.S. bombing raids in Iraq that Chicago caught political fire. 
Downtown streets were flooded with pedestrians waving signs against the invasion “countdown” 
started by the Bush Administration. Word spread that Lake Shore Drive, a major highway 
pinched between downtown and Lake Michigan, was shut down due to the war protesters 
clogging the lanes. I looked to CNN to see how the network covered protests in a major city. The 
silence was jarring. A CNN anchor interviewed retired U.S. military officials speaking on the 
capacity for resistance Saddam Hussein’s army could offer U.S. ground forces. Nothing about 
                                                 
1 I use the term North America to describe the Anglophone geo-linguistic market and thus exclude Mexico from my 
analysis.  
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the major public demonstrations. Nothing about the ring of Chicago police containing antiwar 
crowds, an image reminiscent of the anti-war riots in 1968.  
A month later I had joined a small activist group called Chicago Media Action. We took 
up the cause of localism in the wake of a change in media ownership laws. We made plans to 
attend the Federal Communication Commission’s localism hearings to voice concerns over the 
2003 “multiple-ownership” decision. The change in regulation would relax restrictions intended 
to preserve diversity in media ownership within major markets like Chicago. Little did we know 
that we were playing a minuscule part in what Robert McChesney (2004) would call the 
“Uprising of 2003” the following year.  
Few Chicagoans attended the hearing about localism in Chicago. The hearing was held in 
Rapid City, SD, making it a “heavy lift” for activist volunteer participation. The irony was not 
lost on Chicago activists who drove over 900 miles to have a say about localism. We would have 
two minutes to speak to a panel consisting of two sitting Democratic commissioners and two or 
three South Dakotan broadcasting executives. A series of lights and a timer pointed at speakers 
as questions ranged from bad reception on the outskirts of Sioux Falls to the growing use of 
prepackaged public relations in local news. Each time, a red light flashed to tell the citizen to 
step away from the microphone and sit down. Matters of signal interference were quickly fielded 
by the industry representatives on the panel. Larger systemic questions, those related to structural 
concerns regarding the provision of local media for Midwestern communities, went unanswered. 
Any question or proposition that took the full two minutes was entered into the record while the 
empanelled regulators and station owners looked over paperwork. 
. . .  
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The localism hearings in 2003 were performances. The Commission was performing its 
duty as public-interest advocate by enduring two-minute bursts of broad-ranging criticism from 
members of the public. Only two of the five commissioners attended: those who were critical of 
concentration in news-related industries. Members of the public were performing as well. 
Individual arguments would have little sway over the positions the commissioners had already 
taken. The best we could hope for, some activists argued in meetings throughout the day, was for 
the crowd to appear large enough to “perform” public opinion and hint that, if the ownership rule 
changes were to go through, there would be potential electoral consequences for those who 
appointed members of the Commission. As a new activist, I did not understand what leverage we 
had over the commissioners to make our voices heard. Another activist at the meeting quietly 
noted to me that only the commissioners of the party not in power had attended the meeting. 
This sort of public involvement in major decisions about communication policy in North 
America is at the center of this dissertation. The sense of dissatisfaction I had as I walked away 
from the podium arose from an exaggerated sense of agency in the policy process. It was naive to 
expect a system carefully attuned to activist voices. The question of citizen engagement has 
increasingly taken on international dimensions as a new breed of foreign broadcasters try to 
establish a presence in North American media systems. As a result, North American media 
policy is becoming more and more engaged with questions about foreign content. Stakeholders 
in Canadian and U.S. media policies, for instance, now include a greater range of foreign 
broadcasters bidding for inclusion. This analysis of non-Western broadcasting, therefore, touches 
on regulatory conditions, broadcasting funding models, the industrial conditions in which these 
broadcasters operate and public responses to their growth. The case studies I detail emphasize 
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the social conflicts surrounding battles over foreign news and the policy environments in which 
they took place. 
. . . 
The global communication landscape is growing more diverse. Flows of media in the 21st 
century have become more multidirectional. This is a departure from conditions during the 1970s 
that led communication scholars to criticize the disparity of media imports and exports among 
more and less developed national settings. Asymmetrical power relations among nations gave 
rise to critical interpretations of global media flows. Critics of imbalances in global media 
distribution from developed national contexts (the Global North) to less developed countries (the 
Global South) raised concerns about the role of power in international communication and 
national sovereignty. Trade imbalances and one-way flows of media imports/exports prompted 
theories of “media dependence” and “media imperialism.” Increased flows of media from the 
Global South have changed the dynamics of the late 20th century. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to assess these shifting dynamics in international news 
by focusing on “contraflow,” a term that describes the movement of media from developing 
national settings into those of the wealthier media systems of the world. Contraflow has entailed 
the establishment of new producers of news media originating in the Global South and responses 
to this increased diversity in North America. I assess this reversal by focusing on the production 
and international distribution of news from China and Qatar. I also focus on how these media 
organizations gain traction in distribution markets of Canada and the United States through an 
analysis of regulatory debates and media industry conditions. I use these four sites, two news 
programmers from emerging media powers and two contexts of reception, to study news 
contraflow between the Global South and Global North.  
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Contraflow is often valorized in critical communication scholarship as a means for 
greater media diversity. Many studies of contraflow document the growth of regional media 
powers that upset historic patterns of colonial power.2 As a term, contraflow suggests “the south” 
is gaining a voice, disrupting the hegemony of Anglo-American news dominance. The south can 
now “talk back” with gains in economic and industrial prowess. This may be the case among 
these regions where a preference for familiar cultural products displaces imports from Britain or 
the United States. Growth of regional media powers entails less dependence on media imports. It 
also suggests the potential “balkanization” of the global public sphere in which roughly distinct 
geolinguistic regions exchange media with one or two dominant exporters. But talking back 
implies the fuller value of contraflow is its ability to enter saturated media markets of developed 
media systems like Canada and the United States, places where voices from the Global South 
have historically been marginalized. Gaining a voice in these saturated media markets would, in 
theory, create a more genuine international and intercultural dialog.   
Both the Al Jazeera Network (AJ) and China Central Television (CCTV) promote their 
networks as providing a fuller picture of global events for Western news users. In the case of Al 
Jazeera, the criticism of Western news organizations is more explicit. While CCTV’s publicity 
material is less critical of established global news organizations like CNN International and the 
BBC World Service, the network’s corporate profile brands itself as “the premier source of 
information on China, Asia, and the world” and a gateway to one of the fastest growing 
economies in the world for Western business. Such branding strategies set these networks apart 
from the standard fare, tapping into popularly held political values in North America where there 
                                                 
2 Brazil, for instance, exports telenovelas to Portugal, upending the former colonial relationship with that country. 
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is a perception, though not unchallenged, that foreign news organizations can fulfill American 
and Canadian public-interest values such as the right to receive and impart information, news 
perspective pluralism and multicultural representation in the public sphere. This study tends to 
support these visions of non-Western news networks but takes a more skeptical view of new, 
multidirectional patterns of news. In documenting the expansion of foreign news into North 
America, I qualify the appearance of a more egalitarian global news environment by examining 
the political and economic processes that have given rise to these new producers of news and 
facilitated their distribution. Indeed, it is significant that the most successful news organizations 
offering non-Western perspectives grew out of government-supported media operations that 
work closely with private Western firms.  
Government financing of global news organizations has been problematic for non-
Western news, as much of the regulatory and often heated public debate in North America 
shows. Though government funding does not immediately disqualify a broadcaster as a 
potentially enriching and informative news source, the emergence of these new players is rooted 
in diplomatic purposes. They carry with them the interests of elites to define global events while, 
at once, seeking private partnerships and commercial revenues to support nationalist goals.  
Though political critics decry the rise of “propaganda” and malign state news producers, 
the appearance of several state-supported televisual news organizations in North America can tell 
us more about North American media markets than the sponsor nations’ desire for public 
influence. The prominence of government-funded operations allowing the Global South to gain 
audiences stems from the capital-intensive investments needed to enter saturated commercial 
markets. These industry conditions, massive incumbent companies and high barriers to 
participating in North American news culture, result from policies of media governance in North 
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America. This analysis of contraflow thus undermines a simplistic understanding of the “free 
flow” doctrine, a laissez-faire philosophy of media governance common in North America that 
purports to welcome all information.  
This analysis of contraflow approaches these shifts in global media as a relationship 
between these new producers and the contexts of reception. The contradiction of policy rhetoric 
supporting free information flows and the industrial-legal reality that undermines equality of 
flows can only be seen by viewing contraflow as a dynamic between new producers of media 
and the North American markets they seek to enter. This relational perspective is a departure 
from more common studies of individual news organizations and, on the other hand, studies of 
national regulatory-industrial conditions. I consider both the empowerment of new producers 
from developing national settings as well as the contexts of reception in developed media 
systems. Splitting attention between production and reception allows us to see that the new 
dynamism is not an unalloyed good for more robust discourse on matters of global importance. 
Greater multidirectionality in media flows also points to media globalization as a matter of 
cultural struggle, national-industrial power and, as later chapters outline, a battle over who 
controls how social groups define themselves socially.  
Because contraflow is about international distribution as much as production, I structure 
the dissertation in two parts. The first part (chapters two and three) outlines the political 
economy of news contraflow production. The second part explores methods of media 
governance related to foreign news and documents the responses within Canada and the United 
States to the growth of a more multipolar communication order. 
Part one: the technique of hybrid funding models in a multipolar global economy  
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In part one, I document the growth of international news production from emerging 
media powers. I treat the Qatari Al Jazeera Media Network (AJMN) and China Central 
Television (CCTV) as representatives of what some scholars have called “contraflow,” the 
increased flow of media from historically underrepresented parts of the world into Western 
national media settings. These news organizations represent two of the most prominent non-
Western news producers gaining distribution in North America news markets. Documenting their 
growth and the means by which these networks expand into North America leads me to identify 
government-commercial hybridity in three important areas touched on throughout the 
dissertation: how these news organizations restructure assets in light of expansion ambitions; the 
relationships agents of contraflow develop with Western private distributors; the role of 
commercial advertising in fueling growth.  
Though state-funded, these news organizations depart from some common 
understandings of state news in international broadcasting. They make strategic use of 
commercial revenue and appeal to private, profit-minded media firms in what I call a hybrid 
funding model. This technique of network growth mixes governmental and commercial 
motivations in ways that defy common perceptions of international broadcasters. For example, 
James Wood’s History of International Broadcasting, Vol. II (1999, pp. 22–23), focuses on state-
funded broadcasters with the implication that “international broadcasting” is the domain of state 
actors. Wood, ignoring private companies like CNN International, devotes a chapter to the 
question of state influence on content and the propaganda question. He states, 
Though the major Western broadcasters do have a high degree of 
editorial independence in the type of programmes broadcast, listeners 
need to remind themselves that by the terms of their charter or license 
the broadcasters are usually required to operate in the interests of the 
state. For this and other reasons internationally broadcast news is 
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seldom neutral. As with most news, its balance and objectivity depends 
[sic] on its source, its editing and presentation, and factors such as 
emotion, logic, carefully sifted rhetoric and elaboration.  
 
Wood’s overview of international broadcasters focuses on state-funded activities, but a more 
detailed look at funding systems makes strict categories difficult to maintain.  
Non-Western news providers are in a state of flux, managing their growth through 
innovations in organizational structure and forging private partnerships. It is, therefore, difficult 
to fit AJ and CCTV into static categories that inform studies of international broadcasters. Often, 
international news broadcasters (or, in more contemporary language, “programmers”) are 
funneled to three general categories: state media (e.g. Voice of America, Radio Moscow), private 
media (e.g. CNN International) and public broadcasters (e.g. BBC).3 Categorization is useful for 
making broad distinctions and, as Wood suggests, enabling news users to recognize the 
motivating forces behind information, but strict divisions between state and private media can 
overlook systemic hybridity in media globalization. Cordoning off state media from the larger 
media ecosystem in which they operate can ignore, first, the relationships state-run media 
organizations develop with commercial service providers and advertisers. Second, insisting too 
heavily on outdated typologies obscures the processes of change that become clear in a detailed 
study of the emergence of new English news programmers like Al Jazeera and CCTV.  
Ying Zhu’s study of CCTV draws similar conclusions as she maps CCTV’s emergence 
onto the broader economic transformation of China: 
As China reforms itself and emerges as a nouveau superpower, it is defining a 
new approach to politics, power, and national development, a hybrid model that 
                                                 
3 Domestic BBC broadcasting services resemble this “public” funding model. The media organization distributes 
much of the BBC’s content commercially in international markets. There are no clear robust models for public 
media at the international level, though Alba TV and other community media initiatives most resemble a publicly 
driven international media effort.  
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combines an authoritarian state with a market economy . . . . China has cherry-
picked among market mechanisms, Confucian ideals, and socialist principles to 
pursue a hybrid course of development that has so far kept the one-party state 
entrenched and the masses mostly pleased with their improving living conditions 
and the invigorating spectacle of China’s rise in the world (2012, p. 5).  
 
CCTV’s network strategies specifically reflect this larger national economic pattern, but this 
blending of state-commercial resources is characteristic of contraflow as an adaptive technique 
generally. Al Jazeera, though distinct in noteworthy ways, also reflects hybridization through 
reconciling contradiction: Qatari domestic speech rights versus, for instance, the liberalized 
media ethos promoted by Al Jazeera. Other antagonistic elements in Al Jazeera’s growth are 
economic. Al Jazeera’s struggle to privatize and adopt a legal structure that accommodates its 
public service remit and news editorial independence shows this tension. Yet, the network walks 
these lines and thus requires more nuanced international broadcaster typologies. The blend of 
motivations among state, commercial and public rationales represents a range of tools employed 
for network expansion into foreign national media systems. The state adapts to and 
accommodates the processes of commercial media, taking on commercial enterprises where 
advantageous to get content in front of strategically valuable audiences.  
The blending of state and private capital is not unprecedented in the history of mass 
media. The inception of Radio Corporation of America, for instance, involved the strenuous 
efforts of the Woodrow Wilson administration to cajole private U.S. companies with financial 
stakes in radio to create a new company for the sake of national security interests (see Winkler, 
2008, p. 258). I view the hybrid funding models of these emerging news programmers as a 
technique that sheds light on the expansion of contraflow rather than a static category. It 
describes the behavior of these state-inspired international media organizations in light of the 
modern global media landscape. Table 1 catalogs some of the major global news providers to 
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emphasize hybridity in contraflow as an adaptive technique to facilitate expansion. Expressions 
of this hybridized funding fall along a spectrum that loosely maps onto motivations, ranging 
from the more diplomatic purposes of nationalist interests to the more commercial objectives of 
private news producers. Those falling on the extremes of this scale, though, are not “pure” 
expressions of diplomatic or commercial intentions. Nor are these unchanging definitions of the 
news organizations profiled; they are, in fact, protean. Likewise, though the spectrum could be 
interpreted to suggest state and commercial influence are mutually exclusive, this is not the case. 
State and commercial interests intersect and can support one another as explored in later 
chapters.  
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4 Like RT and Al Jazeera, BBC also has “BBC America.” BBC America, however, is focused on entertainment 
content rather than news as is the case with the American variants of RT and AJ. 
5 Commercial subsidiaries within the BBC’s structure include BBC Worldwide and BBC Global News. These 
commercial properties earn revenues that are fed back into the BBC’s central offices. 
6 Legal statuses vary according to the country in which they are incorporated.  
7 BBC America, one of the BBC’s network of channels, is reliant on commercial revenue such as advertiser 
sponsorship. The British royal charter that allows BBC’s domestic broadcasts to remain commercial-free also 
stipulates that BBC content created for non-British audiences cannot make use of the license fees that fund domestic 
broadcasts. See http://www.bbcamerica.com/faq/ (last accessed March 5, 2015). U.S. Media company AMC 
Networks is co-owner BBC America with the BBC’s commercial-arm distributor, BBC Worldwide.  
Table 1: 
Hybridity 
CCTV 
News 
RT America Al Jazeera 
America 
BBC World 
News4 
CNN 
International 
Tagline “Your 
Link To 
Asia” 
“Question 
More” 
“There’s 
More To It” 
“Nation shall 
speak peace 
unto nation” 
“The Most 
Trusted Name 
in News” 
Ownership/ 
Copyright 
Holder 
CCTV/ 
CITVC 
TV-Novosti Al Jazeera 
Media 
Network/Al 
Jazeera 
America LLC 
BBC Global 
News Ltd5 
Turner 
Broadcasting 
System; Time 
Warner Inc. 
Legal Status6 State-
Owned 
Enterprise 
Quasi-state: 
Autonomous 
Nonprofit 
Organization 
Quasi-public: 
Private 
Institution of 
Public Utility 
Commercial 
Subsidiary of 
Independent 
National 
Broadcaster7 
Subsidiary of 
Private 
Conglomerate 
Ad Support 
Sought? 
Yes; -
Published 
rates; non- 
responsive 
staff 
Yes;  
Active ad 
sales staff; 
ad packages 
Yes; 
Active ad 
sales staff; 
advanced ad 
packages 
Yes;  
Advertising 
dependent 
Yes 
Advertising 
dependent 
Launch 2000 (CCTV 
International
)  
2010 (CCTV 
News) 
2012 (CCTV 
America) 
2005 (Russia 
Today) 
2010 (RT 
America) 
1996 (AJ 
Arabic) 
2006 (AJ 
English) 
2013 (AJ 
America) 
1927 (BBC) 
1991 (BBC 
World Service 
TV) 
1998 (BBC 
America) 
 
1980 (CNN) 
1985 (CNN 
International) 
Purpose 
 
Motivation 
Influence-driven ←-------------------------------------------→ Profit-driven 
 
Diplomatic     ←--------------------------------------------→ Commercial 
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The story of contraflow is not limited to economic factors, but the macroeconomic 
picture is an important backdrop to the changes in global media. The growth of CCTV and AJ is 
related to the larger global economic picture, paralleling reinvigorated investment in Qatari and 
Chinese global communication strategies as these former minor national economies integrate 
more fully into the global capitalist economy.8 The first decade of the 21st century reflects this 
change in international media with this shifting economic picture. Qatar and China’s paths to 
economic growth stem from different factors,9 but a broad picture serves to illustrate an 
important factor animating contraflow.  
Table 2: The World Bank: Data, GDP growth (annual %), 2003 – 2011 (World Bank, 2013) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
United 
States  
2.6  3.5  3.1  2.7  1.9 -0.4  -3.5  3.0  1.7 
Canada  1.9  3.1  3.0  2.8  2.2  0.7  -2.8  3.2  2.5 
Qatar  3.5  20.8  7.6  18.6  18.0 17.7  12.0  16.6  18.8 
China  10.0  10.1  11.3  12.7  14.2  9.6  9.2  10.4  9.3 
 
The gross domestic product (GDP) figures show the growth rates of the four national 
settings considered in this dissertation (Table 2). What is clear in these numbers is the damage 
done to North American economies after the collapse of U.S. housing and financial markets in 
                                                 
8 According to World Bank categories, Qatar is high income non-OECD, China is upper middle income, Canada and 
the United States are high-income OEDC countries (World Bank, 2013).  
9 It is worth noting one significant distinction between these national economies. Qatar’s initial wealth came from 
natural gas reserves within Qatar’s national territory. China’s growth is more dynamic, stemming from a 
manufacturing base with low production (labor) costs and a massive consumer base to sustain manufacturing 
production.  
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2007. While the highly interdependent national economies of Canada and the United States saw 
general economic retraction, the national economies of Qatar and China remain relatively 
unaffected by what was labeled the global economic downturn. 
Data from the World Bank provides some indication of the economic empowerment of 
Qatar and China relative to the United States and Canada. At the height of the great recession, 
GDP growth rates in the United States and Canada contracted: -3.5 percent and -2.8 percent, 
respectively. The same year, Qatar’s economy grew at 12 percent while China expanded at a rate 
of 9.2 percent. Such patterns in the global economy led analysts at the World Bank to forecast a 
“multipolar economic world” (The World Bank, 2011). This multipolarity has important 
consequences for patterns in foreign direct investment and, more importantly, the investment 
strategies of transnational media companies. These numbers suggest a correlation between 
economic ascendance of developing national economies and the growth of media contraflow. It 
stands to reason that greater ties to the global economy create incentive to project a national 
image and create the means to influence global news discourses (see chapters one, two and 
three).  
Data from advertising industry research firms offer a more precise analysis of how shifts 
in the global economy may influence the global communication landscape with the rising 
fortunes of developing national economies like Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (so-
called BRICS). Advertising industry analysis in 2013 predicted growth in advertising 
expenditure in Brazil, Russia and China would average 10.7 percent a year while developed 
markets appear significantly less attractive at 2.8 percent (Warc, 2013). By contrast, national 
agenda-setting papers in the United States that have defined global journalism agendas for 
decades are no longer sustained by their commercial journalism model. The Washington Post, 
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before its sale to Amazon founder, Jeff Bezos, sustained heavy quarterly losses: print advertising 
sank 12 percent while online advertising rose but only enough to make up for half the print ad 
decline (Mufson, 2013). Media companies in developing economies are increasingly attractive as 
media markets. Forecasting global ad spending, advertising industry analyses place developing 
economies at the forefront of the sector’s growth. China’s media industry has most clearly 
benefited from shifting patterns of consumption at the global level. The relationship between 
advertising as a funding source for Chinese media and China’s expanding middle class plays a 
part in redefining global communication flows (see chapter three). 
The redirection of advertising revenues play only one part in changing patterns of global 
media flows. National policies related to investments in public diplomacy efforts are also 
significant. In 2010, The Economist, in a discussion of international broadcasting initiatives, 
pointed to the renewed multipolarity in the global media. Referring to Anglo-American news 
organizations as if they were the old guard giving way to new blood, The Economist noted how 
the “old international broadcasters” were adept at working around Cold War-styled censorship to 
get into national media systems. However,  
A bigger problem for them is competition. Since 2006 China, France, Iran, Japan 
and Qatar have launched English-language TV news channels. China has 
committed $7 billion to international news. That is more than 15 times the annual 
budget of the BBC World Service. . . . The new arrivals are conquering territory 
(and sometimes hiring staff) shed by established Western organizations. (“Waves 
in the web; International broadcasters,” 2010, para. 7–8) 
 
The removal of U.S. government funds for international news services runs parallel to the decay 
of commercial journalism’s financial foundations. Since 2000, the United States’ signature 
international broadcaster, Voice of America, cut the number of shortwave frequencies used by 24 
percent. The BBC World Service, too, ceased short-wave services to the Americas and most of 
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Europe. At the same time, China Radio International, the Chinese government’s short-wave 
programmer, doubled its services (“Waves in the web; International broadcasters,” 2010).  
All of these trends, taken together, illustrate fundamental shifts in the global news 
system. As new international broadcasters grow by embracing commercial mechanisms and 
government support, how are U.S. and Canadian media governance policies responding to the 
new international communication landscape in which the flow of news media is no longer 
primarily from the west to the rest?  
Part two: contraflow’s reception in North America 
The hybrid funding model technique both enables contraflow by subsidizing non-
Western news entry into North America and undermines the integration of these news 
organizations due to the negative perception of government-sponsored media. Government 
backing of AJ and CCTV has allowed these foreign perspectives to overcome steep financial 
barriers to entry in North American media markets only to meet resistance from Canadian and 
U.S. publics. The second part focuses on how this resistance is expressed in and administratively 
considered by regulators in each national setting. Part two also proposes a broader notion of 
regulation by considering the range of legal and economic conditions shaping how news media 
travels around the globe.  
In part two (chapters four and five) I document the processes of foreign news reception: 
how forms of North American media governance influencing distribution of Qatari and Chinese 
media in Canada and the United States.10 I use historical and legal analysis methods to assess 
how power functions in governance of foreign media entry. As non-Western media proliferate, 
                                                 
10 The research in part two examines North America as what Sinclair (1999) has called a geolinguistic block, one 
targeted by foreign news services.  
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the national media systems of Canada and the United States are increasingly confronted with the 
issue of excluding or including foreign news content with implications for domestic citizens and 
subnational ethnic groups.  
In short, part two is an examination of the means of foreign media governance and how 
power functions in making decisions about inclusion and exclusion of foreign voices. Comparing 
these differing national contexts requires more flexible definitions of what constitutes regulation 
than offered by study of individual, national regulatory regimes. I refer to this as institutional 
reception,11 the study of major institutions involved in regulating foreign media. With the 
institutional approach, I outline the regulatory system in North America related to foreign media 
as it functions rather than restricting the research scope to more common legal venues. 
Institutions in my usage include familiar governmental bodies like the Federal Communication 
Commission (FCC) and the Canadian Radio-television Telecommunications Commission 
(CRTC), but also include industry players and governmental influences not commonly associated 
with media governance that, nonetheless, exert influence over international communication 
flows.  
A broadened definition of regulation is important for the study of foreign media 
regulation. While it may be difficult to trace the ways foreign perspectives are policed in the 
United States due to policies of non-intervention in the marketplace, its elusiveness should not be 
taken as proof that it does not exist. Though free from government censorship, strictly speaking, 
                                                 
11 I use the term “institutional reception” to distinguish my study of foreign news in North America from forms of 
audience studies in which media users and their interpretations of media texts are the focus of research. Media use 
and textual interpretation can potentially provide valuable insights about North America’s engagement with news 
contraflow, but research on audience reception cannot go forward before audiences encounter foreign media. Thus, 
in part two, I examine the role publics play in petitioning commercial and governmental institutions to shape 
international flows of international news. 
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the decisions made by commercial cable operators, for instance, function as de facto regulators 
of media content. The crucial difference between official commissions and market regulation is 
the form of public agency in the decision-making processes about what is shown on Canadian 
and U.S. television. While official regulatory bodies are subject to varying degrees of public 
oversight and influence as right-bearing citizens, private commercial entities answer to the public 
as consumers, registering public sentiment in terms of rating figures and considering consumer 
needs in as much as they meet the needs of advertisers. Governmental bodies like the U.S. 
Congress and State Department, too, are more involved with regulation of foreign media than 
traditional media policy analysis recognizes. Bringing these influential institutions into my 
account, I outline a fuller (though still incomplete) view of evolving forms of governance related 
to the integration of foreign media.  
Since media governance extends beyond officially recognized regulators, I draw attention 
to the actually existing policies toward foreign media to question this nebulous regulatory terrain. 
Are national values like free expression, free flow of information and perspective pluralism 
expressed in the influence exerted by these less visible forms of regulation? How do existing 
national policies of media governance cope with the growth of foreign news organizations trying 
to establish a presence in North America? What social conflicts appear in response to contraflow, 
and how are national policy values used to adjudicate these conflicts? Studies of Canadian and 
U.S. institutional reception highlight how interpretations of pluralism, an official priority in both 
contexts, remain limited by a nationalist interpretation. Pluralism is national while the scope of 
media governance grows more global. Stated another way, pluralism, as a public policy principle 
in media regulation, remains defined as if nations are autonomous and “sovereign” despite 
conditions of interdependence. Globalization of manufacturing industries and financial capital -
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and related questions of ecology, human rights and foreign affairs- illustrate a need for a 
redefinition of media pluralism. One of the key questions in this research is whether or not 
nationalist interpretations of pluralism are sufficient for a global system increasingly defined by 
these forms of interdependence.  
Canada and United States: welfare interventionism and market non-interventionism 
The United States represents a reliance on market regulation with minimal government 
intervention, guided by interpretations of the First Amendment. The United States’ reception of 
foreign media is what I describe as a “market liberal” approach. By contrast, Canadian media 
governance represents a “welfare liberal” approach to regulating foreign content. Avenues of 
public participation, though flawed, make the Canadian system responsive to the Canadian 
public as citizens. 
One of the key aspects returned to often in this work is the concept of national identity in 
media policy battles. Canadian and U.S. policies of multiculturalism differ. Where the United 
States has long held to the idea of a “melting pot” as a nod to the multi-ethnic background of 
many Americans, Canadian policy expects less assimilation than is suggested by the melting pot 
metaphor. Canada’s metaphor is the “cultural mosaic,” suggesting that difference can be 
maintained without threatening national identity. These differing notions of multiculturalism and 
pluralism are apparent in Canadian media policy that governs foreign media (chapters five and 
six).  
The question of national identity has defined the relationship between Canada and the 
United States. U.S. media companies have long viewed Canadian communities as an extension 
of the U.S. market. This early international relationship through media trade, dating back to the 
1920s, shaped the Canadian regulatory posture and led, in part, to the sharp contrast in regulatory 
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structures both countries currently have in place. Canadian policy resembles the welfare state 
model identified with a European tradition of regulation. This policy bears the imprint of fears 
that Canadian culture would be lost if national broadcasting industries were overrun by U.S. 
companies. Canadian broadcasting laws prescribing Canadian content quotas and financial 
supports for the production of Canadian media stem from this impulse to preserve Canadian 
cultural autonomy. 
The U.S. tradition, by contrast, reflects a combination of a laissez-faire economic model 
and a free speech tradition that denies centralized governmental controls on speech. In this 
context, business interests have increased significance in decisions about private speech. The 
view of speech protections through the lens of private property defines the role of the FCC in the 
United States, and an accumulating body of law demonstrates the protections U.S. law accords 
speech as private property.  
A recent U.S. circuit court judgment for a major cable distributor illustrates this property 
bias in applied First Amendment law and points to the prerogative afforded business interests in 
determining what is distributed in the United States. Supported by the FCC, independent 
programmer Tennis Channel claimed cable distributor Comcast discriminated against the sports 
network by carrying the channel in a sports tier while carrying Comcast co-owned sports 
channels (non-independent) on a more widely distributed basic tier of channels (“Court to Slam 
Tennis Channel,” 2013). Siding with Comcast, Appellate Judge Estrada said that Comcast has a 
constitutional right to favor its own speech (barring anticompetitive reasons for doing so). 
According to court documents cited in Broadcasting & Cable, Estrada suggested that the FCC 
had “arrogated for itself the role of a government censorship board and that the FCC's decision 
was the most outrageous content call since the Sedition Acts,” going on to analogize the FCC’s 
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support of the Tennis Channel as amounting to “telling a newspaper it has to put a freelancer on 
the front page” (Eggerton, 2013, para. 13). For the D.C. court, FCC rules to support independent 
programmers and, by extension, the public interest in media diversity amounted to an attempt by 
the executive branch to silence political dissent. The language of the ruling is indicative of the 
role of the FCC in content regulation and the conflation of commercial self-interest and the right 
to the expression of oppositional politics in the early American republic. Beyond cases of 
obscenity, the FCC remains a weak regulator of content.  
National media policy, foreign media and pluralism 
National media regulation is justified by recognizing media as a core site of social 
reproduction and thus is intertwined with the maintenance of cultural traditions. Pluralism as a 
policy value has grown in importance during the latter half of the 20th century and continues to 
garner interest in light of the increased interconnectivity related to media globalization. This 
increased connectivity has triggered the need to critically reevaluate the principles that underlie 
media regulation, a field that is tied to national contexts and therefore a national conception of 
speech norms. Studying the reception of foreign media entails recognizing the expanded set of 
stakeholders in decisions about media as a social force, media as a form of political power, and 
media as a business. 
While the nation continues to be the most effective level of media policy, pluralist 
regulatory principles are now being tested by contraflow. Marc Raboy (2002, p. 5) has 
emphasized the importance of considering transnational media in the context of the nation-
centric policy arena. He asks “. . . how to transpose the media policy issues that have occupied 
national agendas at least since the invention of the telegraph to the transnational level where, to 
all intents and purposes, the most important issues are henceforth being played out.” Pluralist 
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principles important to civil society are beginning to inform supranational governance of 
information and communication at the global scale. Pluralism was a strong feature of the World 
Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) thanks to the inclusion of civil society statement 
(Raboy, 2004). Despite the statement lacking regulatory force and impediments to civil society 
influence outside of national contexts (Raboy, 2006, p. 255), the advocacy of "human interest" in 
information policy design shows how pluralism has pushed its way into normative questions 
about transnational media. Both pluralism and an attention to disparities of power in decisions 
about information policy bear the imprint of political pluralism most often linked to national 
settings. The WSIS civil society plenary outlined "A Visionary society”: 
Building such societies implies involving individuals in their capacity as citizens, 
as well as their organisations and communities, as participants and decision-
makers in shaping frameworks, policies and governing mechanisms. This means 
creating an enabling environment for the engagement and commitment of all 
generations, both women and men, and ensuring the involvement of diverse social 
and linguistic groups, cultures and peoples, rural and urban populations without 
exclusion. In addition, governments should maintain and promote public services 
where required by citizens and establish accountability to citizens as a pillar of 
public policy, in order to ensure that models of information and communication 
societies are open to continuing correction and improvement. (WSIS Civil Society 
Plenary, 2003, p. 3) 
 
Though the inclusion of a civil society vision for the future of global information and 
communication is promising for greater democracy in transnational communication flows, the 
influence of democratic public interest values is in its infancy.  
A resurgence of scholarly interest in media policy and pluralism as a policy value has 
taken hold in response to technological convergence and industry concentration. There is a 
renewed debate around legal multiculturalism (c.f. Shabani, 2007) and plurality in political and 
normative theory (c.f. Christians, Glasser, McQuail, Nordenstreng, & White, 2009; Fraser & 
Honneth, 2003; Young, 2002). Media policy has a special relationship to these debates over 
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pluralism given its role in national identity formation, subnational/ethnic identities and diversity 
of political thought for democratic debate. This concern for pluralism has stimulated attempts to 
create assessment models for minority representation across national settings (Ciaglia, 2013; 
Jakubowicz & Sükösd, 2008; Schejter, Kittler, Lim, Douai, & Balaji, 2007). Representation in 
these discussions can provide subnational groups access to national communication resources.  
Pluralism can also refer to representation within media governance itself, as WSIS 
statement outlines. The two are related. Early formulations of the “public sphere” conceptualized 
the form of representation in public opinion as a means to provide critical feedback to 
government, often referred to as the regulative role of public will in democratic governance (see 
Nerone, 2011). But in the administrative state of the 21st century, voicing individual or group 
concerns in media policy requires a more explicit intervention. Representation in this sense is 
more closely related to pluralism as inclusiveness in democratic decision-making. This 
dissertation touches on both these forms of representation but focuses on inclusiveness of media 
policy processes.  
The dissertation chapters follow this chain of reasoning: 
1. The first chapter reviews recent theories of international communication focusing on 
theories of contraflow to set up part 1 and part 2 of the dissertation. The growth of global 
economic multipolarity has led to a parallel diversification of communication power in 
global news communication with important developments in both contraflow 
production/distribution and the contexts of institutional reception. I describe the overall 
dynamic of the changes in production and distribution represented by Al Jazeera and 
CCTV as Neoliberal Contraflow to challenge the celebratory veneer that advocates of 
pluralism lay over organizations like Al Jazeera. The term Neoliberal Contraflow points 
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to the enduring role of the state in processes of media globalization (in both production 
and reception), how state media make use of the commercialized international 
communication ecology and how the state, under neoliberalism, functions to support 
corporate capital (Harvey 2005). New producers of journalism contraflow emerge from 
the economic growth of specific national economies that have successfully integrated 
with the global commercial system. Regional powers like China and Qatar have 
revamped and retooled their communication industries to mix governmental and 
commercial resources for news organizations to function as vehicles for diplomacy. To 
grow and gain distribution they employ hybridized techniques, mixing governmental 
funding and an appeal to commercial revenues to sustain the diplomatic effort. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of pluralism as a policy value to set up the analysis 
of contraflow reception in chapters four and five. The global media multipolarity 
represented by news contraflow has forced policy responses from Canada and the United 
States. Though media globalization in the “age of media abundance” is often portrayed as 
liberated from control and border-eroding, examination of the process of reception 
reveals the social tensions and forms of power as well as the enduring role of the state. 
Thus, the chapter argues that contraflow as the “reversal” of the one-way street in 
television traffic needs to be assessed by examining national media policy principles and 
national markets as these factors shape the circulation of global news television and 
moderate the power of stakeholders in global media flows. 
Part 1: Agents of contraflow in the United States 
2. Al Jazeera exemplifies the mix of governmental and commercial funding sources 
animating contraflow. This hybrid funding model enables contraflow by allowing new 
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entrants in the global news arena to withstand the economic pressures of concentrated 
industry conditions that characterize developed commercial media systems in the United 
States and Canada. The combination of commercial and governmental funding strategies 
is analogous to the motivations of news production: profit motives mix with national 
ambitions; journalistic purposes mix with diplomatic functions. Al Jazeera’s success is 
due in part to domestic national resources: the wealth generated by Qatari natural 
resources industry and the diplomatic needs of Qatar’s ruling elite. The extension of the 
network into foreign markets has prompted the network to adopt commercial strategies to 
gain distribution and reach target publics. 
3. China Central Television exemplifies the hybridity technique as well but differs in how 
the Chinese state achieves economic parity with Western commercial news organizations 
and other transnational media companies. CCTV’s growth into international markets has 
been based on the channel’s courtship of Western transnational media corporations 
(TNCs). The Chinese government’s maintenance of CCTV as a monopolistic state-owned 
enterprise (SOE) positioned the news channel as the gatekeeper to burgeoning Chinese 
consumer markets. Domestic and foreign advertisers, intent on positioning their brands in 
China, provided the SOE with ample funding for operational expansion of CCTV news as 
a diplomatic vehicle. CCTV’s funding base stems from China’s domestic resource: the 
value of its population to transnational commercial media firms. 
Part 2: Media governance of foreign media in North America 
4. The United States’ reception of Al Jazeera and CCTV typifies the Market Liberal 
approach to foreign media policy. U.S. policy toward foreign media is largely incoherent, 
relying on market forces and corporate media management to determine what foreign 
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content gains distribution. Though less coherent than the regulatory regimes in the 
welfare models in Europe and Canada, significant regulatory forces continue to exert 
influence, influence that is often ignored due to the “free flow” policy value that shrouds 
U.S. media regulation. Though free flow and viewpoint diversity are cornerstones of 
stated U.S. media policy, regulation of foreign media proceeds unsystematically and 
beyond public scrutiny. Public opposition to foreign media plays a marginal role unless 
framed as a foreign policy concern which trumps the extension of American free 
expression and pluralism principles to global media flows. Regulation of foreign news 
under Market Liberalism, despite pluralistic policy values, ignores asymmetries that 
result from concentrated economic power. 
5. The Canadian reception of CCTV and Al Jazeera exemplifies what I label the Welfare 
Liberal approach to foreign media policy. Canadian policy is more coherent, relying on 
rules governing the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunication Commission. The 
process is public-intensive though heavily structured by the commercial needs of major 
Canadian media companies. This deliberative model opens space to hear public concerns, 
giving voice to those opposing foreign media. Domestic public-interest groups supporting 
and opposing foreign media publicly argue their cases by using Canadian broadcasting 
law which values Canadian multiculturalism and pluralism in national media. The CRTC 
is therefore in a position to weigh arguments about the entry of foreign media 
organizations. The decisions analyzed, however, show how national media policy 
principles insufficiently account for power asymmetries among stakeholders. The 
inconsistent use of rules about abusive speech -based in the Canadian Broadcasting Act’s 
multicultural mandate- point to the need to rethink pluralism in light of increased 
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contraflow. Despite a more active regulatory context, Canadian procedures adhere to 
what I call political agnosticism in reviewing foreign broadcasters and, thus, tend to 
ignore uneven power relations in global media flows. 
6. In 2004, Al Jazeera failed to enter the Canadian public sphere while China’s state 
broadcaster succeeded, despite highly parallel arguments and evidence. This chapter 
examines the CRTC’s contrasting. Changes at the CRTC related to its judgments 
regarding CCTV, Al Jazeera and the Italian broadcaster RAI illustrate how Canada’s 
regulatory system adapted to global media multipolarity. A series of applications to 
broadcast in Canada between 2004 and 2008 forced the regulator to reevaluate existing 
policies that limited foreign media entry. The decisions by the CRTC during this time 
caused public outcry, leading the commission to revise its foreign media policy. These 
decisions call attention to the strain placed on national regulatory principles in responding 
to global media integration. The CRTC’s regulatory model illustrates the paradox of 
multiculturalism in the age of global media. Contraflow represents the chance to diversify 
domestic content and internationalize news content for Canadians. Various advocates for 
CCTV and AJ portrayed them as a means to fulfill the policy goal of providing 
subnational ethnic communities with home-language programming. Yet these news 
organizations also threatened multiculturalism due controversial coverage that appeared 
to violate North American news norms. The Canadian regulator’s response to foreign 
media points to the challenges of applying national media policy to emerging issues of 
global media circulation. 
Processes of media policy-making have not received enough scholarly attention. As 
media policy scholar Des Freedman (2005, p. 4) writes of the United Kingdom and United 
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States, “[m]edia policy formation has rarely been exposed to either academic or wider public 
scrutiny.” The absence of public scrutiny is “partly because the ‘shape’ of the media (as opposed 
to media content) has failed to register as a key part of public policy-making . . . .” Freedman 
points to the urgency of media policy research in light of “[n]ew actors, technologies and 
paradigms [that] are emerging in the global media environment . . . creating new or accelerating 
existing conflicts concerning the transparency, accountability and inclusiveness of this key area 
of public policy.” 
This research bears out Freedman’s view that  “media systems are . . . purposefully 
created, their characters shaped by competing political interests that seek to inscribe their own 
values and objectives . . . .” (2008, p. 1). Media policy that emerges from these competing 
interests cultivates certain media structures and discards alternatives and this is a political 
process that can be subject to change. But who guides this change? How are regulatory settings 
designed to account for the new range of stakeholders in national and transnational media flows? 
The fact of choice is often obscured in policy documents, policy papers and in the 
assumptions that underwrite the legitimacy of various forms of media regulation. This obscurity 
is found in the Canadian model of government oversight as well as U.S.-styled governance via 
market mechanisms. The procedural admission of public concerns that is a feature of strong 
public-interest systems, like that of Canada, is meaningful, but the execution of such public 
interest must be scrutinized for the forms of power that surround and, at times, eclipse public 
venues. The idea of a media system as a series of choices that provide advantage or disadvantage 
for various stakeholders is blotted from view by the assumption that a “natural” market-based 
process of selection produces the best possible outcome for democracy. 
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Media systems are designed in this complex play of stakeholders with various levels of 
agency and power. The localism hearing in 2003 was an illustration of this power and how it 
plays out in making decisions about power in mass democracy. Systems invite certain players 
and push back against others. In contrast to the perception of media systems being natural 
outgrowths of market and technological conditions, media systems are systems of selection. The 
process of selection is all the more important when we recognize that media globalization is 
cultural struggle. Media policy is also a site of cultural struggle. Whether global media serves 
democratic deliberation and public interests within and among nations is a matter of choice. This 
dissertation redirects attention to the forms of power expressed in policies related to media 
globalization as a small contribution to the effort to create a more equitable communication 
landscape and more inclusive world.  
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Chapter 1  
Global television, pluralism and news contraflow: toward a renewed account of domestic 
regulation as “foreign media policy” 
As the popular faith in the structural and 
professional superiority of Western media 
practice faces crisis, what might be the 
ramifications of an entry into the global 
media system of a state-controlled 
commercial enterprise such as CCTV?  
--Zhu, 2012, p. 5 
 
For some, pluralism is the most effective 
form of politics in its recognition of 
difference and its combination of 
competitive behaviour and consensual 
outcomes; for others, pluralism refers to the 
means by which inequalities are embedded 
into a political system that claims to 
celebrate the existence of different social 
groups and then finds a mechanism for 
prioritizing the interests of some over others. 
How is this debate expressed normatively 
inside media policy?  
--Freedman, 2008, p. 30 
 
In this chapter, I outline theories of international television flows to frame my case 
studies of global news contraflow into North America.12 This chapter’s structure mirrors the 
dissertation at large. I begin with a focus on new producers of international journalism before 
turning to consider national reception of contraflow. This structure reflects my argument that 
both production and distribution make up the fuller story of the North American experience of 
news contraflow: how non-Western news organizations move into North America. The chapter 
introduces the idea of “neoliberal contraflow” as a way to emphasize the adaptations of non-
                                                 
12 My use of the term “North America” is in the sense of a linguistic market for foreign broadcasters and thus 
excludes Mexico. 
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Western news producers to the commercial context of target markets in North America. The first 
part considers production of contraflow and competing visions of the positive social value of 
media abundance. The second discusses competing theories of contraflow and global television 
to highlight the salience of critical scholarship on communication policy governance and the role 
of power in global media flows. The final third of the chapter turns fully to institutional reception 
where I develop a critical policy studies lens for the analysis of pluralism as a North American 
regulatory principle in light of the proliferation of non-Western news producers. New forms of 
power created by new patterns of flow into North America call into question the ability for 20th 
century regulatory models to adequately serve public interest in an age of growing 
interconnectivity.  
Media globalization is a form of cultural struggle. Beyond debates over media 
sovereignty, foreign media can fulfill democratic ends by acting on multicultural mandates and 
expanding viewpoint diversity within a media system. It is therefore important to recognize the 
role of power in processes of integration. Critical theories of global communication provide a 
basis for assessing forms of power in these new flows. Reflecting the case studies that follow, 
this chapter discusses theories that highlight how struggles for self-definition take place at 
subnational, local, national and transnational levels. Furthermore, North American stakeholders 
at these various levels compete to shape transborder media possess varying degrees of influence. 
This chapter explores theories of power in global communication, focusing on media industries, 
government policy and public agency that constitute a more holistic portrait of power in foreign 
media regulation within North America.  
Global media and growing “multipolarity” 
Intensifying flow of media products from the United States to the rest of the world in 
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decades following the World War Two caused Wilson Dizard (1966) to worry over the image of 
the United States created by commercial televisual exports during the 1960s. By the late 1990s, 
similar flows from the United States inspired Ingrid Volkmer (1999) to theorize the formation of 
a global public sphere around the internationalization of CNN during the Gulf War. As these 
examples suggest, a great deal of writing has been devoted to flows from “west to the rest” (see 
Nordenstreng & Varis, 1974; Nordenstreng & Schiller, 1979; Tunstall, 1977). But, as Jean 
Chalaby (2005) has argued, media globalization now features transnational firms and institutions 
that are not part of the familiar bloc of Western companies. Evidence suggests international 
communication dynamics have changed significantly in the new millennium, an effect of what 
the World Bank and U.S. State Department have called a new “multipolarity” in the global 
economy and international communication (Committee on Foreign Relations United States 
Senate, 2010; The World Bank, 2011). The multipolar international landscape has led to the 
proliferation of international news broadcasters beyond mainstream players of the 20th century. 
This variety has created opportunities for increased diversity of news sources, many of which 
target North American markets with foreign and English-language media services.  
Non-Western entrants to the world of global news production have been called 
“contraflow” (Oliver Boyd-Barrett & Thussu, 1992). Contraflow, as a concept, is often described 
as a trend in international communication. Developing nations like Brazil, China, India, Russia 
and Qatar have gained prominence in global flows of news media with the growth of their 
domestic economies. Thussu (2007, p. 5) defines contraflow as “the phenomenon of the rise of 
the non-Western media, increasingly visible in the global symbolic space.” Though this is a 
demonstrable trend, theory of contraflow and certain aspects of its implications for global 
communication remain underdeveloped. Several authors have documented these new flows and 
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offered typologies, but a focus on producers has created a gap in analyses. A deeper analysis of 
distribution and national policy governing foreign media integration is mostly absent.  
Accounts of the rise of non-Western producers have celebrated greater abundance of 
media globally and the potential for new exchanges of news and “civilizational dialog” (c.f. el-
Nawawy & Powers, 2010; Lynch, 2007). New dynamics of international communication are 
often considered in light of correcting for Western dominance of flows. Thussu (2007, p. 20) has 
noted how “[t]heoretical debates have largely been confined to how the rest of the world relates 
to, adopts or appropriates Western media genres. There is relatively little work being done on 
how the ‘subaltern flows’ create new transnational configurations and how they connect with 
gradually localising [sic] global ‘dominant flows.’” A holistic approach to contraflow recognizes 
both production and distribution as essential components of the new dynamism. The 
multiplication of voices on the world stage has been fostered by technological, economic and 
social change and has strong potential for promoting media diversity, pluralism of global 
political visions and intercultural dialog. But overly optimistic assessments of these 
developments may overlook important features of this proliferation.  
Abundance as liberating 
Greater interconnectivity has given rise to competing theories of an emerging news 
culture in a globalized media landscape. The expansion of both producers and means of 
distribution of journalism has led some to offer more hopeful views of journalism in the 21st 
century and its relationship to perspective plurality and decentralization (c.f. Van Der Haak, 
Parks, & Castells, 2012). Much of the exuberance stems from the sense that a new 
communication era has liberated journalism from the grip of national elites that undermined 
news independence even in democratic media systems. Advances in information technology have 
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rescued journalism discourses from the bottlenecks that defined broadcasting media,13 allowing 
the expansion of those that can produce and disseminate media. The broadening of access to 
media entails, theoretically, less elite control of public discourse.  
The sense of new abundance in the globalized media environment for journalism has led 
Brian McNair (2006) to develop what he calls the “chaos paradigm” to understand the new “non-
linear” nature of contemporary communication processes. McNair downplays the explanatory 
power of the older “control paradigm.” A chaos paradigm, he outlines, 
. . . makes more transparent the idea that social processes are chaotic: contingent 
and unpredictable in their evolution, despite intense efforts to manage them by 
social actors; that power in a globalised, mediated world has become more fluid 
and fragile, no longer monopolized by ruling classes whose dominance is pre-
determined by structural advantage. 
 In the context of globalised news culture, to talk about chaos is to argue 
that the journalistic environment, far from being an instrument or apparatus of 
social control by a dominant elite, has become more like the weather . . . . Like 
storm fronts, journalistic information flows around the world in globally 
connected streams of real-time data, forming stories which become news and then 
descend through the networked nodes of the world wide web to impact on 
national public spheres. (2006, p. xviii) 
 
Theorists of global media like McNair and Castells (2009) see positive potential for resistance 
through network models of communication power, and there is clear evidence that elite control 
of the sort McNair envisions would fail in a modern media environment.  
 These optimistic points have merit, but require important qualifications. McNair places 
high hopes in the democratizing potential of media abundance and international flows of 
information. He says, “it is neither naïve nor utopian to speculate that the recent expansion of 
                                                 
13 For example, the cozy relationship between establishment journalism and elite political figures typified U.S. 
journalism’s “high modern” period after World War Two (Hallin, 1994). 
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global news culture . . . can facilitate democratic progress at the global level” (2006, p. 4). But 
McNair’s broad view of a journalism liberated from elite influence in the global age too quickly 
dismisses enduring forms of control. His emphasis on rebuking the idea that the elites can dictate 
through a new media environment risks losing sight of the continuing forms of inequality 
engendered by systemic preference for profit and exclusive norms in media policy. Changes in 
the global media landscape have potential for disrupting concentrations of power, but 
governmental and industrial regulation still play a heavy role in determining the nature of what 
can appear in North America. It is hardly “chaos” that guides executive decisions at Time-Warner 
and Disney. 
 One aspect missing in McNair’s overarching formulation of a liberated journalism 
environment is the multifaceted role of capital in managing that chaos. His broad claim that 
“journalistic organisations and the professionals who staff them [are] more independent and 
disruptive of power in their communicative activity than their allotted role in critical media 
sociology . . . has allowed” fails to account for more nuanced understandings of “informational 
biases” in producing journalism (Bennett, 2011), journalism produced under conditions of 
systemic hypercommerialism (Robert Waterman McChesney, 2004), and the role of 
industrial/business interests in guiding policy decisions about the use of technologies and 
infrastructure (D. Schiller, 1982, 2007). As Marc Raboy (2002, p. 9) has argued regarding policy 
in the new millennium, “the only actor successful at pursuing an agenda with anything 
approaching consistency is the transnational private sector . . . . concrete media policy 
developments at every level are clearly being driven by economic concerns.” Indeed, critical 
media theorists like Dan Schiller (in Valdivia, 2003, p. 140) have consistently pointed to the 
larger political economy of global culture industries that structure the appearance of abundance: 
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Genuine cultural diversity would be predicated on a rough measure of equality: 
comparable opportunities for training, program production and distribution 
would be equitably available to would-be creators worldwide. Widespread 
audience access to program offerings hailing from across the globe, and 
representing diverse idioms and points of view, would be routine. 
 
However, 
To an unprecedented extent, indeed, the walls of the corporate imagination 
enclose the immensity of global cultural production. Transnational purveyors of 
the corporate-commercial model have been largely freed to pursue accumulation 
strategies with local partners as a matter of mutually self-interested private 
negotiation.  
 
 Finally, theorizing a new paradigm in which attempts at control are weakened due to the 
condition of communication abundance sidesteps changes in media technologies. Markus Prior 
(2007), for instance, convincingly argues that abundance in media environment and the 
consequent variety of choice leads to political inequality. Even if journalism is freer from elite 
dictation than a previous era, increased media choice for media users, Prior points out, “also 
causes increasing segmentation between news and entertainment fans” (2007, p. 274). The 
downside of abundance may be a growing division between those with the political know-how 
journalism offers and those who no longer encounter news as they once had in the “low-choice” 
broadcast-era. A high-choice media environment may have negative consequences for broad-
based democracy since many may cut out news from media diets entirely. 
 The hope in communication abundance is in its ability to decentralize power. News in a 
globalized world, in this vision, leads to a positive plurality of interactive publics. The 
proliferation of channels of communication, increased reach of media and greater “choice” in a 
market for media can, however, coexist with power asymmetries (Karppinen, 2013, p. 52). There 
remains an urgent need to examine the new lines of power that guide this proliferation and the 
major forces that take part in sorting the abundance. Theoretical glorification of the diminished 
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ability of elite and corporate policing of information flows risks ignoring significant anti-
democratic forces shaping media environments. 
The national level in media globalization 
Perhaps one of the most important features of news contraflow into North America is the 
national interest supporting new producers and subsidizing media network reach into foreign 
media markets. The pronounced role of national interests in making South-North news 
contraflow viable highlights the role of the nation-state in processes of media globalization.  
As mentioned in the introduction, the mix of private economic and government purposes 
has produced categories of news that defy overly simplistic typologies. Oliver Boyd-Barrett (in 
Ingrid Volkmer, 2012) has noted how theory development of news agencies has lagged behind 
mapping this broader terrain of news production. He describes one striking absence in the study 
of global news: 
State-owned or controlled agencies have attracted less attention than independent 
agencies because there is a loose but uniformed belief that simply because an 
agency may be subject to state control it is somehow unworthy of serious 
attention (perhaps because it does not subscribe to how Western journalists and 
scholars feel the world ought to be run), whereas even momentary reflection 
would suggest that a state agency is at least as interesting as any other. (2012, p. 
340) 
 
China Central Television (CCTV) and Al Jazeera (AJ) are examples of contraflow yet also 
illustrate the confluence in funding sources for global news production. They provide compelling 
case studies for analysis of how the mixing of market and governmental imperatives in 
international news shapes transnational public spheres. The mixed funding technique that has 
gained prominence in increased news contraflow highlights the enduring importance of the 
nation for transnational news dynamics.  
With Thussu, I feature the prominence of state-sponsorship and emphasize that this takes 
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place within an encompassing market-orientation of the global media system. Contraflow has 
grown out of the broader shift to market mechanisms and the “[g]radual commercialisation of 
media systems around the world,” creating “new private networks that are primarily interested in 
markets and advertising revenues” (2009, p. 222). Commenting on China’s state broadcaster’s 
recent expansion into the increasingly commercialized global media environment, he notes how 
China’s effort “reflects the recognition by the Beijing authorities of the importance of the English 
language as the key to success for global commerce and communication and their strategy to 
bring Chinese public diplomacy to a global audience” (2009, p. 223). Though “nationality 
scarcely matters” for private media networks according to Thussu, I argue that we need to 
recognize news, as a form of public diplomacy, maintains a nationalist agenda in global flows of 
information.  
The news organizations examined in this dissertation are examples of translocal media, 
media producers that use regional satellite platforms to reach foreign national audiences and 
subnational cultures within national settings (J. D. Straubhaar, 2007, pp. 74–75). Though media 
is translocal, flows remain shaped by nations in important ways, despite speculation on the 
disappearance of the nation (Morris & Waisbord, 2001). Platforms for media globalization carry 
with them the nation as formative element in both production (i.e. news as diplomacy) and 
reception (i.e. national regulatory policy and roughly national media markets).14 Nation-states 
support transnational flows while national policy limits and conditions their reception. The 
nation, despite the weakening of the welfare state model, remains central as a unit of analysis 
despite criticism of methodological over-emphasis on the national level (Aksoy & Robins, 2003; 
                                                 
14I detail the state’s role in production in chapters 2 and 3 and examine U.S. and Canadian reception in chapters 4, 5 
and 6. 
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Kavoori, 2009).  
Scholarly assessments of contraflow have criticized assumptions that underlie the term 
“contraflow” itself. From the perspective of transnational cultural studies, Anandam P. Kavoori 
(in D. K. Thussu, 2007, p. 49) suggests studies of contraflow have assumed stable spatial 
locations as units of analysis (i.e. East-West; North-South; national origins). Spatial flow does 
not account for the “deterritorialization of cultural products.” He defines contraflow in a way that 
deepens theoretical considerations and unpacks static categories used to assess the phenomenon. 
He writes, 
Media contra-flows are the semantic and imaginative referents for the 
institutional, cultural and political matrix of a world framed by processes of 
global cultural power and local negotiation: a world experienced through the 
identity politics of nations, individuals and cultures and negotiated through 
contestations of locality, nationality and global citizenship. 
 
Kavoori’s definition moves away from focuses on “institutional and political arrangements” 
premised on “unreflexive Western dominance” to consider the “cultural and symbolic world of 
lived experience” (2007, pp. 51–52).  
Though this study departs from Kavoori’s emphasis on the lived experience of contraflow 
to focus on the institutional aspects of news organizations and regulatory policy, a postcolonial 
critique of common analytic categories is relevant for institutional approaches as well. It points 
to the need to disengage from assumptions about the cultural autonomy of developed national 
settings and opens the study of contraflow to consider the contests over identity and belonging 
within developed nations. It highlights how contraflow is fundamentally about symbolic power 
and how expressions of cultural identity take place beyond as well as within institutional settings 
like regulatory bodies and industry boardrooms.  
Deterritorialization, however, cannot be a premise to ignore efforts to reassert boundaries 
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and territorial sovereignty. Contests over new flows from “east to west” illustrate how static 
forms of social belonging (i.e. nationally bound identity or notions of cultural purity) exert 
considerable force to maintain these borders. Opposition to foreign media in North America 
seeks to exclude symbolic discourses according to national priorities voiced by media activists. 
In sum, the path to symbolic power remains bound up with national institutional arrangements, 
industrial conditions and policies that influence production and reception of flows.  
The diversification of media production for North American audiences (Cushion, 2010) 
has changed media policy venues. Increased foreign investment in North American markets 
entails an expansion of stakeholder interest in global media flows. Power, however, is uneven, 
and nation-states continue to wield significant resources in the creation and distribution of 
images. This view of power points to the material base for the control of symbolic environments. 
For example, ethnic Chinese communities in Canada may resist mediated representations of their 
community in Chinese exports to North America. They do so with small-circulation, independent 
publications, but the limited resources of a volunteerist, local media operation have little hope in 
rivaling the scale and institutional power of the Chinese state. 
Uneven relationships in media globalization like this bring up another characteristic of 
contraflow that leads me to reassert a focus on the national level. The division between state and 
private media has blurred, making it necessary to evaluate flows of media into North America by 
considering obscured geopolitical interests that animate the production and dissemination of 
news.15 Funding models that blend the purposes of state media and the resources of commercial 
media reflect what I call hybrid funding technique. The blending of state and commercial 
                                                 
15 This obscurity of national sponsorship in contraflows is especially pronounced in the case of Al Jazeera. National 
ambition is more obvious in China’s state media. 
 41 
 
 
resources is the result of state media’s engagement with the larger commercial and privatized 
context of national communication policy. This term intends to call attention to the pattern of 
foreign state investments in gaining representation in target markets (public diplomacy) and, 
consequently, the necessity of state media organizations to engage with media markets on 
commercial terms to reach geopolitically valuable publics in North America. 
Contraflow and neoliberalism: states of commerce 
I refer to this mix of state and commercial motivations exerting influence in international 
media flows as neoliberal contraflow: the increased flow of media from the developing world as 
conducted by the international communication environment shaped by neoliberalism. To be clear, 
I do not use the term to emphasize how agents of contraflow are mere commercial entities 
resulting from a broad trend toward privatization. This use of neoliberalism would ignore the role 
of government in the expansion of foreign networks. Nor does this term indicate a purely 
commercial global media environment which state-backed media companies like Al Jazeera and 
CCTV must navigate. This would ignore the role of the state in structuring, through policy and 
other means, a communication landscape favorable to corporate capital and industrial 
empowerment. Rather, I follow David Harvey’s (2007) interpretation of the “neoliberal 
condition” in which the role of the state has transformed, incrementally shedding public-minded 
programs and shifting asset resources into the private realm. The term helpfully highlights state 
intervention in global flows by strategic use of the commercial interests in media and journalism 
industries. The industries specific to this study include commercially-oriented distributors, 
transnational marketing/advertising firms and transnational media firms. As the case studies in 
the following chapters document, the entry of non-Western news producers has proceeded 
through accords between major commercial and state stakeholders in global communication.  
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What is the role of the state in these developing patterns of international news flows? At 
the onset of the 21st century, Dan Schiller (2001) noted that, historically, the role of capital in 
electronic communications has been limited by the state. The most significant influence in the 
reorganization of world communications, he observed, was capital: 
. . . the current reorganization of world communications is historically 
significant, because and insofar as it is placing the field of electronic 
communications on a unified and ubiquitous capital basis. In our era, in 
turn, capital's demands predominate in redefining the social purposes 
and institutional functions of world communications (2001, p. 51). 
 
International news broadcasters make up a fraction of the broader communication landscape 
Schiller describes. Still, at first glance, the mixed funding models pursued by Al Jazeera and 
CCTV in the decade following Schiller’s observation seem like a reassertion of the political state 
in defining the social purpose of international communication. The state funding and national 
interests that animate international news production, however, should be understood as the 
reassertion of the state within a larger pattern of governance defined by neoliberalism. The role 
of the state in Al Jazeera and CCTV’s development underscores accords between the interests of 
powerful state and capital configurations. 
Following Schiller’s reasoning, the theoretical frame for the models of contraflow in this 
dissertation emphasizes the role of what might be called the “capitalist state.” As a term, the 
capitalist state suggests an ongoing erosion of the distinction between governments and private 
capital that defined 20th century models of media governance. Earlier eras were defined by public 
governance of media, strong regulatory authority through public-service licensing and the 
production of media through government-sanctioned monopolies (i.e. the British Broadcasting 
Corporation). Government played a strong institutional role in shaping national media, 
particularly in the European experience. In line with Schiller’s observation, state-backed news 
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organizations have developed along patterns that suggest this commercial basis in which 
regulatory power has shifted away from government institutional frameworks in many parts of 
the Western world (see also Chakravartty & Sarikakis, 2006). While national interests provide 
funding for the production of geopolitically motivated news media, CCTV and Al Jazeera 
compete with commercial rivals and within a larger commercial distribution system. This 
distribution system, in turn, is shaped by North American policy environment. 
Harvey (2007) points out that neoliberalization is not simply the erosion of the welfare 
state and the dismantling of 20th century programs of embedded liberalism. In Harvey’s usage, 
the term captures the explicit marshaling of state power to favor corporate interests and, by 
extension, the reassertion of class power, what Harvey calls “accumulation by dispossession” as 
the state take a proactive role in moving more and more assets out of state administration and 
into the marketplace. The state, rather than functioning as a public welfare-minded check on 
commercial interests, adapts to and accommodates corporate-commercial needs. Harvey: 
Behind these major shifts in social policy lie important structural 
changes in the nature of governance. Given the neoliberal suspicion of 
democracy, a way has to be found to integrate state decision-making 
into the dynamics of capital accumulation and the networks of capital 
accumulation and the networks of class power that are in the process of 
restoration, or, as in China and Russia, in formation. (2007, p. 76) 
 
This is the larger political economic context in which non-Western news has risen to the global 
stage. The phenomenon of 21st century contraflow and the creation of a more “even” 
international communication environment is marred by the larger context of neoliberalism’s 
policy influence. This influence can be seen in both the production and global distribution of 
contraflow.  
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The first process, production, is rather clear. The rise of new news producers has relied 
on considerable investment on the part of national sponsors in creating news organizations and 
funding the move into international distribution. Neither CCTV nor Al Jazeera would exist 
without the initiative of state actors. These new news organizations, however, show 
characteristics that depart from classic forms of state-run media. This is mainly because of the 
adaptations these organizations undertake as a means to function within the larger commercial 
environment.  
Second, the systems of media governance through which agents of contraflow like CCTV 
and Al Jazeera must negotiate to gain distribution in North America are also inflected by aspects 
of the larger neoliberal environment of media flows. Inking deals with private U.S. corporations 
like Comcast, Verizon and Time-Warner Cable forces these agents of contraflow to participate in 
the commercial media environment. The desire for broad distribution to North American 
audiences requires these state-created news producers interact with the larger corporate 
commercial environment and adopt the standards commonly applied to commercial content 
providers to demonstrate market viability, ratings figures and demonstrable advertiser interest 
foremost among them.  
A theory of the capitalist state could provide an explanation of these trends as states 
become more than handmaidens to capital interests. As the examples of Al Jazeera and CCTV 
show, they increasingly participate as market players to fulfill state policy goals through 
communication. Overarching features of the collusion (rather than collision) of state and 
capitalist motivations related to contraflow include:  
• the appropriation of commercial mechanisms to carry nationalist programming into 
foreign media systems;  
• the restructuring of diplomatic tools to function within the larger commercial field: state 
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media organizations remodel operations to resemble transnational commercial 
enterprises; 
• corporate leadership in processes that bring foreign news before national regulatory 
bodies;  
• state-owned enterprises (SOEs) engage in mergers and acquisitions to mirror patterns of 
industry concentration of major commercial media operations and match buying power of 
transnational, private media firms; 
• the use of government-sanctioned monopoly power to attract advertising revenues. 
 
This mix of political and commercial motivations provides more evidence for the state 
support of corporate capital, illustrating the ability of state power, as in the case of state-owned 
news networks, to adopt the logic of capital and, on the other hand, the willingness of capital to 
accommodate the needs of emerging state power. Advertisers and the larger commercial complex 
in which they function have served to buttress state communication power. State media respond 
by reorganizing to function more like corporate institutions, taking on formal structures of 
corporate media enterprises. Contraflow, though often “valorized” as a challenge to Western 
hegemony, illustrates the strategic adaptation of state power within the context of a broad shift to 
market determinants over and against public-interest government intervention in communication 
industries. As Thussu (2009) has suggested, contraflow may represent a reconfiguration of 
hegemonic power rather than resistance. 
Neoliberal contraflow, as a descriptive concept, highlights the relationship between 
government-supported foreign news organizations and the encompassing global communication 
policy environment. As I argue further in chapters two and three, state news media organizations 
have adapted their funding structures, news media exports, and organization of assets to gain 
market access in North America. This helps explain why several new international news 
organizations seem to act as advertising-hungry TNCs at one moment and diplomatic organs in 
the next. This explanatory perspective challenges celebrations of an age of media abundance by 
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reasserting questions of power and agency in light of the larger structures that create the 
appearance of plurality. 
Rather than celebrating abundance as a means of liberating publics from elite control, a 
more nuanced approach considers agency within these larger structures. Joseph Straubhaar’s 
(2007, p. 8) model for world television reconciles the competing views that either favor structure 
as determinant or agency of media users: “[t]he main structuring elements for world television 
are: economic frameworks, technological bases, institutional forms of organization and 
operation, genres and forms of television content, and enduring cultural definitions and values.” 
Straubhaar proposes an analytic structure for the study of global television culture industries in 
which flow and reception are “bounded but not determined by political, economic, and 
institutional structures” while “structures offer resources and constraints on cultural agents.” 
Finally, “rules and patterns” within these structural boundaries are created by institutions and 
those laboring within them.  
To analyze power in the reversed flows of news, we must attend both agency and the 
governing structures that enable and limit the power of stakeholders in flows of media. Criticism 
of a national focus in studying contraflow serves to emphasize that the nation is only one level 
that informs processes of media globalization. The interaction between stakeholders at multiple 
levels constitutes a more holistic model for assessing functions of power related to contraflow. 
These stakeholders include subnational communities, nations and firms existing at the multiple 
levels of media globalization. Power is expressed in the interaction between these levels. 
Levels of interaction and stakeholders: democratic governance and media globalization 
Global governance of media flows is not robust as a broad-based and participatory 
political process. Relevant economic organizations like the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
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and similar multinational economic partnerships like the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) have remained beyond meaningful public scrutiny and, in fact, often work against 
national public-interest policies (in Ingrid Volkmer, 2012, p. 339). Organizations such as the 
World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) have created some political space for 
autonomous civil society groups (M. Raboy, 2004), but the state and its relationship to 
transnational economic actors remain crucial. This means global flows are governed in a 
piecemeal fashion, each national setting providing the legal and cultural-normative parameters 
that shape the role of foreign news within a national media system.  
While the nation has reemerged in research approaches to global communication, uneven 
relationships in the international community are also enduring features of critical studies of 
international communication. Dependence theory of the 1970s detailed relative power among 
nations, using models of center and periphery (Galtung, 1971) and core-periphery-semiperiphery 
(Wallerstein, 1979) to outline dependent development that constrains the production and 
circulation of world media. More recent models of world television have proposed gradations of 
regional power that recognize the emergence of more and less powerful media hubs in which 
media flows take shape around emerging media powers (J. D. Straubhaar, 2007, p. 109). A 
gradation framework recognizes the rise of regional media powers in which media producers 
become dominant exporters to surrounding national markets (see also Thussu, 2007). This new 
configuration has led Joseph Straubhaar (2007, p. 22) to reinterpret “asymmetrical 
interdependence” as “the variety of possible relationships in which countries find themselves 
unequal but possessing variable degrees of power and initiative in politics, economics, 
technological capability, and culture.”  
Asymmetrical Interdependence is a useful theory for the analysis of contraflow into the 
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industrialized media systems of North America. First, “interdependence” corrects views that 
position industrialized media systems as the impenetrable core and emanating source of 
globalization. Where “notions of an unreflexive Western dominance,” in Kavoori’s phrasing, 
would overlook Canadian and U.S. responses to these flows, an interdependence frame makes 
them more visible. Second, the model highlights the economic empowerment of new nations and 
the growth of transnational news production stemming from increased global economic parity.16 
The emergence of greater South-North flows provides an opportunity to examine how former 
“centers” as regulators of imported media. Analysis of contraflow from this perspective means 
“viewing global, regional, national, and local actors as part of an interdependency that is 
dynamic but asymmetrical, with growth and change in uneven and changing degrees” (J. D. 
Straubhaar, 2007, p. 22). Such an approach provides insights on how transnational public spheres 
take shape and how contested boundaries that facilitate or interrupt transnational news flows are 
reconfigured through cultural struggle.  
The study of news contraflow into Canada and the United States sheds light on inequality 
of communication power among nations while pointing to these additional levels of interaction 
within and beyond the nation-state. The process of institutional reception involves interactions 
among local, subnational, national, and transnational stakeholders. Scholars of transnational 
media and related social phenomenon have noted the need for clarity of terms in globalization 
                                                 
16 Straubhaar, Chalaby, Thussu and other analysts of world television focus on the rise of non-U.S. programming in 
transnational contexts. The focus of these scholars is on developments beyond the Western world. While this focus is 
clearly valuable, there is less attention to how the growth of independent news networks gain distribution. 
Frameworks recognize new transnational media companies and South-South flows but rarely take the next step in 
their analysis of a new “cosmopolitan” media culture: is this new world of television gaining ground within 
industrialized media systems? If so, how? If not, why? 
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research (see Boli and Petrova in Ritzer, 2007). Again, Straubhaar is instructive: 
One important theoretical and analytical point is to disentangle what is 
national, what is global and what is perhaps most clearly seen as 
transnational. . . . Several of the emerging media and cultural exporters . 
. . are even stronger in markets or cultural spaces that are regional 
(geographically contiguous spaces or markets like South or East Asia) 
or cultural-linguistic, that is, geographically dispersed but culturally and 
linguistically linked markets or spaces like the widely dispersed 
Anglophone or Lusophone cultural markets. (2010a, p. 258) 
 
He goes on to describe how emerging media powers might progress through these various levels 
of engagement with cultural-linguistic markets like North America:  
It might be theoretically interesting, therefore, to think of emerging 
media and cultural powers as those who work first from a strong home 
base, either large or affluent or both. Secondly, it seems that emerging 
powers build next on an important regional or cultural-linguistic market 
base in which they are to some degree also dominant. Then, thirdly, we 
may see them emerging as truly global media or cultural export powers, 
reaching first to diasporas, then to more truly global audiences in the 
case of China and India, or moving directly to export as in the case of 
Brazilian television. (2010, p. 258) 
 
Other scholars have wrestled with these levels of globalization in considering emerging 
media powers as well. In her study of Chinese news, Xin Xin (2012, p. 6) calls attention to both 
the national level of analysis and the need to focus on the interaction between these levels of 
media globalization. “. . . the ‘national,’ although literally invisible in the global/local nexus, 
remains important to the globalization debate. . . . the global/national/local triad, with a focus on 
the interactions between global, national, and local actors, provides a better analytic framework . 
. . .” I make similar distinctions in studying the interactions between national regulatory 
stakeholders and their relationship to transnational media producers like CCTV and Al Jazeera. 
The national space remains important in the definition of global media circulation as the 
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institutional space governing the interaction of these stakeholders in policy processes.17 
Discussions of globalization as “cosmopolitanism” likewise frame it as in opposition to 
nationalism. Globalization’s gain, in this view, is nationalism’s loss. However, both nationalism 
and forms of cosmopolitanism play roles in modern information and communication 
technologies that do not map onto this zero-sum framework. In her study of media and 
nationalism, Mihelj (2011) rejects the dichotomy. She argues that the process of globalization 
requires the “grammar of nationhood” . . . which “constitutes one of its fundamental premises” 
(29).  
While globalization theory may be helpful in charting the 
intensification, proliferation and speeding-up of transnational networks 
and flows across a range of political, economic as well as cultural 
spheres, it often exaggerates the novelty and extent of these processes, 
and downplays the persistence of various forms of segregation and 
exclusion. (2011, pp. 29–30) 
 
Globalization, in this perspective, is seen as another stage of the nation-state system: its global 
rise.18  
With the reassertion of the nation as an important part of global media analysis, there is a 
growing consensus that formerly discreet levels of media globalization are now less distinct. Jean 
Chalaby (2005, p. 32) has used the term cosmopolitanization to describe a new “era” in 
                                                 
17 It is important to note, however, that news contraflow into Canadian and U.S. media systems makes these debates 
a matter of geopolitical concern. Thus, media policy regimes in North America are increasingly questions that relate 
to foreign policy and subnational communities’ relationship to foreign states seeking a voice within developed 
commercial media systems. 
18
 The continuing role of national influence on the nature of a global public sphere helps explain the cases of Canadian and U.S. 
media spaces. Institutional analysis of foreign media reception suggests the media systems of the United States and Canada, 
despite the rhetoric of free flow and multiculturalism respectively, limit the viability of foreign media integration. These limits, 
examples of what might be called media or informational borders, stem from the interaction of structural and cultural factors. I 
emphasize structural constraints of economic conditions and government policy as primary influences in this process, but it is 
important to recognize how media norms take both socio-cultural and legal-regulatory forms. For example, broadly held 
expectations of news impartiality are cultural norms but take clear legal form in regulation prohibiting abusive language that 
targets ethnic groups.  
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international communication:  
The distinctive feature of the current era is cosmopolitanization. Once, 
international communication reinforced nation-states, then it linked them 
together, and today it is transforming their very fabric. International 
communication is restructuring media flows at up to four levels (local, national, 
regional and global), involving a complex network of companies, products and 
audiences. . . . This period is not so much characterized by the creation of a new 
layer of communication flow but by the enmeshing of these four levels. 
 
New dynamism in flows of news have the effect of expanding the stakeholders in North 
American media policy (Braman, 2004), eliciting support and rejection of non-Western media at 
multiple levels (see Figure 1).  
With such an expansion of stakeholders and new power relationships stemming from 
such expansion, the question of democratic governance of these flows becomes more pressing. 
The analysis of institutional reception taken up in this dissertation documents the constellation of 
interests that influence foreign media entry into national public spheres and the strain placed on 
national policy principles related to foreign news integration. The processes of institutional 
reception array these political coalitions against one another, opening up the discussion of 
contraflow to a more focused study of the regulatory principles (i.e. pluralism, multiculturalism, 
free markets, free expression and viewpoint diversity) that govern the interaction between these 
levels in advanced democracies and shape how participants can effect change.  
Though a good model includes this multilevel variety of policy stakeholders, commercial 
interests and foreign political interests possess disproportionate influence in foreign televisual 
flows, shaping the diversity of foreign media in North America (Hackett & Zhao, 2005). Various 
subnational publics have relatively limited ability to influence these decisions. As Zhao and 
Hackett (2005, p. xi) observe, active civil society must engage these decisions to turn media 
abundance to democratically meaningful purposes. “Porous international borders” they note “. . . 
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have allowed ‘foreign’ media to penetrate the domestic domain and question state hegemonic 
projects,” but the potential for pluralism and inclusion of alternative views is contingent on a 
“democratic social consciousness.”  
Working against this hopeful vision of democratized power of “the public” is social and 
political division within national settings. This subnational dimension is a place of contest rather 
than the often imagined unified national public under the protection of national policy. Where 
citizen voices gain traction in public discourse and policy arenas, there is no unified public voice. 
Rather, subnational publics can fight among themselves for the interests of their specific identity 
enclave, opposing foreign perspectives that may bring increased visibility to one group while 
threatening the political standing of another. Detailing relationships between these subnational 
stakeholders within the context of national policy is important to assess North America’s 
engagement with foreign media. National media policy principles, in turn, govern decisions 
about who benefits from the availability of foreign news flows.  
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Figure 1: Media policy stakeholders are a “complex network” of stakeholders at multiple levels that seek to influence national policy 
in response to the introduction of foreign news to the public spheres of the United States and Canada. 
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The political economy of contraflow and the “market for loyalties” 
In his discussion of the “growing reverse traffic” in media flows, Thussu (2007, p. 4) 
brings up the question of contraflow’s potential to pluralize media systems and to represent the 
unrepresented. “Will contra-flow of media lead to greater empowerment of cultures and 
mediated symbols often in the margins of globalisation discourse and will this be achieved at the 
loss of influence and authority among the cultures that have dominated media flows?” Taking 
Thussu’s question further, we can ask if empowerment of “the margins” is not a question of 
distribution as much as production. Indeed, the reversal of flows implies not only the growth of 
non-Western media production but the flow “back” to dominant centers. A critical theory of 
contraflow into North America must address the legal, normative and economic factors that 
condition the entry of foreign news into North America and evaluate forms of power expressed 
in decisions about the integration of voices that might empower the marginalized.  
The study of contraflow into the commercial markets of North America shifts the focus of 
older models of critical political economy. Rather than framing asymmetry as the flow from 
major industrialized commercial conglomerates to “the rest,” it is important to call attention to 
the role of industrialized media systems in maintaining global communication asymmetry in 
which the Global South remains underreported and foreign public opinion remains obscure and 
distorted (see Iskandar, Adel, 2005; Mody, 2010; Pieterse, 2008).19 It is important to examine 
North American responses to the proliferation of foreign news, particularly in light of the shifting 
economic fortunes in late capitalism. Not surprisingly, changes in communication production 
map onto this multipolar economic world in terms of both the scope of producers of 
                                                 
19 This approach is a departure from studies of resistance to US media exports, both the historic forms like those 
associated with the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) and more contemporary analysis 
of the “limits” of liberalization as offered by Goff (2006) and others. 
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communication services and reconfigurations in the borders created by structures of reception at 
the national level (J. M. Chan & McIntyre, 2002; Monroe E. Price, 2009). Refocusing political 
economic analysis to more fully account for limits to flows into heavily commercial media 
systems is crucial to more fully account for the functional dynamics of global media integration 
and the anti-hegemonic potential of contraflow. 
An advantage of political economic analysis of media is its recognition that markets are 
constructed through political work and are, therefore, subject to change (Mosco, 1996). 
Conglomeration, concentration, and oligopolistic market conditions in both production and 
distribution are created and maintained by political decisions. Regulatory environments create 
favorable conditions for some and disadvantage others. The role of public and private institutions 
in reception is most effectively discussed in light of the integration of these models, accounting 
for economic and political institutions that maintain an unequal international communication 
landscape and, at once, produce resistance to such inequality in the process of global encounters 
among stakeholders with sharply different degrees of power (Chakravartty & Zhao, 2008).  
Critical political economy of media flows sensitized to the exclusive/inclusive function of 
regulatory normativity is essential for a complete picture of the degree to which the proliferation 
of televisual news from the Global South truly provides a means to new forms of plurality within 
the regulatory structures of developed democratic media systems. The United States and, 
increasingly, Canada, are high-water marks for the program of economic liberalization of 
communication industries.20 But, as I have argued, the larger context of media policy, defined by 
                                                 
20 This led Hallin and Mancini (2005) to categorize the Canadian system as exemplary of the “liberal” media system 
model. Hallin and Mancini add Canada to the list of liberal media systems though with the caveat that substantial 
distinctions between the two existed. Many aspects of the Canadian system are uncharacteristic of the liberal model. 
My analysis in later chapters distinguishes between the Canadian and U.S. models of foreign media regulation as 
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the transformation of the state to facilitate liberalization and privatization, is a global trend that 
constrains and shapes contemporary contraflow. 
Neoliberalism as “governing context” of contraflow into North America 
Much critical work has focused on the neoliberalization of media policy regimes in 
specific national settings. Chakravartty and Zhao (2008, p. 4) define neoliberalism as “a political 
philosophy rooted in the claim that the market is more rational than the state in the redistribution 
of public resources and is based on a ‘return’ to individualism animated by the modern notion of 
consumer sovereignty.” Critical scholars of global communication have pointed to 
macroeconomic developments reshaping global media patterns (Robert W. McChesney & 
Schiller, 2003). Neoliberal economic policy, though not supranational governance strictly 
speaking, has transformed national and regional media systems. Some effects have been the 
growth of commercial models of production, the defunding of public-service media and the 
eclipse of public-interest values in a march toward a so-called deregulated model. This 
transformation coincides with the period during which the political momentum of NWICO and 
its focus on free and even flow of information stalled (Frau-Meigs, Nicey, Palmer, Pohle, & 
Tupper, 2012).21 As economic liberalism experienced rebirth in Britain and the United States (D. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Welfare Liberalism and Market Liberalism respectively. The research conducted for this dissertation tends to 
highlight the difference between Canadian and US regulatory practices to the degree that a systematic comparison of 
policy regimes can be made. US and Canada appear closer in geography than in philosophies of media governance, 
neoliberalization notwithstanding. 
21 Kaarle Nordenstreng described the NWICO movement for greater parity in global communication among 
developed and developing media systems as meaningful in terms of the debates inspired rather than tangible change 
to policies governing media flows. The emergence of news organizations from the Global South and their reach into 
the former “center” of the center-periphery model should be framed in this longer history. Though recent patterns of 
contraflow can be viewed as the answer to some of the concerns NWICO activists underlined, the government 
resources that make them viable and the larger neoliberal structures in which they operate undermine an 
interpretation that portrays subaltern news as an answer to inequality in global communication.  
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Baker, 2007; Harvey, 2007), the political momentum for the creation of mechanisms that would 
promote an even flow diminished (Preston, Schiller, & Herman, 1989). Exported models of 
neoliberal governance of communication industries have shifted the functions of the state toward 
partnership models with non-governmental bodies and transnational private capital. 
Critical studies of neoliberalism’s influence on the “global” communication system often 
focus on the weakening of the welfare state model and the commercialization of previously 
nationalized industries in a process of “deregulation.” The role of the media-regulating nation-
state as public-interest gatekeeper has, under neoliberalism, come to be viewed as inhibiting free 
trade in information. Chakravartty and Sarikakis (2006, p. 36), however, argue that “the profound 
changes that take place in the field of communication and media policy should be seen as a kind 
of ‘reregulation’ of neoliberal governance.” Reregulation calls attention to the myth of an 
idealized free market in which economic decisions are neutral once shed of government 
involvement. It also underlines how the reliance on markets as the preferred form of 
communication governance creates its own form of protectionism, one guided by the needs of 
massive capital enterprises rather than the public-interest needs of a democratic citizenry. As 
critical scholars have underlined for decades, market regulation shapes communication spaces 
(O. Boyd-Barrett, 1998). But popular discussions of national regulation of media, especially in 
the United States, still tend to dismiss the market as a constraining or diversity-limiting form of 
regulation.22 The push of commercial transnational corporate media into authoritarian regimes, 
News Corps’ early dealings with China, for example, entrenches a false dichotomy between 
government and the market as regulatory forces.  
                                                 
22 This is especially the case when traditional forms of censorship, notably used by the governments of China and 
Qatar domestically, are contrasted with private media seeking to open foreign communication markets. 
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My discussion of contraflow as conditioned by neoliberalism disrupts this dichotomy by 
considering the supportive relationship between commercial and state power in global televisual 
media flows. First, I draw attention to the regulatory power of dominant economic players in 
national media distribution. Major firms (Canadian Rogers Communication and U.S.-based 
Comcast, for examples) wield disproportionate power through economies of scale, deciding 
which media will gain access to a national public through complex commercial negotiations in 
which state media organizations seek to satisfy commercial gatekeepers. Second, the relationship 
also points to the use of commercial media firms in executing the diplomatic (or propagandistic) 
will of authoritarian countries attempting to establish representation in foreign media systems.  
The blindspot in contraflow studies: distribution 
Cold war-styled diplomacy and state-funded international broadcasting operations (i.e. 
Voice of America) have received generous scholarly attention (Baylouny, 2005; Dabbous & 
Nasser, 2009; Krugler, 1997; Nelson, 1997). Where questions of foreign media reception do 
come up, these histories point to the means of resistance employed by the Soviet Union: massive 
jammers intended to prevent the public reception of signals from broadcast operations like Radio 
Liberty and Radio Free Europe. For all the merit in advocating for the right of public “to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers,” as the 
UN Declaration of Human Rights lists, analysis of signal jamming23 can over-invest in narratives 
about authoritarian governments' struggle to resist “modernizing” and “liberating” forces. The 
                                                 
23 The Cold War frame that emphasizes production and the resistance of the oppressive state is still in circulation. 
Twenty-first century journalistic and academic discussions of Iran’s relationship with the “outside world” and 
China’s censorship of the Internet are highly redolent of the Cold War frame: authoritarianism cannot resist the twin 
forces of technology and innate democratic aspirations of their publics. 
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production-focus of contraflow has overshadowed the equally important conditions of reception, 
the regulative function of the market as it relates to the representation of global media pluralism.  
Analysts of contraflow have tended to detail non-Western producers and the emergence 
of regional media powers like Japan (Iwabuchi, 2002) and India (Juluri, 2003; Kavoori & 
Punathambekar, 2008), as I have suggested in the preceding analysis. A focus on contraflow as a 
set of newly empowered producers can ignore the question of distribution in advanced media 
markets. Indeed, the steep barriers to entry that characterize developed national economies may 
make entry difficult for independent media producers except for those backed by transnational 
corporate capital or the resources of wealthy states. The assessment of global news contraflow is 
incomplete without careful study of the modes of power and agency in distribution decisions.  
Distribution deals make or break commercial upstarts that seek a target number of 
eyeballs as incentive for advertisers. Distribution deals are also the bread and butter of news 
operations with diplomatic purposes (Seib, 2012). Global news production-distribution in the 
first decade of the 21st century is a struggle for mediated representation among regional settings 
within the emergent global public sphere. This struggle takes place in the larger context of an 
audiovisual system yoked to the “overarching logic of capital accumulation,” but with important 
qualifications where state power makes use of the commercial calculus to buttress its own 
political and economic interests. The expansion of the Al Jazeera Network and China Central 
Television illustrate these struggles over the nature of public spheres in media globalization. 
With the growing presence of foreign news sources for North American audiences, new conflicts 
are introduced with multipolar dynamism in communication flows. These struggles are about 
who will control the changes brought on by media globalization through national media policy 
and market contexts.  
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National media policy in a global context: a foreign media policy? 
To shed more light on this aspect of global communication flows, I follow Monroe Price’s 
turn to “negotiation” as a key part of understanding the role of capital as well as policy in 
regulating media contraflow. Price’s (2004) “market for loyalties” is also a productive lens to 
discuss questions of contraflow distribution in North America. Price (2004, pp. 31–32) describes 
the market for loyalties as a media space in which “large-scale competitors for power use the 
regulation of communications to organize a cartel of imagery and identity among themselves. . . . 
Management of the market yields the collection of ideas and narratives employed by a dominant 
group or coalition to maintain power.” The market Price identifies produces community identity, 
and nations are naturally protective of this identity with an interest in maintaining political 
stability. Globalization of this “market” increases the range of participants in national media 
regulation, changes the boundaries over which cartels seek managerial control, and forces 
regulatory bodies to employ rules of “participation and exclusion.” This kind of analytic 
framework puts national responses to pressures exerted by media globalization in a larger 
context. Government both creates the condition for Price’s cartels and participates in the market. 
Changes in domestic media law will follow when legal frameworks fail to protect the system of 
relations maintained by existing cartels or when new identities requiring incorporation come onto 
the stage. As Price explains, “[t]hose in charge of the cartel of loyalties would want to find 
devices to place the power of destabilizing images in what are deemed safe hands” (2004, p. 41).  
As outlined, national and subnational stakeholders like ethnic associations, media 
activists and other public-interest groups are engaging with emergent transnational voices. The 
news-production model of diplomacy represented by Al Jazeera and CCTV has led subnational 
stakeholders to petition national regulators and commercial firms in an attempt to regulate the 
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flow of these news players according to the needs of the specific publics they represent. These 
conflicts over media imports into North America effectively position the state as mediator in 
geopolitical conflicts. Tensions resulting from media contraflow highlight the need to reevaluate 
national cultural policies in light of novel forms of power introduced by foreign news 
organizations.  
 Conflicts over media imports are not new, but the Global South’s request for entry into 
North America with a blended form of news-diplomacy, an aspect of what Joseph Nye called soft 
power, complicates older models of the regulated national public sphere. Classic models of 
governmental regulation continue to play a gatekeeper role, and, ideally, protect democratic 
public interest against the excesses of the market.24 But the pattern of liberalization noted by 
communication scholars has had the effect of removing power from view in these processes. 
Accordingly, Price outlines the need to examine a “hidden ‘foreign policy’ of the media” as an 
unexplored site of global media governance. Decision-making in more liberalized media systems 
have submerged into a less visible realm as major decisions about media imports have receded 
from arenas of public oversight. To elucidate the reorganization,  
. . . we must look at the domestic structures in the receiving countries, 
structures upon which dependence often still exists. We must see how 
shifts in those pillars are used to temper the entry of the global players. 
Indeed, ‘law,’ in the sense of officially developed norms that control 
behavior, may be less often the result of unilaterally declared statute or 
regulation than of negotiation.  (2009, p. 202) 
 
What are the means of regulation, political and otherwise, that structure the flow of media 
                                                 
24 In Price’s theory of television “national” and “public” interest can easily be conflated in dirigisme models of 
media governance. The public is not unified in the way this conflation suggests. Recognizing the heterogeneity of 
the public is essential in the analysis of distribution and public policy principles governing distribution decisions.  
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across contemporary borders? Suggesting an “end of television and foreign policy,” Price 
questions whether a specific kind of foreign policy associated with the era of broadcast television 
has come to an end. The implication is that the nature of classic broadcasting permitted the 
closed media borders within an international system but that technological and policy changes 
have undermined the gatekeeper model of national governance of communication systems. 
Price’s most important point in speculating on this transition is his emphasis on foreign 
countries’ investment in the media policy of target nations. He asks “[i]s there what might be 
called a foreign policy of media structures, namely, an interest by one state (or the international 
community) in the mode by which media are developed through an interdependent set of 
nations?” (2009, p. 197). 
In line with Price, I argue that North American policies toward foreign media exist, but 
that the outline of this area of investigation is not yet clear. Price’s question implies a need to 
shift focus to reception when considering contraflow, the mechanisms that filter and select non-
local perspectives for national audiences. Price argues that the “End of TV,” at least as used 
during the broadcast era, follows from the decline in the state’s ability to control information 
space. Price defines the nebulous terrain that remains after the loss of older forms of 
governmental regulation:  
. . . voluntary negotiations between states (or between states and media 
conglomerates) concerning the flow of certain categories of information (for 
example, hate speech, pornography, and information related to national security) 
increase – as do the means for states to reinstate their authority. (2009, p. 201)  
 
Price speaks to the means of entry in what might be termed a post-governmental regulatory era. 
While the classic regulatory role of the state, the gatekeeper model, may be diminishing (or 
transforming to near unrecognizability), the power of corporate gatekeeping is alive and well, 
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shaped by the macroeconomic changes of neoliberalism.  
Elsewhere, Price (2008) has discussed the regulation of satellite communication as a state 
intervention. The 20th century model rationalized the authority of the state in minding the 
informational gate to create a distinct public sphere organized around national boundaries.25 The 
principle of prior consent multilaterally established a sort of Westphalian agreement to respect 
the national boundaries despite the diffusion of technology that unavoidably overflowed 
boundaries. He marks out earlier periods of formal regulation in supranational regimes like the 
United Nations in contrast to a contemporary period defined by less formal, pragmatic regulation 
as nations adapted to the new technologies of communication. These informal negotiations are 
adaptive moves in a sort of protoregulatory soup, a pastiche of efforts to control and direct 
information flows in the absence of established public policy goals or formal regulatory 
guidelines at the international level.26 The resulting responses are piecemeal and often come 
down to moments when national pressure can be exerted on points of transmission: restrictions 
on the use of earthbound satellite transponders, threats to leave ownership consortia, the 
withdrawal of investments when satellite companies broadcast politically sensitive material, etc. 
The shifts in media governance to what Price calls negotiation gets at the obscure terrain of 
contemporary global media policy understood as an evolving set of regulatory tools that define 
the flow of media content.27  
                                                 
25 “Less formal” also means that these agreements are less centralized and involve less public oversight, making a 
researcher’s task of systematically treating the subject more difficult but also more necessary. 
26 Price notes how “[t]he effort to launch Al Jazeera English in the United States is a study in informal decision-
making and informal government influence that lurks somewhere beneath the radar” (2008, p. 12).  
27 Price (2008, p. 18) observes how some rationales of exclusion have more success this pastiche model of 
governance: “[t]errorism is the trope that succeeded [as a rationale for prior restraint] where cultural exception, fear 
of pornography, sweeping cultural imperialism and national identity failed.” 
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These trends require a redefinition of policy and an expanded notion of regulation.28 
Where these hidden processes of negotiated regulation can be brought into the light, they need to 
be subjected to a principled examination for the forms of exclusion they engender. The remainder 
of the chapter discusses models for assessing the forms of regulation being brought to bear on 
contraflow. If the rise of new production centers offers an opportunity to embrace global media 
abundance and fulfill liberal policy goals of diversity and pluralism, it is necessary to examine 
the actually existing means of selecting and filtering flows.  
The national public sphere and global pluralism  
I adopt the normative lens of public sphere theory in assessing new patterns of 
international media regulation. This normative tradition has encountered serious criticism in the 
wake of a renewed emphasis on theoretical pluralism in media studies. The profound sense of 
cultural multiplicity instilled by what Anthony Giddens called “the intensification of worldwide 
social relations” in globalization (1991, p. 64) appears to show the geographic limits of 
normative theories of media and journalism where they are not blatantly ethnocentric and 
jingoistic (J. C. Nerone, 1995).29 Normative communication theory that aspired to be universally 
applicable to all social and cultural contexts has come to be seen as a vain enterprise. But 
normative theorizing remains essential. One reason for this is the invisible function of norms 
within regulatory and cultural settings. For example, the broad liberal consensus that state-
                                                 
28 A broader and more realistic notion of regulatory forces include corporate partnerships, public-interest groups, 
foreign network availability, market conditions that incentivize independent content producers, the ideological 
purchase of free expression, its legal execution and which sectors of society can fruitfully make use of free 
expression arguments in the legal system adjudicating programming and distribution disputes, etc.  
 
29 See the fuller critique in Last Rights: Revisiting Four Theories of the Press. 
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produced news is necessarily less independent than news generated in a commercial system 
functions as a normative baseline for public-interest group arguments opposing foreign news 
entry. In scholarly debates, the sense of multiplicity has led to the rejection of grand theory, 
leading many to abandon prescriptive analysis for mere description. But, as Christians and his 
co-authors (2009, p. 16) note,  
a normative level of theorizing still occupies a central place in 
communication studies, with many issues of law, policy and governance 
being highlighted by current changes in media technology and structure, 
as well as by the pressures on media freedom stemming from the so-
called war on terror. 
 
Public sphere theory has undergone a torturous and somewhat inconclusive process of 
critique and revision since its initial theorization with founding figures like Walter Lippmann, 
Hannah Arendt, John Dewey and Jürgen Habermas (Boeder & Dahlgren, 2005; Calhoun, 2002; 
Crossley & Roberts, 2004; Robbins & Social Text Collective, 1993). Crucial reconsiderations, 
deconstruction and reconstruction of the theory have questioned very basic elements in light of 
changes for inclusive civil society and the expanding capacity for global communication: the 
gendered and sexed nature of the public; the divisions between what have been matters of public 
debate versus those matters confined to the privacy of “the household;” divisions between high 
and low culture; the appreciation of what Arendt called the realm of “Action” over the feminine 
realm of gossip and entertainment media.  
These earlier models of the public’s relationship to media and the state have felt the 
tectonic shifts of civil rights (Squires, 2002), global multiculturalism (S. A. Gunaratne, 2006), 
gender empowerment (Nancy Fraser, 1990) and queer theory (Warner, 2002). The ideal public 
sphere was a place for independent voices engaged in reasonable dialog, but these critiques 
demonstrated how the public sphere was a place of enforced silences as well. In line with these 
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critiques and reformulations, the globalization of media industries and news has forced public 
sphere theorists to recognize the limits of a Habermas’s ([1962] 1991) original conception. Given 
the advent of globalization as a social reality for publics in the late 20th century, I emphasize 
important reassessments related to media and the challenges to any culturally specific normative 
framework for assessing media performance (c.f. Garnham, 2000). I then turn to more recent 
work on the concept of the public sphere to develop a critical approach to actually existing media 
governance as it relates for foreign media flows into North America. 
Substantial revision of public sphere theory has thrown into question whether the theory 
can still provide insight. All that is left, some argue, is an outdated and 
historically/geographically specific set of idealized prescriptions about the relationship among 
publics, the state and the media (for criticism, see Crossley & Roberts, 2004). Public sphere 
theory is tested by the intensification of international communication flows. As Nancy Fraser 
(2007) has convincingly argued in her critique of Habermas’s idealized model of  18th century 
print culture, the public sphere is bound by the nation-state, fundamentally disabling it as a 
functional theory for global media. The theory cannot be effectively applied to satellite 
broadcasting or publics that exist in transnational space. The idea of a “non-national public 
sphere” is oxymoronic since basic features of the public as classically theorized depend on the 
nation (as national parliament) to provide for the actualization of public will formed through and 
identified with independent news media. 
Though transnational publics and diasporic publics appear to lack the basic features 
required to apply public sphere theory, those elements of the theory that warn of government and 
commercial forces undercutting the independence of media remain valuable. On the whole, even 
critiques of Habermas’s idealized public sphere tend to see the initial value in media functioning 
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as a space for autonomous public discussion as a means for self-government. One of the central 
tasks of public sphere theorists in the 21st century is to reinvigorate the democratic spirit of the 
public sphere, reconstructing its models to account for new patterns of communication flows. To 
move public sphere theory forward, we need to look at the contemporary conditions that have 
challenged its relevance. Theories of international communication flows and institutional 
analysis of production capacities and reception structures are necessary components of a fuller 
assessment of these new dynamic flows and the roles of power and agency bound up with new 
forms of regulation of foreign media flows.   
Radical-pluralist critique of national regulation 
The rise of news media from the Global South has clear consequences for principles of 
pluralism common to democratic theories of media like the public sphere, both as a subject of 
theory and practical policy decision-making. Critical attention to conceptualizations of pluralism 
in democratic media systems is essential, and naïve celebrations of diversity can fail to identify 
the role of power in media and decisions about media flows. Analyses of institutions and 
stakeholders in the process of regulating media flows can become blind to asymmetries of power 
under the market liberalism of the U.S. system and the deliberative approaches employed by 
Canadian media regulators. The approach outlined by Karppinen (2013), the radical-pluralist 
model, creates a third space to recognize the failures of pluralism as conceived by these two 
dominant modes of media regulation by emphasizing such asymmetries. Radical pluralism 
corrects for the agnostic view of power seen in both U.S. and Canadian media governance and 
serves to illuminate how power functions in processes of negotiation that include stakeholders, 
from transnational corporations to small ethnic communities.  
Global flows of programming transcend ethno-cultural boundaries and provide for greater 
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representation of subnational communities. Overly optimistic views of technology-enabled 
abundance highlight the benefit of cross-border flows. First-generation Chinese immigrants in 
Canada, for instance, can be well served by media in a familiar language, connecting immigrants 
to home culture and nurturing such hybrid identities. But such attempts to establish 
representational pluralism within national media systems should be critically assessed, a point 
Mihelj (2011, p. 178) stresses in her analysis of media and nationality. A normative benchmark 
that crosses cultural context, she argues, is inclusive participation.  
To be able to asses[s] [sic] cross-cultural communication from a 
normative standpoint, we have to first ask what kinds of inclusion and 
exclusion it engenders, and keep in mind that the mere transcendence of 
ethno-cultural divisions within a state does not necessarily bring about 
connections that are open to everyone, but can easily end up replacing 
one form of exclusion with another.  
 
Mihelj’s concern for inclusion is part of a trend in scholarly reappraisals of pluralism as a 
principle in democratic governance and media policy. Some of the key points of this emerging 
literature on transnational inclusiveness are the discursive aspects of inclusion/exclusion, the 
means of group expression and the norms that surround policy debates. These reappraisals have 
direct bearing on the transformations taking place in the means of governance of international 
media flows and provide a starting point for modeling the implications of the procedures.  
Interpretations of pluralism as a policy value remains confined within nationalist legal 
interpretations.30 Yet, important questions stem from newly available perspectives in contraflow. 
If a national polity must make decisions about war and peace, should policy values like media 
diversity and pluralism be reinterpreted to include a broader notion of global plurality? Should 
                                                 
30 For an example of academic discussion of evolving national frameworks for media diversity, see Horowitz 
overview of U.S. media policy since the civil rights era (2005).  
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national regulatory principles shaping media globalization catch up to a world of economic and 
cultural interdependence? Put another way, to what degree do national regulatory priorities need 
to recognize global implications of decisions to live up to liberal conceptions of democratic 
deliberation and viewpoint diversity? 
With the challenges to national media governance presented by the growth of non-
Western news, North American policymakers have an opportunity to reconsider longstanding 
principles. Contraflow presents starkly different models of news and journalistic conventions, 
generating stresses on institutions conducting media flows.31 Principles of free flow ignore the 
structural and practical limits on the number of perspectives that can be given a place in modern 
mass media systems. Democratic models of regulation, while recognizing these limits and using 
public procedures to make such decisions, often remain insufficiently aware of the power that 
operates within the selection process. To scrutinize these approaches, I use Kari Karppinen’s 
radical-pluralist perspective as a way to approach questions of power in both the market liberal 
and welfare liberal models of media governance and discuss radical pluralism’s relevance for 
aspects of North American global media integration. 
Karppinen (2013, p.1) has begun to rethink media pluralism in light of challenges to 
public sphere theory and argues “for a more critical conception where media pluralism is 
understood not only in terms of variety or choice, but more broadly as a normative value that 
refers to the distribution of communicative power in the public sphere.” With other policy 
scholars (Freedman, 2008), he notes how pluralism is often robbed of its political utility in two 
                                                 
31 In Canada, these stresses can be seen in the public response to the Canadian Radio-television Telecommunications 
Commission decisions. In the US, the intertwined free information-flow and free-market paradigms have come 
under greater scrutiny as it becomes clear that limitations must be imposed in a world of “communicative 
abundance” (Pelton 2004). 
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ways. First, “pluralism” appears as an unassailable good, preventing a critical engagement with 
the term at the conceptual level.32 It can become mere rhetorical homage as a “god-term” in 
policy statements. Second, media pluralism can be marshaled by proponents of a market-based 
approach to media governance and therefore lacks any capacity to critically assess the poverty of 
representation induced by the reliance on commercial mechanisms in production and distribution 
decisions. In both cases, the role of power is obscured in negotiations over international media. 
Pluralism, Karppinen argues, must be re-galvanized to have critical force. In deconstructing the 
term, Karppinen (2013, p. 7) puts important questions to advocates of pluralism and the limits of 
the term in policy discussions.  
Is there not a point at which healthy diversity turns into unhealthy 
dissonance? . . . In the context of an increasingly complex and at least in 
some sense diversified media landscape, the crucial question remains as 
to how pluralism should be conceptualized as a political value without 
falling into the trap of flatness, relativism, indifference, and an 
unquestioning acceptance of market-driven difference and consumer 
culture.  
 
Pluralism, critics note, has been used to justify free-market populism and a celebration of 
consumer choice. As I argue in my analysis of Canada’s attempt to formulate policies for foreign 
media (chapter six), ambiguity leads to the appearance of paradox in policymaking. In Canadian 
national media policy, an appeal to social pluralism justifies silencing voices that threaten 
Canadian multiculturalism. This runs to the heart of free expression conundrums. The paradoxes 
                                                 
32 Early media policy through the creation of various national/public broadcasting organizations in large national 
setting were guided by the need to unify a national public. This impulse to cultivate common culture was an 
exclusive endeavor and met with challenges from the margins: voices were left out of the monolithic conception of 
public broadcasting. The monolithic vision gave way as philosophies of multiculturalism took root in legal and 
judicial settings during the latter half of the 20th century. This dissertation characterizes the United States and 
Canada as two paths toward managing multiculturalism: laissez-faire vs. policy-directed pluralism.  
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of pluralism become clear when media imports meet ambiguous multicultural policies in which 
intolerant voices are disallowed for the sake of a tolerant society. For pluralism to have any real 
problem-solving power for democratic regulation of media structures, it must be theorized as a 
value in itself. Policy outcomes of pluralism can, thus, recognize elements of self-contradiction 
and forms of power that undermine the larger policy goal of inclusive democracy (Young, 2002).  
Karppinen offers a tripartite scheme for sorting out vagaries of pluralism policies and 
establishing a more meaningful understanding of pluralism. Table 3 is my distillation of the key 
distinguishing features of three models of procedural democratic based on Karppinen’s 
framework for discussing pluralism. The deliberative model, theoretically rooted in Habermas’s 
early public sphere theory, functions as a critique of the liberal conception of public discourse 
which suffers from a dependence on market logic. Where market liberalism and 
commercialization of communication space led Habermas to theorize the decline of the ideal 
public sphere of rational discourse (the “refeudalization thesis”), others have criticized the 
deliberative approach for its insistence on consensus.  
Table 3: Contrasting Conceptions of  
Democratic Pluralism in Media Policy  
Liberal Pluralism 
 
Deliberative Pluralism Agonistic/Radical Pluralism 
 
• Marketplace of ideas 
metaphor 
• Relies on markets to 
address social issues  
• Blind to asymmetries 
of power re: private 
property 
• Ratings equated with 
socially purposeful 
• Individual freedom 
and plurality  
 
 
• Rational-critical 
discourse  
• Consensus is aim of 
deliberation 
• Power-free 
objective ignores 
power in different 
stakeholders 
• Envisions 
consensus without 
exclusion 
 
 
• Hegemonic political 
projects can be 
contested 
• Agreement not goal of 
public discourse 
• Asymmetries of power 
highlighted 
• Exclusion assumed   
• Consensus framed as 
“temporary hegemonic 
construction” 
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Table 3 (cont.) 
• Negative freedom of 
media focused on 
political power 
• Predisposed to defend 
speech acts as private 
property (vs. state 
assertions of public 
interest) 
• Premised on 
overcoming 
difference through 
reasoned debate 
• Group identities 
envisioned as 
pregiven and 
merely entering 
public realm 
discussion 
• Identities are fluid; 
anti-essentialist 
• View public as place 
of identity formation 
rather than pregiven 
identities in 
competition 
 
The problem of exclusion in democratic law-making has prompted contemporary 
theorists to frame struggles for recognition “as a pervasive aspect of struggles over norms of 
social coordination and governance generally [that are] linked to struggles over the distribution 
of power and resources” (Shabani, 2007, p. 42). Rather than universal norms that have 
historically proven to repress or subjugate difference for the sake of deliberative consensus, 
political philosophers like Thomas McCarthy and James Tully conceive of deliberation that 
makes room for strong difference. As McCarthy summarizes: 
Because the irreducible diversity of interpretative and evaluative standpoints 
associated with cultural pluralism regularly gives rise to intractable disagreements 
on normative questions . . . the idea of ‘reasonable agreement’ has to be 
differentiated beyond rational consensus on the one hand, and strategic 
compromise on the other, to include such forms as the indirect justification 
attaching to procedurally correct decisions issuing from a legal-political system 
that is itself perceived to be basically just, and the mutual accommodation 
afforded by community-minded members who want to live in harmony even 
when they disagree about the common good. (in Shabani, 2007, p. 47) 
 
Karppinen’s radical-pluralism model for media pluralism similarly seeks to improve on the 
deliberative model by emphasizing forms of power the deliberative model ignores. He outlines 
the radical pluralist critique of current notions of liberal pluralism guiding media policy 
decisions: 
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. . . a critical notion of media pluralism must be able to account for the difference 
between the sheer number of voices, the number of different voices, and above 
all their relationship with existing power structures in society. As a consequence, 
media pluralism can be understood to be more about power relations and less 
about defining or defending difference as such. (2013, p. 10)  
 
Radical pluralism attempts to establish theoretical ground beyond both the uncritical embrace of 
pluralism and the deliberative model’s emphasis on consensus by drawing attention to the role of 
power.  
Radical pluralism is an improvement on the deliberative model associated with 
Habermas, but it does not simply abandon the key function of consensus in the deliberative 
approach. The radical pluralist approach improves on the way that consensus is portrayed by 
viewing consensus as necessarily exclusionary. As a result, the political reconciliation required 
to move forward in the practical politics of regulatory decisions and democratic law-making in 
general is not itself abandoned for an endless play of difference in which no binding decisions 
can be made. Instead, any consensus is acknowledged as certain stakeholders holding sway over 
others. Power asymmetries are always recognized in an agonistic model of the democratic 
process. This foregrounding of power differences among stakeholders contrasts with the 
deliberative model’s zeal for the formation of unified public will which sacrifices difference and 
plurality for rational consensus. The radical-pluralist model always makes space to contest 
existing hegemonic formations (Karppinen 2013, p. 43). If consensus is the golden term for 
deliberative models, resistance is so for the radical-pluralists.33 
                                                 
33 The main difference in these two later models of democracy is the view of power in the public sphere and media 
policy. A radical pluralist model improves on deliberative democratic models by stripping away idealistic 
assumptions about power within the public sphere. Abandoning the Habermasian principle of agreement created 
from a realm of free debate, the new critical approach to pluralism proposes that deliberation is always a defeat for 
certain interests rather than a celebration of public unity. The appearance of unified will is always hegemonic, 
always marked by asymmetrical power relations. Where deliberative theory is premised on a terrain of debate free 
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A critical policy studies standpoint reflects these power concerns in the analysis of how 
the media structures resulting from policy and procedures within policy formation itself account 
for the relationship between dominant and subordinate groups. To what extent do institutional 
arrangements foster meaningful public participation in as much as they weigh the needs of each 
stakeholder according to the unevenness of power within the policy arena? This is not merely a 
question of creating bureaucratic avenues for publics to voice their concern (i.e. consumer 
surveys and hearings) but the evaluation of how existing avenues account for power in more 
subtle ways (i.e. forms of evidence allowed, what views are admissible in judicial settings, 
financial and organizational capacity of stakeholders, etc.). These less visible forms of inclusion 
and exclusion privilege some participants over others. For example, it is often a matter of norms 
and, in publicly accessible regulatory settings, codified standards of deliberation. 
Examining the normative dimensions of media governance takes a step beyond basic 
institutional analysis that defines much of the approach to policy studies. As Young (2002) and 
Karppinen (2013) emphasize, scrutiny of the underlying assumptions within institutions of 
governance reveal how norms can work against inclusiveness. Normative assumptions allow 
institutions to ignore asymmetries of power in policy processes. Procedural norms of 
Habermasian deliberation like the need to defer self-interest for the common good and the refusal 
to recognize unofficial identities (Calhoun, 2002) undermine the idealized context of inclusive 
decision-making.34  
                                                                                                                                                             
from these asymmetries of power, radical pluralism assumes no such power vacuums exist. 
34
 These points address the problem of deliberation in general and the means to foster pluralism in making policy 
decisions in a democratic, inclusive way. For those concerned with the processes of media policy, plurality of 
decisive voices is of double importance. Arguably, these theories of deliberation take on an even more pressing 
importance when the subject of deliberation is, itself, national media policy governing plurality of the system.  
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Many of the perpetually unresolved questions come down to how policy analysts decide 
which groups deserve what means of representation given their social place within a society. The 
decisions amount to the distribution of communicative power to some groups over others within 
a national communicative polity. Making communication policy choices relies on the assumption 
that social groups – ethnic, religious, political– can be effectively demarcated for such policy 
decisions (Benhabib, 2002). To do so in policy documents risks not only embracing a flawed 
essentialism in conceptualizing diversity but writing such essentialism into law, denying the 
fluidity of identity, hybridity and a flexibility that defines social life in an age of global 
migrations, diaspora and transnational communication.  
This is part of the challenge for those crafting and executing policy in the age of global 
media. The well-meaning impulse to provide adequate representation within national media 
systems is further complicated by increased connectivity and the influx of competition to define 
local communities by non-local media organizations. In the context of representation in media 
institutions, policy decisions about foreign media have direct bearing on how social groups can 
self-identify as imagined communities, connecting anonymous members of the same community 
through commonalities of language, cultural interests and political orientation. Still, regulatory 
apparatuses can regard the proliferation of contraflow as vehicles for more “authentic” 
representation. A media policy system sensitive to the needs of communities and cognizant of 
subnational ethnic communities, for instance, can view foreign language programming offered 
by a foreign government as a fair fulfillment of the media needs of recent immigrants and the 
underrepresented linguistic groups. However, this thinking can be viewed as a facile 
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multiculturalism that ignores the relationship immigrant or diasporic communities have with 
their cultures of origin and broadcaster seeking entry. The relationship may range from receptive 
to ambivalent to antagonistic. If antagonistic, efforts to foster greater communicative agency by 
offering foreign-language programming may have the unintended consequence of reinforcing 
asymmetries of power and reintroduce hegemonic power under the banner of diversity.  
Conclusion 
What administrative logics guide negotiations with foreign broadcasters and negotiations 
among stakeholders in these processes? In the absence of formal content regulation governing 
the acceptance or rejection of foreign media, what forms of regulation replace it? How are these 
choices made in the absence of formal administrative bodies with guiding principles based on 
legislative or judicial reasoning? When formal bodies are in place, as is the case with Canada, are 
principles of pluralism prepared for the growth of foreign broadcasters? In her critique of 
cosmopolitanism, Mihelj (2011, p. 186) notes how a “cosmopolitan consciousness” does not 
necessarily reflect or, for that matter, embrace international communication representative of the 
heterogeneous reality of the globe. Rather than admire this cosmopolitan consciousness over and 
against nationalism, the solutions we propose should “harness the potential of existing national 
frameworks, and help open them up to transnational loyalties and mediated bonds.” She notes 
how the dynamic of contemporary global flows “indicates that the route to cosmopolitan 
communication does not lead past the nation-state and national spaces of communication, but 
through them” (187).  
The chapters that follow examine the nature of producers of contraflow and the processes 
of North American integration that elucidate the changing terrain of a media landscape with 
cosmopolitan potential and how media policy regimes in North America respond to a more 
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multipolar media landscape. A radical reinterpretation of media policy principles would 
recognize the forms of power expressed in these new flows. Concepts of pluralism in North 
American regulation have sought to serve public policy goals of reflecting national diversity 
with varying degrees of success, but the reversal of news flows has offered a chance for national 
policies in the West to reflect global as well as national conceptions of diversity. The question 
remains whether national media and communication policy can transform to meet the challenge 
of global heterogeneity with consciously articulated domestic media policy that recognizes the 
failure of nationalist interpretations of 20th century public policies.  
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Chapter 2  
Neoliberal Contraflow: Al Jazeera’s hybrid funding techniques 
Chapter abstract: The mixed funding model undergirding Al Jazeera’s growth between 1996 and 
2013 has drawn out different scholarly approaches. What does the internationalization of the Al 
Jazeera network tell us about the larger context of global communication it navigates as an 
example of contraflow? For many scholars, the rise of the Arab news organizations provides for 
diversification of news discourse. AJ’s move into North America invites speculation on this 
point, but the means of the network’s expansion, its financial bases, also need to be scrutinized. 
The international growth of the Al Jazeera Network (AJN) illustrates how contemporary 
contraflow contributes to positive pluralism in regional news perspectives sought by critical 
policy analysts of global news flows, particularly the political programs proposed during 1970s 
debates within UNESCO’s New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO). 
However, analysis of contemporary contraflow shows how Al Jazeera is not the result of a 
fundamentally restructured international communication order aiming to foster greater parity in 
flows of news. The network’s potential contribution to global news pluralism notwithstanding, 
the expansion of the Al Jazeera Network’s reach represents the continuation of structural 
asymmetry in global communication and the adaptation of state communication power to the 
neoliberalism as the encompassing model of governance for international communication 
industries.  
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Introduction: Al Jazeera as contraflow and hybridity in news funding 
Al Jazeera (AJ) has become one of the most visible examples of contraflow in global 
news media. The network’s news division, with its non-Western identity and the challenges it 
presented to the George W. Bush administration’s framing of U.S. military intervention in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, made a spectacle of Al Jazeera’s maverick role in global news flows. As a 
news organization, Al Jazeera’s growth into Western news markets and especially the 
developments in English-language programming in 2006 mark a minor but significant departure 
from Anglo-American hegemony in global news flows. This chapter describes Al Jazeera’s 
network growth and focuses on the range of revenue sources that supports the movement of the 
first Arab network to enter the high-rent media systems of developed economies in North 
America.  
Profiling the Al Jazeera Network’s funding model is important since the channel has 
become emblematic of contraflow and, for many, represents the hope for new dynamism in flows 
of information from historically underrepresented social groups and geographic regions (Lynch, 
2007; Miles, 2006; W. Youmans & Brown, 2011). In these narratives, AJ is an agent of greater 
equality. There is a widespread sense that the Arab media network can deliver on North 
American media policy values of diversity and pluralism. Among critical scholars of global 
communication, Al Jazeera also stands out as a potential fulfillment of goals formulated during 
UNESCO’s New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) of the 1970s: a more 
equitable participation in international news discourse (Frau-Meigs et al., 2012; Shelton A. 
Gunaratne, 1978; Preston et al., 1989). What is Al Jazeera’s relationship to the legacy of the 
Non-Aligned Press Movement which sought to correct imbalances in South-North flows of 
news? Linking Al Jazeera’s rise to this history is as tempting as it is problematic. Al Jazeera’s 
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model of production and its pattern of growth are departures from the vision promulgated by 
many NWICO advocates who explicitly linked the communication order to a larger critique of 
unevenness in  the international economic order (Carlsson, 2003, p. 39). While Al Jazeera does 
offer a chance for a more global pluralism in U.S. and Canadian media, I argue it is an example 
of neoliberal contraflow. The transformations of the network in the process of reaching into 
North America highlight how contraflow is limited and conditioned by the larger commercial 
orientation of global communication flows.  
In the case studies of AJ’s North American distribution in the chapters that follow (four 
and five) I detail the Canadian and U.S. contexts of reception, focusing on debates in public 
discourse and the debates among invested stakeholders: major media companies, public-interest 
groups and state institutions of media governance. The funding model that blends governmental 
policy objectives with a journalistic mission, what I have called funding hybridity, was a central 
source of tension in these debates. Many stakeholders in decisions about the network’s 
distribution in North America questioned the professionalism of journalism produced by a state-
funded organization. But facile references to AJ’s state benefactor, Qatar, as evidence of 
“propaganda” ignores how the network synthesizes a non-commercial public mission with 
appeals for support through more commercial endeavors.  
Evaluating AJ requires examining the network’s strategic use of commercial models of 
revenue generation and commercial distribution firms. Here, I profile the larger Al Jazeera 
Media Network (AJMN) as a media enterprise in search of broader publics to highlight the mix 
of noncommercial and commercial strategies as the regional broadcaster moved to become the 
first “global” news network originating from the Middle East. Al Jazeera’s growth reflects the 
advancement of hybrid funding models that stem from the adaptation of state media operations to 
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the increasingly neoliberal context of production and distribution. Outlining the process of the 
network’s globalization, I argue the organizational changes of Al Jazeera reflect neoliberal 
contraflow defined in chapter one. The network’s accommodation of commercial demands in 
global expansion, a hallmark of what I call “neoliberal contraflow,” is most visible in Al 
Jazeera’s struggle to enter the United States. Al Jazeera’s strategy targeted American cable 
distribution despite the economic impediments and low prospects for near-term commercial 
returns. Like CCTV (see chapter three), Al Jazeera appears to function for diplomatic ends while 
engaging with an encompassing privatized and commercialized media environment. 
The chapter is arranged chronologically, documenting the early “regional” stage of Al 
Jazeera’s globalization and significant changes in the organization’s structure as it sought new 
markets. Since regulatory debate and oppositional activism discussed in the following chapters 
tended to focus on the AJ’s political bias, I devote space to criticisms of the network as a form of 
public diplomacy rather than traditional news as defined by North American norms. After 
discussing expansion strategies, I outline how Al Jazeera changed throughout the course of its 
entry into global news markets to compete with established commercial multinational media 
companies.  
Al Jazeera Arabic 
Launched in 1996 by Qatar’s ruling Al-Thani family following a bloodless coup put in 
motion by Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, the deposed leader’s son. The coup changed the 
direction of the wealthy microstate toward greater market liberalization and international 
ambitions (Seib, 2012, p. 8). Al Jazeera began as regional news programmer in Arabic with a US 
$137 million grant from the new Qatari government with forecasted annual grants of $100 
million. The creation of Al Jazeera Arabic (AJA) followed the dissolution of Qatar’s ministry of 
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information as part of a broad liberalization plan in both Qatar’s economic policy, opening newly 
accessible natural gas reserves to global markets, and Qatar’s attempt to represent the country as 
embracing domestic liberal reforms in terms of tolerance of critical journalistic voices.35 AJA 
broadcast from a nation of 1.7 million inhabitants, though foreigners with temporary status make 
up over three-fourths of the population (U.S. Department Of State, 2012). Despite this relatively 
small home market, the satellite reach of the network allowed the channel to quickly amass 50 
million viewers in the larger Arab world.  
AJA’s rapid rise was contingent on cultural and economic elements as well as changes in 
satellite media. As Shawn Powers (in Seib, 2012, p. 8) observes, AJA’s initial burst of growth 
stemmed from three factors: its journalistic mission and financial subsidies from Qatar, its hiring 
of professional journalists, and the access to C-band satellite transponder on the Saudi-owned 
Arabsat to reach satellite dish owners within the larger Middle-East. Historically, a sizable home 
market was essential for national media companies to create a base from which to grow into 
foreign markets (Flew, 2007; Tunstall, 2008b). Qatar’s small home market prevented this pattern 
of expansion. The combination of satellite distribution across national boundaries in the Middle-
East, the roughly unified linguistic market for news across these countries and Qatar’s 
willingness to fund production were essential elements that gave life to the broadcaster and 
provided the initial foundation for global expansion.   
Despite its financial reliance on an Arab state, the channel quickly gained a reputation for 
independence from state information ministries that had dominated Arab news production 
historically (Fandy, 2007). Qatar’s Sheikh Hamad himself endorsed the independence of Al 
                                                 
35 It should be noted that AJA was granted greater editorial freedom as a “liberal” journalistic organization while 
domestic media policy remained more tightly controlled. As a result, Qatari politics were not subject to the 
aggressive investigation and reporting that would plague neighboring authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. 
 83 
 
 
Jazeera a year after funneling money into the start-up, saying “[s]ome discomfort for government 
officials is a small price to pay for this new freedom” (Martin, 2002). The broadcaster spoke to a 
pan-Arab audience and, in the process, “rattled” authoritarian governments in the Middle East 
with western-liberal news practices (El-Nawawy & Iskandar, 2003; Miles, 2006), though Qatar’s 
domestic politics remained missing from the network’s otherwise critical coverage. Arab 
regimes, Morocco, Egypt and Saudi Arabia among them, banned the channel’s reporters, closed 
its bureaus and jammed its satellite signal (“Al Jazeera banned in Morocco,” 2008; Jager, 2008). 
The channel’s willingness to interview Israeli officials bolstered perceptions of AJA’s 
independence, but questions of political bias remained, causing Israel’s official press office to 
cut ties with the organization in 2008 as well (Toameh, 2008).  
Grants from Qatar provided a funding base for AJA’s early operations, but the 
broadcaster was “eager for ads,” according to the channel’s advertising manager, Foad Tawil. In 
2001, Al Jazeera had established business relationships with multinational companies such as 
General Motors Corp., Nissan Motor Co., Mitsubishi and Proctor & Gamble Co. Al Jazeera 
brought in $15 million in ad revenue in 2000, up from $3 million in 1998. Politically inspired 
boycotts by Arab advertisers cost the network an estimated $30 million and prevented the 
company from becoming financially autonomous from Qatar, a goal set for 2001 but postponed 
indefinitely as the network incurred new expenses with the launch of additional media services 
(Koranteng, 2001). 
AJA: Journalism as “weapon” 
AJA’s influence on regional politics exemplifies the media power Qatar possessed in 
subsidizing news for the Middle-East North African region (MENA). Al Jazeera is part of a more 
global trend toward the exercise of political power through media ownership as a means of 
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advancement in global politics and economics (Zayani, 2005, p. 14). Zayani observes how Arab 
“governments are ideologically inclined to more commercialization and privatization” and at 
once “they still conceive of media as a state-controlled public service” (2005, p. 15). Ibrahim 
Helal, former editor-in-chief, outlined how the Arabic channel functioned as political tool. “Al 
Jazeera is like the nuclear option. Its track record of causing trouble for Arab governments, and 
its record of mobilizing the Arab masses gives Qatar a weapon in its foreign relations. The 
implicit threat the channel represents gives Qatar an upper hand in political negotiations” (in 
Seib, 2012, p. 11).  
Throughout the Arabic broadcaster’s growth between 2001 and 2008, many 
commentators continued to link the station to regional politics, challenging AJA’s journalistic 
sincerity. As Olivier Da Lage (“The Politics of Al Jazeera or the Diplomacy of Doha,” 2005) has 
noted of the Arabic broadcaster, Al Jazeera performs a political service for its national sponsors, 
raising Qatar’s profile among neighboring powers like Saudi Arabia. “In the eyes of Sheikh 
Hamad who wants his small emirate to be promoted to the major leagues,” Da Lage notes, “Al 
Jazeera instantly found its place in the panoply of instruments designed to achieve such an 
objective” (“The Politics of Al Jazeera or the Diplomacy of Doha,” 2005, p. 55). Mamoun Fandy 
(2007) similarly emphasizes the network’s political role, pointing to the competition between Al 
Jazeera and rival Arab network Al-Arabiya36 as inextricably linked to the Qatari-Saudi rivalry. 
Leaked U.S. State Department Diplomatic cables also lend evidence to the channel’s usefulness 
to Qatar in regional politics. In 2010, Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani described his 
government’s attempt to pressure former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak to join 
                                                 
36 Al Arabiya is a Saudi-based, 24/7 free-to-air news and current affairs satellite channel. The network was launched 
with private investors, many of which were associated with Saudi royalty. Al Arabiya is often described as the 
alternative to Al Jazeera and a response on the part of the Saudi government to Al Jazeera’s popularity.  
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multinational talks on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If Mubarak would join Qatar in the 
negotiations, Al Thani said, “[w]e would stop Al Jazeera for a year,” (State Department 
Transcripts, 2010). Al Thani’s description portrays Al Jazeera as under the direct control of 
Qatar, using the network to put pressure on regional governments as a means to achieve foreign 
policy objectives. 
These comments position Al Jazeera as “weapon,” but different analysis suggests the 
relationship between AJA and Qatar’s regional power is more complicated. Sakr (“Challenger or 
lackey? The politics of news on Al-Jazeera,” 2007, p. 128) has questioned the view of Al Jazeera 
as mere instrument of Qatar’s political agenda, noting that Qatar would be expected to “play it 
safe” given its relative smallness compared to regional powers. Wessler and Adolphsen have 
claimed that “despite this ambiguous relationship to the Qatari government, the channel has 
“enjoyed an amount of editorial independence that is unusual for the region” even if this 
independence emerges more clearly in contexts outside Qatari borders (Wessler & Adolphsen, 
2008, p. 442).  
Differences of analysis are due to the fact that Al Jazeera’s political influence can be 
indirect. A Jerusalem Post interview with Dr. Mordechai Kedar, Israeli military intelligence 
official-turned-academic touches on this point. Commenting in 2008, Kedar said AJA’s “subtle” 
political leaning made the broadcaster an “Islamist mouthpiece channeling the message and 
philosophy of the Muslim Brotherhood.” He noted that the channel “grants Sheikh Yusuf al-
Qaradawi untold hours of airtime and his message is that of radical Islam” (Jager, 2008, para. 6). 
The goal of the Arabic broadcaster, he said, was to support “all organizations and movements 
that are anti-establishment” with the aim of getting . . . 
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. . . the Arab masses to focus their frustrations on their own dictators and rulers – 
Mubarak and Abbas for instance – and not on the Gulf sheikhs who are laughing 
all the way to the bank. So the station’s message is aimed at the man in the gutter. 
And the combination of radical Islam and championing the frustrated 
downtrodden and oppressed brings Al-Jazeera immense ratings. (Jager, 2008, 
para. 15) 
 
Kedar’s assessment is a fairly common complaint leveled against the network during 
early expansion that questions AJA’s journalistic integrity. Western journalistic ethics adopted 
by AJA contrasts with the view of the news organization as a political front for Qatari state 
interests, but these two faces of AJA are not mutually exclusive. The watchdog journalistic form 
adopted by Al Jazeera inserted a critical discursive space between the region’s governments and 
the governed and threatened official information control. The inherent threat of a pan-Arab 
independent news organization was at once a journalistic enterprise as well as an asset to Qatari 
state power. The formation of what Marc Lynch (2007) has called a “new Arab public” 
stemming from AJA’s ability to focus political attention on issues of importance to the region. 
Combined with the transnational reach of the network across boundaries of officially controlled 
media systems, Western-styled journalism was, in effect, marshaled as tool in Qatari 
international relations. 
Al Jazeera’s English News Ventures, News as Diplomacy: 
These questions of motivation carried over into Al Jazeera’s English-language ventures 
as the broadcaster gained prominence beyond the Middle East and began to develop news 
exchange relationships with Western organizations. Following the American-led invasion of 
Afghanistan in 2001, Al Jazeera was the only source for news in Kabul. The institutional 
expertise on the region and an established personnel infrastructure allowed the young network, 
then only four years in operation, to become a wellspring of on-location reporting. Where U.S. 
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news operations rushed correspondents to the region, Al Jazeera had maintained operations in 
Kabul and roots in the region to provide broad context, history and a deeper knowledge of 
political dynamics.  
Rebroadcasts of Al Jazeera’s coverage among U.S. news networks became commonplace 
as Al Jazeera sold repackaged news segments to organizations in Germany, India, Indonesia, 
Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. Such demand pushed network executives at Al 
Jazeera to speculate on a “market failure” for news in the West, planting the seeds for strategies 
of expansion into English-language news production (Seib, 2012, p. 11). By 2002, Al Jazeera 
was developing plans for the production of an English-language web portal, AlJazeera.net, to 
begin filling the apparent unmet demand. Signaling the early intention to expand into new 
markets, the network also entered into content buying contracts, purchasing 1,000 hours of 
documentary productions from BBC Worldwide, the commercial arm of the BBC (Malkani, 
2003). 
 Retransmission and an online presence as early forms of expansion into English-language 
markets had mixed success due to political responses within the U.S. Departing from U.S. news 
reporting that relied on official statements released by administration and military officials, Al 
Jazeera offered a view of the invasion from the perspective of civilians caught in warzones, 
creating disagreement over AJ’s framing of American policy in the region. The broadcast of 
Osama bin Laden’s taped announcements had eroded relations, leading high-level officials to 
accuse the network of airing propaganda and portraying the Arab broadcasts as an enemy 
communication containing coded messages (McGreal, 2009). As early as September 2001, the 
Pentagon had enlisted public affairs contractor Rendon Group to monitor Arab media and 
provide a “detailed content analysis of the station’s daily broadcast . . . [and] identify the biases 
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of specific journalists and potentially obtain an understanding of their allegiances, including the 
possibility of specific relationships and sponsorships” (Pew Research Center, 2006, para. 5).  
U.S. administration officials began pressuring the Qatari Emir to rein in the negative tone 
of the coverage. Then Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld publicly accused the network of 
airing Taliban propaganda and challenged the “professionalism” of the network. Rumsfeld 
proclaimed in press briefings that Al Jazeera showed “a pattern of not making judgments about 
the accuracy of propaganda” (Pew Research Center, 2006). In 2004, Rumsfeld suggested Al 
Jazeera was worked with “terrorists,” saying "[s]ometimes journalists just happen to be there [at 
the scene of civilian casualties]. But we know for a fact that other times the terrorists have told 
journalists - and I use the word inadvisedly [sic], quote unquote journalists - they've told 
journalists where they are going to be and what they're going to do. And the journalists have 
been there" (“Aljazeera slams Rumsfeld ‘terror’ slur,” 2004, para. 4). Hostility toward the 
channel became less rhetorical when, in November, US military forces fired missiles into AJ’s 
office in Kabul, Afghanistan, leading to speculation on the Bush Administration’s potential 
motives (Sullivan & Pincus, 2005). With Iraq in 2003, the network again became a focal point. 
Cabinet officials reiterated their attacks on the network. The 2004 State of the Union Address 
also maligned the network as a source of “hateful propaganda.” By the time the invasion was fait 
accompli, US forces had twice bombed broadcast facilities and held AJA cameraman Sami Al 
Hajj as an untried enemy combatant in Guantanamo Bay (Pew Research Center, 2006).  
Such consistent characterization of the network as enemy news source had tangible 
effects on its ability to gain ground in the United States. Newsgathering access and ad revenue 
dried up as a consequence of the tumultuous political atmosphere. Advertisers AOL and Yahoo 
quickly retracted advertising campaigns on the network. AJ reporters complained of difficulties 
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in finding willing interviewees. In response to coverage during the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, 
the New York Stock Exchange banned several Arab broadcasters from reporting on the trading 
floor. After the fall of Baghdad, the Iraqi interim government, under American leadership, 
suspended Al Jazeera reporters, further limiting the network’s newsgathering capabilities (Pew 
Research Center, 2006). Operational impediments followed. DataPipe and Akamai 
Technologies, media companies which had signed contracts to provide technical support and 
broadcast services, pulled out of agreements with the company. Day-to-day business was set 
back when insurance companies refused to offer policies to broadcasting staff. Al Jazeera’s 
Washington bureau lost office space when an American television production company nullified 
its agreement with the broadcaster. Al Jazeera’s online English portal also came under attack 
from hackers, redirecting traffic to porn sites or overwriting the channel’s homepage with 
messages like “Let Freedom Ring” to disrupt page viewing (Miles, 2006). These impediments 
forced a postponement of AlJazeera.net until later in 2003, but the network’s directors and its 
Qatari benefactors pushed forward with plans to develop a dedicated English-language channel 
with the hope that “the network could provide a bridge between the Arab world and the West,” in 
the words of Qatari emir (Sands, 2003). 
Al Jazeera English: competing for space in international news  
Scholarly and journalistic work taking shape during Al Jazeera’s move into English 
programming often uses bridging and connecting metaphors. El-Nawawy and Powers (2010), for 
instance, consider the channel “conciliatory media,” finding that AJE’s audiences exhibit a 
greater willingness to consider competing information claims in news. Examining retransmission 
of Arab satellite media, Wessler and Adolphsen challenge the bridge metaphor, deflating Arab 
media’s impact to “showing that a different (Arab) perspective on the [Iraq] war exists – rather 
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than actually infusing Western coverage with this different perspective” (2008, p. 458). Samuel-
Azran (2010) has similarly highlighted how mainstream US journalism conceded to 
governmental pressure to “reformat” Al Jazeera’s news and frame the channel as “deviant” for 
US audiences. Canadian scholars have also challenged the unique restrictions applied to AJA in 
the channel’s bid for carriage on Canadian satellite and cable systems in 2004 (Dakroury, 
2005a).   
Varying scholarly approaches to the network tend emphasize different aspects of Al 
Jazeera English and its funding structure. The divergence is instructive, pointing to the novelty of 
Al Jazeera and the news network’s tendency to defy easy categorization. A recent example from 
journalism studies (Kasmani, 2012), for example, examines AJE by asking to what degree global 
news markets are “competitive” for advertising revenue. After reviewing evidence from 
journalists and editors working for Al Jazeera English and the BBC World Service, the author 
concludes that international media competition for advertising revenue does not, as some argue, 
lead to homogenization of global news content. “The findings of this study further support the 
argument that the global news landscape . . . creates the environment for a multiplicity of ideas 
and plurality of news reporting” (Kasmani, 2012, p. 15). International relations analyses, by 
contrast, approach news organizations as political entities rather than with the assumptions of 
Western-styled commercial news “competition.” Accordingly, a political lens tends to dismiss 
the pursuit of profit. At best, commercial revenues are tangential to the political objectives of 
sponsor governments. In this vein, Philip Seib points out how the network is “the latest in a line 
of media ventures that have sought to use mass media to help establish a pan-Arab identity . . . .” 
(2008, p. 20). The “Al Jazeera Phenomenon” was more than competition for ad revenue, figuring 
more clearly into the history of media in the Middle-East.  
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Where questions about the competitive nature of global news arena can ignore news 
organizations as political investments, the analysis of AJ as a political animal can give too little 
weight to the market conditions in which they operate. Seib (2012, p. 191) has argued that 
commercial aspects of the Al Jazeera phenomenon should not preoccupy scholarship.  
The commercial possibilities of expanding into English are obvious: more 
audience means more advertising revenue. But given Al Jazeera’s emir-ensured 
financial security, the commercial aspects of expansion should not be overrated. 
Despite ‘Al Jazeera’ being one of the world’s most recognized brands, the 
organization’s expansion agenda was not primarily driven by expectations of 
profits . . . . Rather, a principal ambition of the Al Jazeera leadership is to change 
journalism, and by so doing change international politics. 
 
While Seib highlights the contribution Al Jazeera makes in “giving voice to the voiceless,” it 
remains essential to understand how such voices gain global circulation. Such examples of 
contraflow require examining the complicated relationship between transnational commercial 
media industries and state diplomatic machineries. A mix of motivations defines the global news 
media landscape, and ignoring the commercial aspects of entering the global marketplace in 
media risks overlooking important factors shaping the news organization. Analysis must consider 
these simultaneous functions of news production, its governmental objectives and commercial 
obligations, at the global scale. Al Jazeera’s development does point to the supportive role of 
state subsidy in news globalization, yet it is precisely the pronounced role of the state in enabling 
contraflow that underlines the necessity of engaging the commercial industries structuring 
expansion into global markets and the commercial logics that provide de facto governance of 
communication flows. Though the channel’s spokespersons often say “advertising revenues” are 
less important to the channel, commercial concerns are foisted on the channel in its search for 
English news markets. 
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At its 2006 launch, AJE could rely on a guaranteed two-year commitment from Qatar 
while it attracted viewers and advertisers to transition to a less dependent revenue model and 
eventual privatization (Johnson, 2006). A country with the landmass of Connecticut, Qatar has 
the third largest gas reserves in the world and rapidly growing foreign assets estimated the same 
year AJE launched to be near $30 billion. The Qatari government increased its financial prowess 
with strategic investments in additional energy sectors with Qatar Holding, the nation’s 
sovereign wealth fund (Scott, 2012). While specific amounts are not disclosed, industry 
observers estimate that Al Jazeera’s start-up capital had reached upward of $1 billion by 2009. 
The bulk of Al Jazeera’s non-state revenue during initial expansion derived from two sports 
channels launched in 2004 with 1.7 million subscribers paying $40 a year, bringing in $70 
million in addition to licensing fees for exclusive footage (Helman, 2009).  
AJE, originally dubbed Al Jazeera International, was part of broader network goals to 
enhance the channel’s position among international news providers. The network had set its 
sights on North American entry with a devoted 24-hour news channel in English. But entering 
the North American market meant competing with incumbent U.S. news providers for limited 
space in cable distribution. Matching major players in global news is daunting. During AJ’s 
initial push into English-language news markets, CNN had the largest infrastructure, employing 
close to 4000 worldwide. The network also boasted 46 bureaus, 33 situated abroad. Total 
operational expenses for CNN amounted to over $721 million in 2008, up from $654 million in 
2006 (Pew Research Center, 2009). BusinessWeek puts CNN’s annual budget for 2007 even 
higher at $856 million (Carlin, 2006). BBC World had a presence in markets of over 200 
countries, reaching 280 million homes (Gray, 2007). In 2009, the company outlined plans to 
achieve international visibility and position the network as to compete with major western news 
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organizations by 2012. Part of this vision was the growth of external bureaus to root reporting in 
local contexts (BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 2010a). By 2010, the network had developed the 
largest foreign bureau system with further plans to create channels in multiple languages beyond 
Arabic and English (BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 2010b).  
Competing with these incumbents in commercial markets necessitated organizational 
change outlined in the company’s vision for 2012, but it also meant engaging with profit-minded 
distributors, content providers and advertisers. Establishing a revenue base through the sale of 
airtime to advertisers requires a massive infusion of start-up capital, a sum capable of 
withstanding the early skepticism of the small number of global advertisers. “It sounds obvious,” 
a global marketing specialist commented regarding the surge of new entrants in 2007, “but 
advertisers will be wary of using the new channels until there is solid audience data to allow 
comparison with established channels” (Gray, 2007). Exacerbating these economic barriers, 
global news services must compete for a relatively select set of pan-regional and global 
advertising campaigns. Tim Riordan, television director at the largest pan-Arab broadcaster, 
MBC Group, complained that transnational networks have not been receiving the level of 
advertising they deserve, saying the advertising market “has to catch up with reality” (Akerman, 
2007).  
Entry into international news markets is difficult regardless of the particularities in 
regional origin. French-run France 24 began services the same year as AJE with a budget one-
eighth the size of CNN and faced similar uphill battles in establishing an advertising support 
model. As with AJE, France 24 is a mixed revenue model, drawing funding lines from both 
advertising and the French government. Even with former advertising CEO Alain de Pouzilhac at 
the helm, France 24 was projected to run at a loss of $100 million for years after launching 
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(Carlin, 2006). New entrants can expect a protracted period of ad revenue shortfall during the 
initial introduction of programming. 
The dissatisfaction fostered by the lack of regional representation in dominant Anglo-
American news provision offered AJ marketers a way to appeal to distributors outside the United 
States, creating markets from the disaffected. Network developers for Al Jazeera pitched the 
channel to nonwestern distributors with a tone of global populism.  Asian bureau chief, Derl 
McCrudden, for instance, described how AJ brings a “Southern” perspective. Where Western 
media “generally covers Asia through disasters, economic crises or stories with little substance, 
like technology, Al-Jazeera’s remit is to cover stories on the ground, week in and week out” 
(Choong, 2008, para. 17). Playing on the disparity in global representation, news directors 
advertised AJE’s editorial mission as rooted in the “philosophical south” (Gooch, 2008). Al 
Jazeera was to “cover the people – not just the powerful” (Anstey, 2007). Al Jazeera news 
staffers argued that completing the picture of world events can eventually compel other networks 
to give more time to developing regions by filling the silence on Africa, Asia and the Middle 
East (Malek, 2006). The English news service established two teams in Beijing with bureaus in 
Manila, Jakarta and Sydney (Gooch, 2008). Plans also included setting up bureaus in Zimbabwe, 
Egypt, Kenya, Ivory Coast, and South Africa (Bowman, 2006). Former managing director Nigel 
Parsons summed up AJE’s dedication to regionalism, saying “[w]e want Africans to file African 
stories and Latin Americans to cover stories in Latin America” (Johnson, 2006). 
Billing AJE’s transnational pedigree as a means to ferry the issues of the developing 
world onto a world stage brought AJE some initial marketing success. The network made inroads 
to Asia, reaching 110 million households a little over a year after launch. In 2008, the channel 
was granted distribution rights on Hong Kong cable systems and gained access to more than one 
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million viewers, bolstering its credibility with regional viewers by establishing an editorial 
branch based in Kuala Lumpur rather than filing reports through Doha, Washington or London 
(Choong, 2008).  
AJE’s journalistic mission was global in scope and sought to avoid mere replication of 
the Western journalistic form, according to journalists and directors working for the channel. 
Network planners suggested the channel was a substantially different model of news that 
explicitly challenged Anglo-American news frames. As then director of Al Jazeera Network 
described the channel the day it was launched in 2006: 
Al Jazeera today is an international media organization. Al Jazeera English will 
build on the pioneering spirit of Al Jazeera and will carry our media model to the 
entire world. This new channel will provide the same ground-breaking news and 
impartial and balanced journalism to the English-speaking world. (in Seib, 2012, 
p. 23) 
 
Though branding efforts and public statements of journalists differentiated Al Jazeera’s news 
from British and American outlets, the BBC and CNN served as models for the Al Jazeera 
Network as a whole. AJE was conceived as an international project designed to position Qatar as 
a regional media center engaged with both commercial and public-interest appeal (Khalaf, 2005).  
To achieve this international agenda, the U.S. was always a target market as was eventual 
privatization, initially considered in 2003. As AJE’s launch date drew closer in 2005, Qatar 
pushed plans to privatize the network, moving away from the governmental model of the BBC 
and toward the advertising model of CNN (Vedantam, 2005). Plans to transform the network into 
a shareholding company, initiated by the Qatari emir, were put forward in advance of AJE’s 
2006 launch as an answer to continuing pressure on the network from high-ranking U.S. 
officials. According to a senior Qatari official, new members of AJ’s editorial board were added 
to explore the best way to sell the media company. “We really have a headache,” the official 
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explained to the New York Times, “not just from the United States but from advertisers and from 
other countries as well” (Weisman, 2005, para. 3–4). Though privatization was sidelined until 
2011, Al Jazeera executives devised the privatization plan as a means to answer criticisms from 
political detractors in the United States and, at once, to attract more advertising revenue from 
“[t]he merchant families in control in the Persian Gulf [who] feel they cannot sustain their 
position if they are not part of the status quo” (Weisman, 2005, para. 21–23). Share sales in the 
Qatari stock exchange were to be available to Qatari citizens and members of the Gulf 
Cooperative Council with only minority shares available to those outside the GCC, but the 
prospect of “sale to the highest bidder” generated unease among the journalism staff 
(“Privatization of al-Jazeera,” 2005). 
Though this initial privatization scheme was scuttled, the channel made other moves to 
soften entry into North American markets with strategic hires to give the channel familiar 
western professional veneer. Senior British journalist David Frost joined the network in 2005. 
Josh Rushing, former U.S. marine in charge of communications at U.S. Central Command in 
Qatar, was also added to the list of correspondents to counter the impression that Al Jazeera 
represented narrow political interests in the Middle East. Network directors positioned AJE as 
answering a market failure to provide in-depth international news in the United States, but 
entering the competitive markets meant altering perceptions of the channel by transforming the 
regional broadcaster to address global audiences and U.S. audiences in particular. This involved 
adopting a new look more competitive with commercial news in the West with vivid color 
schemes, shorter talk shows and programs tailored to U.S. commercial markets (Khalaf, 2005). 
The cultural bridge Al Jazeera was to build would need to be constructed out of more than a 
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public-interest appeal. It would require transformations of the network to suit the needs of 
commercial interests of North America. 
AJE and new media distribution 
Failure to obtain traditional forms of distribution in the United States led the company to 
rely on digital distribution through Youtube and other new media video distribution platforms. 
The network’s mixed model allowed it to move in and out of media formats fluidly and engage 
new media distribution. In 2007, one year after the channel’s launch, AJE continued to have little 
success in entering the most coveted English markets in the United States but was supplying 
70,000 video clips per week to YouTube. Over 20,000 viewers in the United States paid $6 per 
month for online streaming of the full channel (Edgecliffe-Johnson, 2007). Al Jazeera’s new 
media strategist reflected at the time how “[p]art of our mission, our mandate is to get our news 
out. We don’t have the direct commercial pressures that others have. If we can make some 
money, that is great” (N. Cohen, 2009).  
Between 2009 and 2011, new media figured heavily into AJE’s early business plan for 
English markets that sought to establish an “interactive spirit” and reaching audiences. The use 
of new media gave AJE a stronger international presence even as it found cable distribution 
blocked. The channel offered video news feed services to leading British newspapers and mobile 
phone podcasts (BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 2009). Mobile application market development 
made both the Arabic and English programming available to Symbian and Windows phones 
worldwide (PR Newswire, 2009). Al Jazeera struck deals with IP software specialist, Global 
Digital Broadcast (GDBTV) as part of an online television package (M2 Presswire, 2009).   
Digital technology also allowed network planners to get a sense for interest in the 
channel. Three years after launch, sixty percent of AJE’s Internet traffic was from North 
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America, giving Al Jazeera administrators some means to persuade distributors concerned with 
market demand (Helman, 2009). During three weeks of the intensified Palestinian-Israeli combat 
in 2009, Al Jazeera parlayed its broadcasting operations into YouTube and Twitter feeds to meet 
the demand for information on the conflict in U.S. cable markets that had not carried the channel. 
Broadcasting via the online distribution platform Livestation, AJ’s online audience for Gaza 
coverage increased 500%. These statistics are more impressive during the 2011 Arab Spring 
during which traffic to the English site increased 2500% (Stelter, 2011). The news organization’s 
coverage of the Arab Spring spurred its social media campaigns, pushing the network’s 
Facebook following to over 400,000 and 240,000 on Twitter (Edgecliffe-Johnson, 2011, para. 9). 
Digital distribution strategies did not lead to early successes in more traditional forms of 
distribution in the United States. Upon AJE’s launch, the network hoped to have 40 million 
homes lined up. Exceeding their benchmark, AJE launched with a base of 80 million viewers, 
none in the United States. After spending tens of millions to build high-definition broadcast 
facilities in the United States, Britain, Qatar and Malaysia, AJE found cable and satellite 
providers in the most lucrative global markets reluctant to bring the channel into their packages. 
The apparent aversion to new international news providers prompted one industry observer to 
blame the “xenophobic giant media companies that control what this seemingly parochial nation 
watches or, in this case, does not watch on television” (Paskowski, 2006). Commenting on the 
barriers to new networks gaining U.S. distribution, Cathy Rasenberger, a cable consultant that 
assists new networks, described the attitude of distributors during Al Jazeera’s expansion. “In 
general, operators have never been less interested in launching new networks, as they have 
neither the bandwidth nor the margins to absorb them.” “Moreover,” Rasenberger observed, 
“operators argue that there are no remaining underserved audiences on TV, and that new video 
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product will not help them move the dial versus the competition” (Poggi, 2013, para. 3). The lack 
of commercial incentives to bring Al Jazeera programming to U.S. television consumers became 
a source of debate as political unrest in Egypt forced U.S. networks to seek out Al Jazeera 
footage and expertise on the region. 
Al Jazeera’s Arab Spring “moment” 
Al Jazeera’s news efforts in North America moved into the public spotlight once again in 
early 2011 as Egyptian protests began to attract the attention of Western news outlets. As unrest 
in President Mubarak’s Egypt garnered attention in U.S. media, the limited resources of news 
organizations in the global north became apparent once again with a heavy reliance on the 
network’s footage of protests. Mainstream U.S. journalists began to publicly recognize the 
network’s indispensable role in documenting Egyptian public resistance. ABC’s Sam Donaldson 
underlined the reliance on AJ for ground-level coverage within Egypt: 
Talk about propaganda for Al-Jazeera. Thank you for what you’re doing. People 
say Al Jazeera fanned the flames here by bringing the fact that democracy is in 
existence and that people are being suppressed. That’s what we need. We need 
more communication in the world. It’s not Al Jazeera’s fault that Mubarak is 
under siege now. (Amanpour, 2011) 
 
The channel’s image in the United States was changing in substantial ways. Beyond the relay of 
images from Tahrir square, popular press accounts credited AJ with being a force for political 
liberalization in Arab national politics and an essential information source for Americans.  
AJE’s “blackout” in the U.S. became more glaring with the Egyptian revolution. Report 
after report showed the Al Jazeera logo emblazoned in the corner of images streaming out of 
Egypt’s Tahrir Square into U.S. homes. Frank Rich, writing in the New York Times, compared 
AJE’s absence to the information jamming efforts of the Soviet bloc in the postwar period. 
“You’d almost think these news-starved Americans were Iron Curtain citizens clandestinely 
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trying to pull in the jammed Voice of America signal in the 1950s . . .” (Rich, 2011, para. 12). As 
an indication of Al Jazeera’s changing image in United States public discourse, then Secretary of 
State Hilary Clinton criticized U.S. news companies by way of appreciating Al Jazeera. 
"Viewership of Al Jazeera is going up in the United States because it's real news." Clinton went 
on, adding "[y]ou may not agree with it, but you feel like you're getting real news around the 
clock instead of a million commercials and, you know, arguments between talking heads and the 
kind of stuff that we do on our news which, you know, is not particularly informative to us, let 
alone foreigners" (Maher & Corcoran, 2011, para. 3). 
Commentators began to speculate on “Al Jazeera’s moment,” anticipating a change in the 
popular regard for the channel that might allow the network access to the lucrative U.S. market 
and increase the channel’s appeal to commercial gatekeepers in the United States. Researchers 
Youmans and Brown (2011, p. 6) sought to test the potential for AJE to overcome public 
prejudices in the United States. Their survey findings showed that U.S. news consumers tended 
to judge the message by the messenger: 
The perception of AJE as biased is robust among American viewers in general, 
and especially among those politically conservative and suspicious of Arabs. We 
found that the same news segment that boosted evaluations of CNNI when 
attributed to that network had no impact on the generally negative evaluations of 
AJE, even though it originally aired on AJE. Since these perceptions correlate 
highly with the more deeply held constructs of political ideology and prejudice, 
this “moment” is, at best, limited to a willingly receptive portion of the country. 
 
This kind of work on audience attitudes provides valuable insights on perceptions of the 
network, but the importance of public perception can be exaggerated as a main barrier preventing 
the network from establishing itself in media markets. Market access that might be granted to Al 
Jazeera had less to do with individual prejudices or negative public perceptions. Indeed, U.S. 
cable companies have long been criticized for ignoring consumer interest in purchasing programs 
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individually, the “a la carte programming” option. Instead, cable and satellite firms have insisted 
on maintaining the tiered multichannel bundles that necessitate buying programming in which 
media consumers have little or no interest while also providing the sole source of high-speed 
internet access in de facto monopoly market conditions (Crawford, 2013). AJ’s vaunted non-
commercialism, often cited as a means to distinguish the channel from commercial competition, 
is limited by the need to engage with mainstream distributors whose commercial interests restrict 
AJ’s ability to remain autonomous from influences of market power.37 
Al Jazeera’s “moment” in 2011 did not immediately translate into distribution deals with 
major U.S. distributors despite indications of consumer interest and the good press. But new 
media vehicles for programming served a long-term strategy. Absent on U.S. television, the 
English-language website received over 66 million visits in April of 2011, 42% from the United 
States (Hampp, 2011). This and similar surges in traffic to AJ’s online news indicated a 
successful campaign to build audiences before courting advertisers and distributors. Adrian 
Smith, international account director for the ad-buying company Mediacom U.K., noted how 
AJE appeared less interested in acquiring advertising contracts. “They don’t go out very hard- 
they’re not sending fliers out or coming around knocking on the door saying you should be 
advertising on Al-Jazeera.” AJE Managing Director, Al Anstey, outlined how this soft push for 
advertising contracts dovetailed with the organization’s mission: “[i]t’s not about revenue for us; 
it’s about getting our journalism to as many people as possible. Yes, we do advertise on the 
channel, we do look for revenue opportunities. But that is not the driving force” (Hampp, 2011, 
para. 2–3). While AJE maintained a tepid relationship with advertisers in English, the Arabic 
                                                 
37 For example, conditions attached to Al Jazeera distribution with cable companies required limiting online content 
availability to push news users toward viewing patterns though more profitable. 
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channel had begun to develop a more robust advertising revenue stream. By 2010, ad buys across 
the network’s Arabic channels reached near $650 million, only $29 million of those revenues 
coming from the English news channel (Hampp, 2011, para. 8). 
Multinational channel expansion and privatization  
Al Jazeera is often discussed on a channel-by-channel basis with little consideration of 
the company’s expansion into multiple regional and language markets with a broad range of 
programming (see Table 4). These forms of expansion involve strategic investments beyond 
news and public affairs. The company has developed channel bundles with production in 
children’s programming (Al Jazeera Children’s Channel), sports broadcasting rights (Al Jazeera 
Sports/beIn Sports) and documentaries (Al Jazeera Documentary).  
Table 4: Global Expansion of the Al Jazeera Media Network (AJMN), 1996-2014 
AJMN Channel Launch Year Content/Scope Ownership/Funding 
Al Jazeera Arabic (AJA) 1996 News: Regional-
geolinguistic; Arabic 
Language 
Qatari Government 
Grants 
Al Jazeera Sports 
(renamed beIn Sports 
Arabia in 2013) 
2004      
2008      
2009      
2012 
Entertainment: Regional; 
Arabic, French, English 
Languages 
Qatar Sports 
Investments, Turner 
Broadcasting System 
Al Jazeera Mubasher 2005 Public Affairs Programming: 
Regional/Egypt; Arabic 
Language 
Qatari Government; 
Public Entity 
Al Jazeera English (AJE) 2006 News: Geolinguistic; English 
Language 
Qatari Government 
Grants 
Al Jazeera Documentary 2007 Information: Regional-
geolinguistic; Arabic 
Qatari Government 
Grants 
Al Jazeera Balkans  2011 News: Regional; Bosnian, 
Croatian, Serbian Languages 
Qatari Government 
Grants 
Al Jazeera America 
(AJAM) 
2013 News: Regional; English 
Language 
Qatari Government 
Grants/Advertising 
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Al Jazeera Sports (renamed beIN Sports to remain consistent in multinational branding) 
is the most clearly commercial arm of the network and represents an aggressive courtship of 
foreign markets. The diversification of the company’s content portfolio (in partnerships with 
established transnational media firms like Turner Broadcasting Systems, co-investors in Al 
Jazeera Sports) illustrates investment patterns that position the network to make gains in both 
advertising contracts and foreign distribution. In 2011, Al Jazeera Sports made a bid to acquire 
the Orange Sport channel from France Telecom after agreeing to pay US $126.5 million a year 
for the right to broadcast matches over four seasons (Cherian, 2011). In 2013, Al Jazeera Sports 
bought exclusive MENA broadcasting rights to the Union of European Football Associations 
championships for years 2015-2018. The network used the content as a base for three additional 
sport channel launches (“Al Jazeera in exclusive deal for UEFA rights,” 2013). In a move that 
positions the network as the sole means for U.S. distributors to air high-demand games, the 
network acquired U.S. broadcasting rights for several tournaments that had been owned by three 
different North American distributors, GolTV, Univision and Fox Soccer (Reynolds, 2012). In 
addition to acquiring rights to Europe’s top soccer, the network purchased rights to the U.S. 
national soccer team’s 2014 World Cup qualifying matches. Al Jazeera Sports reportedly spent 
double the amount GolTV had paid for comparable programming and paid Comcast for carriage 
to the cable operator’s 22 million subscribers (Belson, 2012). Such lavish spending created a 
range of content holdings, 1300 live soccer matches annually, and created base for launching two 
U.S. soccer channels in both English and Spanish languages. 
These sports acquisitions coincided with Al Jazeera’s legal restructuring in 2011 
following Emir Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani’s ratification of Law 10/2011 in May. The 
law renamed the company the “Al Jazeera Media Network” and shifted the broadcaster’s formal 
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definition from a “public entity” to a “private organization devoted to public interest” (Toumi, 
2011). AJMN’s directors stated that the move was made to give administrative and editorial 
flexibility needed for continued global expansion plans, including entry into new linguistic 
markets with Al Jazeera Balkans, Al Jazeera Turkey and Al Jazeera Swahili. The legal 
redefinition also restructured the company to be better suited for private shareholders.  
Despite the official statements in the wake of the company’s change in legal identity, the 
reasons for the move remained opaque, raising questions for media reporters and editors in the 
region. Khalid Al Sayed, editor at The Peninsula, questioned the desire for “flexibility” since it 
was clear that Al Jazeera already had the freedom to report on controversial issues outside of 
Qatar. The terms of the transformation, he observed, lacked clarity: “. . . how can a media outlet 
become a ‘public utility’?” Al Sayed asked about the change, “[a]nd how will Qatar as a nation 
benefit from this public utility?” (Toumi, 2011, para. 15).  
What is clear is that some of the “flexibility” afforded by the move was part of a strategic 
initiative put in place by the network’s board of directors to position the company in markets 
beyond satellite television services. Reports in the Saudi newspaper, Al Sharq, indicated that the 
redefinition was “necessary for Al-Jazeera to keep pace with the tremendous development of 
information services worldwide” (Forrester, 2011, para. 5). As a “media network,” AJ sought to 
expand into new technological ventures focused on new media platforms and mobile phone 
services. The transformation into AJMN was designed to broaden Al Jazeera’s financial base 
through opening to investors and thus create a network of support among wealthier constituents 
in the Middle East. This would, first, dampen objections to the network that had inspired 
advertising boycotts ten years earlier. Broadening the investor base would also provide a 
counterpoint to those who claimed AJ was only a cloaked mouthpiece for Qatari foreign policy. 
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In 2013, having struggled for nearly a decade to entry the U.S. market, AJMN purchased 
the commercially unsuccessful Current TV for $500 million. Current TV was valuable to the 
network because of the carriage deals Current had previously established with major U.S. 
distributors (L. B. Baker & Lauria, 2013). Rather than placing AJE in this spot as many industry 
observers had expected, AJMN chose to develop an entirely new channel, Al Jazeera America 
(AJAM), recruiting U.S. news anchors from established commercial operators (Thielman, 
2013b).  
But the transition from AJE to AJAM also showed signs of Al Jazeera’s capitulation to 
the needs of U.S. commercial distributors. As part of the noncommercial virtue AJ often featured 
as a distinction from commercial news networks, network directors had promised to treat online 
and cable news users equally. This public-interest philosophy of unfettered access and wide 
dissemination of its news product was put aside as a concession to U.S. commercial distributors 
that sought to avoid duplicating programming online and undermining the draw to exclusive 
cable content. The network’s online streaming of AJE went dark in an apparent change of the 
network’s public-access policy (Stelter, 2013). One journalist for AJE commented that “[i]t’s a 
form of corporate censorship that would make the Chinese Politburo jealous. And an incredible 
show of disrespect to all the reporters operating in the U.S. who have helped build Al Jazeera’s 
brand name in this country.” Al Jazeera’s new distribution deals meant recognizing the financial 
needs of American companies who had an interest in redirecting traffic to the more potentially 
profitable cable channel. Though new media platforms had been a means to get AJ news to 
North American audiences, full integration of the channel in U.S. market entailed limiting online 
access in line with the commercial needs of distributors.   
Conclusions: Neoliberal contraflow as global pluralism? 
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Despite many disputes about the validity of such criticisms it seems irrefutable 
that ‘free flow’ between the strong and the weak, the haves and the havenots, has 
had undesirable consequences for the latter, and hence at the international level 
for the developing countries.  
-the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems 
(Problems, 1980 [2003], p. 141) 
 
I introduced this chapter by suggesting contemporary contraflow could be understood in 
the context of NWICO’s 1970 activism for equality in flows of information. AJ clearly 
represents greater equality but deviates from NWICO’s vision of supranational regulatory power 
to achieve greater parity in global communication. Rather, AJMN illustrates how greater 
communication power is achieved through rather than in spite of an increasingly commercialized 
and “deregulated” global communication environment. The reversal of global flows represented 
by AJMN should be viewed in the context of how this form of contraflow takes place by 
embracing rather than resisting the larger neoliberal structures of communication governance 
(see chapter 1). Al Jazeera’s expansion into foreign markets and the company’s development of 
multinational channel bundles suggests that AJMN does not challenge the fundamental 
commercial configuration of global flows. Instead, the network’s globalization entailed 
organizational change from the regional “Al Jazeera Arabic” in 1996 to the global “Al Jazeera 
Media Network” in 2011 that significant investment in the dominant commercial environment of 
global media production and circulation. These changes facilitated the development of 
multinational commercial channels and the accommodation of structures governing global media 
that produce power asymmetries which undermine structural parity in global flows. While Al 
Jazeera presents an opportunity for greater diversity in global flows, the funding model that 
undergirds its success illustrates how international flows of news remain defined by a pay-to-
play dynamic. 
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Straubhaar and Duarte (2005) propose a theory of how global media firms go about 
localizing commercial products for foreign audiences. According to the theory, foreign firms 
increase their levels of commitment to markets by ramping up expenditures to adapt media 
products to local markets. The four stages they identify are: 
1. Changes in the original media product to appear local 
2. The use of local languages 
3. Employment of local talent in management and production 
4. The diversification of geographically broad satellite feeds to reflect subregional markets 
It is interesting to note how well theory developed observing commercial multinational media 
firms fits the most visible example of contraflow four decades after the International 
Commission for the Study of Communication Problems issued the UNESCO report. Though 
these examples were derived from examples like Star TV in Asia and Sky Latin America, the 
evolution of Al Jazeera from insurgent Arabic news programmer into the Al Jazeera Media 
Network suggests certain forms of contraflow stem from accommodation of commercial 
mechanisms. This form of localization and the public relations branding blitz portraying Al 
Jazeera as “oppositional” raise concerns about the potential loss of the independence trumpeted 
by advocates for diversified flows of news. The prevailing model of media economics imposes 
limits to pluralism and the multidirectionality of flows in global news, and these limits should 
not be obscured by the appearance of pluralism allowed under neoliberal forms of media 
governance. 
Researchers have described the hybridity of the funding model as one of AJMN’s 
strengths. Shawn Powers, for instance, describes Al Jazeera English as having the best of both 
worlds in being open to commercial revenues while making use of Qatari sponsors. Speaking of 
Al Jazeera English, he writes, 
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. . . AJE’s ability to generate support, both from its host government and from its 
journalists and audiences around the world, allows the channel to never be 
beholden to any single constituent, like the BBC is to the British Parliament and 
CNN is to its stockholders . . . the hybrid model of public and private, quasi-
governmental international broadcaster, and quasi-voice of the voiceless that 
enables AJE to operate successfully in today’s complex environment. Its ability to 
draw interest and support from a range of constituents, from educated American 
elite to Arab autocrats, provides the channel with the capacity to operate between, 
rather than depend on, market forces and geopolitical interests. (Seib, 2012, p. 25) 
 
An alternative view of Al Jazeera’s expansion frames the pressures in Al Jazeera hybrid funding 
model as a reflection of the communication policy environment that governs flows of news. 
Putting aside the common questions of Al Jazeera’s reliance on either political and commercial 
influences, AJMN’s reliance on a wealthy state  as an agent of contraflow points to the enduring 
asymmetry of global communication in news. Al Jazeera’s eventual entry into the United States 
and its growth as a multinational media organization underlines the absence of structural means 
to achieve more genuine perspective pluralism at the global scale. While royal benefactors may 
facilitate a reversal in global communication flows, detailing the hybrid techniques for expansion 
serves to point out the depth of inequality in neoliberal governance of global communication. 
Not all examples of contraflow will have equal opportunity. Due to this larger context of media 
governance, significant examples of contraflow like Al Jazeera remain subject to both 
geopolitical inclinations of wealthy states and market forces.  
Indeed, examples like Al Jazeera and CCTV illustrate how the commercial aspects of 
global communication flows and national policies that foster concentrated commercial power in, 
for instance, distribution industries, require such massive expenses that “contraflow” in the 
United States will likely be limited to those with the means to pay for access and maintain 
operations without regard for economic sustainability. Given this relationship between emerging 
voices in global news and the political economy of international communication flows in the 
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United States, what is the true prospect for broad-based and public-spirited international 
journalism? With this question in mind, I turn to my parallel account of CCTV as a foreign 
broadcaster seeking distribution in North America. 
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Chapter 3 
Neoliberal Contraflow: China Central Television’s hybrid funding techniques 
Chapter abstract: I argue that China is an example of a hybrid funding model common to 
emerging players in global news seeking North American news audiences. CCTV exemplifies 
neoliberal contraflow, defined as media originating in the Global South that engage in public-
private partnerships as state-supported media function in concert with major commercial firms 
involved in transnational media markets. To discuss China’s move into global media markets, I 
document CCTV’s relationship to national and transnational advertisers. As a domestic media 
producer, CCTV functioned as a gatekeeper to the growing Chinese consumer economy. I then 
discuss the growth of CCTV’s foreign output stemming from the transformation of the domestic 
media company to a more transnational and commercial footing by partnering with foreign 
media firms. Ultimately, I argue that the blending of state and commercial sources of revenue is 
a defining feature of news contraflow production and distribution in North America.  
 
. . . just as it is no longer, if it ever was, 
constructive to discuss whether the Chinese 
economy is moving toward the American model 
at a time when the two economies are so closely 
intertwined and when the ‘actually existing 
American model’ has encountered such a 
profound crisis, it will be illuminating not only to 
compare national media systems within the 
confines of national political economies and 
cultures but also to study the dynamics of 
hybridization and contestation between different 
media systems and political cultures. 
-Y. Zhao, 2012, p. 173 
 
[China] will grow its own Time Warner. We at 
Turner want to, and will continue to be, part of 
that transformation.  
-Steve Marcopoto, president Turner 
Broadcasting System Asia Pacific  
 
Multinational marketers ironically owe a debt of 
gratitude to one of the most famous Communists 
in history, Mao Tse-tung.  
-Advertising Age 
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Introduction 
The Advertising Age sentiment that marketers in China owe Mao Tse-tung “a debt of 
gratitude” captures the ironies stemming from recent changes in global news media (Madden, 
2006a). Why would advertisers, the circulatory engine of capitalist consumer culture, praise 
Mao? In the context of Advertising Age, such praise has a clearly ironic ring. Mao’s anti-
capitalist mission relied on the power of media as a tool of mass political persuasion. Party 
policies led to national subsidies for the diffusion of media into even poverty-stricken and rural 
parts of China. The modern network, grown with a similar nation-building mandate, now proves 
a boon to marketers seeking to reach what was in 2010 395 million television households, 95% 
of the population (Landreth, 2010). Such comments from the advertising industry serve to 
emphasize the confluence of state policy and commercial industry in contemporary China. The 
interpenetration of capital and state resources is a defining feature of China’s ascension to the 
World Trade Organization in 2001 and the simultaneous internationalizing news network CCTV.  
Government initiatives were the source of the earliest international broadcasting systems, 
from technology engineering standards to regulatory conditions necessary for signal non-
interference (Bumpus & Skelt, 1984; Wood, 1994). CCTV is not a unique example of 
government funding in the proliferation of foreign news (Cushion, 2010; D. K. Thussu, 2007). 
Many emerging global news networks mix these funding resources to rely on seek commercial 
revenue sources and maintain substantial government/public funds for growth and expansion. As 
an example of contraflow in global media circulation, China has transformed its state broadcaster 
into a revenue-generating media company with strong links to national and transnational 
advertising companies. While government funding has been withdrawn, structural regulation 
 112 
 
 
keeps CCTV in a central position domestically and enables its expansion overseas in important 
ways.  
This chapter documents the funding techniques that support the extension of CCTV into 
foreign markets. Based on the relationships CCTV develops with private transnational media 
firms between 1995 and 2012, I attribute China’s ability to implement its “going abroad” policy 
shift toward soft power to the commercial value of the Chinese domestic population. Strategic 
partnerships with private capital are examples of the “marketing mechanisms” emphasized by 
Chinese leaders in 2003 as a component of expanding China’s media presence overseas (Xinhua, 
2003). The relationship between government media and global ad spending plays an expanding 
role in international news contraflow, and CCTV’s relationship to Western-styled private media 
companies has helped define the global media landscape.  
CCTV’s evolution as a news organization animated by both political and commercial 
incentives exemplifies what I call neoliberal contraflow. I outline the public-private relationships 
bringing life to China’s foreign media industry to provide background for the discussion of the 
network’s move into North America in the chapters that follow (chapters 4 and 5). Opponents of 
Chinese media protest the funding sources and challenge independence in regulatory debates 
over foreign broadcasters entering North America. In both the United States and Canada, media 
activists have rejected CCTV as propaganda. CCTV, opposition argued before regulators, did not 
comply with North American standards of objectivity, balance, and impartiality. Funding sources 
served to impugn CCTV.  
The methods of production and, more importantly, the perception of the geopolitical 
motivations for production becomes important to public-interest organizations involved in 
regulating media flows into North American contexts. As such, detailing the hybrid funding 
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model sets up my examination of the public activism that erupted in response to the Canadian 
government’s policies regarding foreign media entry. Despite significant mobilization and media 
activism by media activists in Canadian politics, China’s extension of soft power into the 
Canadian regulated system was largely successful in terms of gaining distribution as discussed in 
chapter five.  
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the model of media production and international 
distribution with a focus on how it is financed. China’s integration with global market capitalism 
is a cornerstone of this process. Chinese media is viewed as a profit vehicle in Western industry 
and business literature analyzing China’s markets. After outlining views of Chinese media 
markets, I briefly summarize the recent history of CCTV’s integration with international 
commercial media firms. I then highlight some of CCTV’s characteristics that present challenges 
for North American media activists and regulators. Finally, I review the turn to soft power, what 
has been called the “Going abroad” project, a policy meant to “bridge the gap between China’s 
strong economy and its still weak media influence abroad” (Xin, 2012, p. 2). The policy has 
pushed CCTV, among other state media producers, to expand with overseas audiences in mind.  
CCTV’s Reorganization for Ad Revenue and Social Control 
Even when trying to look beyond superficial contradictions, 
the ironies of China’s mixed economic model are hard to ignore. 
Take, for instance, the pay-to-play media culture riding the 
coattails of China’s long economic boom. In 2012, flattering 
coverage of a company in the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 
official newspaper costs $1 per Chinese character. International  
CCTV Organizational 
Profile (self-reported 
2012)  
• 42 Channels 
inside China 
• 7 Channels 
outside China; 6 
languages 
• 13,000+ 
employees  
• 140 countries 
• 150 million 
subscribers 
• 50 foreign 
bureaus 
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executives hoping to generate buzz about their company’s plans to partner with Chinese firms or 
introduce products to Chinese markets can secure an interview on CCTV at a rate of $4,000 a 
minute. These are publicized rates, cited by global public relations firms and Chinese media 
outlets despite the practice being considered a form of bribery by the Chinese authorities 
(Barboza, 2012).38  
Table 5: Global Expansion of China Central Television, 1996-2014 
CCTV Channel Launch Year Content/Footprint/Language Ownership/Funding 
CCTV-1 (General) 
Originally “Peking 
Television” 
1958 
Renamed 
CCTV in 
1978 
News, Drama 
Regional: China, Hong Kong, 
Macau, Taiwan  
Chinese Language 
China Central 
Television 
CCTV-2 (Finance)  1963 Financial and consumer news 
and entertainment 
China Central 
Television 
CCTV-3 (Arts and 
Entertainment)  
1969 Arts programming 
National: China 
China Central 
Television 
CCTV-4 (International 
Chinese) 
1992 News 
International: Asia, Europe, 
America subdivisions 
Mandarin 
China Central 
Television 
CCTV-5 (Sports) 1995 Sports programming and 
news 
National: China 
China Central 
Television 
CCTV-5+ (Sport Plus) 2008  China Central 
Television 
CCTV-6 (Movie)  1996  China Central 
Television 
CCTV-7 (Military and 
Agriculture)  
1995 Military and Agricultural 
National: China 
Chinese 
China Central 
Television 
CCTV-8 (TV series) 1994 Television Drama 
National: China 
Chinese 
China Central 
Television 
CCTV-9 (Documentary) 
National and 
International 
2011 Documentaries 
National and International 
Mandarin, English 
China Central 
Television 
                                                 
38 Though the legalities remain undefined due to lax enforcement, paying for coverage in this way can be considered 
bribing a government official since most journalists work for organizations controlled by the state, making it subject 
to Chinese anti-corruption law as well as the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.  
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Table 5 (cont.) 
CCTV-10 (Science and 
Education) 
2001 Science and Education 
National: China 
Imported and local 
productions 
China Central 
Television 
CCTV-11 (Chinese 
Opera) 
1998 Opera 
National: China 
China Central 
Television 
CCTV-12 (Society and 
Law) 
2004  China Central 
Television 
CCTV-13 (News) 1998 News 
Mandarin 
National and International 
China Central 
Television 
CCTV-14 (Children)  2003 Children’s programming 
National: China 
Chinese 
China Central 
Television 
CCTV-15 (Music) 2004 Music programming China Central 
Television 
CCTV-News 
(International English) 
2000 News for foreign audiences 
English 
International (“worldwide”) 
China Central 
Television 
CCTV-Español 
(International Spanish) 
2007 News for foreign audiences 
International 
Spanish 
China Central 
Television 
CCTV-Français 
(International French) 
2007 News for foreign audiences 
International 
French 
China Central 
Television 
CCTV-ةــــــ يبرعلا 
(International Arabic) 
2009 News for foreign audiences 
International 
Arabic 
China Central 
Television 
CCTV-Pусский 
(International Russian) 
2009 News for foreign audiences 
International 
Russian 
China Central 
Television 
CCTV America 2012 News for foreign audiences 
National: US 
English 
China Central 
Television 
CCTV Africa 2012 News for foreign audiences 
International 
English 
China Central 
Television 
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These features of China’s media system are representative of the broader transformations 
rooted in the opening of China’s economy to the global market. 39 China’s rise, particularly 
changes in the late 1990s and early 2000s, should be situated in this larger context. Dan Schiller 
(2005, p. 88), for instance, casts these transformations as one component of the “structural 
reconfiguration of transnational capitalism” in general. Investors and policymakers alike view 
China and its information sectors as “poles of growth” for the global political economy while 
Chinese policymakers “attempt to secure advantages for domestic capital as [China’s] 
representatives broker (often venally) transnational corporate access to the country’s great 
reserves of cheap labor power and to its expanding domestic market.”  
I emphasize two consequences of this reconfiguration to frame the development of CCTV 
as an international, state-owned media company. The first is CCTV’s usefulness as a point of 
control for Chinese media officials who manage transnational corporate access to the domestic 
population. The second is the renewed importance of gaining a foothold in national media 
markets of major trading partners through news and cultural broadcasting. CCTV’s expansion 
overseas is an investment in maintaining public opinion in strategic national settings from which 
massive foreign direct investment flows. For many transnational media firms looking in, China 
continues to be seen as the means of global growth. China can absorb production surplus in a 
variety of economic sectors. CCTV has the dual function of gatekeeper to this consuming public 
and means of conditioning public opinion domestically as well as in foreign settings.  
China’s strategic embrace of market mechanisms has had noteworthy consequences for 
the role of media within China. Yuezhi Zhao (2012, p. 157) has observed how party organ 
                                                 
39 The “opening” of the Chinese economy beginning in 1978 also saw the restructuring and renaming of China’s 
national television network. Established as Beijing Television in 1958, the renaming as CCTV accompanied the 
more general shift toward market measurements and an emphasis on financial self-sustainability.  
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publications became a means for the CCP to communicate among upper-level leadership, 
making the post-Mao era papers function like the elite press in the West. The relationship 
between elite economic power and news production in China (see Zhao, 2012, p. 163) draws 
attention to the broader economic transformations since reforms began in 1978. Xinhua, despite 
early failed attempts at autonomy from government subsidy, has raised the status of its business 
division, suggesting “that the Chinese news agency has taken the notion of the market very 
seriously, and commercial activities are now seen as just as important as Party journalism, if not 
more so” (Xin, 2012, p. 136). Advertising and marketing in China have become a means of 
growth and a sustaining economic source for media at large.  
A brief review of changes in the Chinese media landscape since the introduction of 
market reforms outlines some of the characteristics of the hybrid funding model and its 
expression in China. The hybrid funding model represented by CCTV has had its national and 
now international growth sustained by the selective engagement with market forces and the 
national “natural resource” of a massive population of attractive consumers.  
The rise of China as an economic, political, and military power has coincided with the 
China’s growing initiative in global telecommunication infrastructure, hardware, and content. 
This initiative involves forging transnational economic relationships around, among other things, 
advertising practices (D. Schiller, 2005). China’s incorporation of market strategies across 
communication sectors is a clear trend but remains selective. The  reform era in China led to 
liberalization of media and telecommunications while maintaining a “fortified regime of political 
control and state capacity building in the management of these systems and increased 
commodification of services” (Zhao, 2008, p. 29). Economic reform of Chinese culture 
industries has prompted the state to view the systematic development of the sector as a tool in the 
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pursuit of economic and cultural power in global settings as well as the management of domestic 
political conditions. The projection of Chinese influence through the global marketplace in 
media goods and services is based on the funding structure that mixes state control with the 
market power of monopoly control over Chinese domestic markets.  
The sort of selective liberalization seen in China produces incentives for foreign 
investment, making potential yields too lucrative to pass up despite the potential impediments 
private companies anticipate when operating in a managed economy. The value of China as an 
investment is reflected in UN surveys of multinational executives who consistently place China 
ahead of the United States as prospective host country (UNCTAD, 2012). General foreign direct 
investments from the United States show returns of 13.5% in China, 3.8% higher than global 
average (“China’s economy and the WTO,” 2011).  
Investment in China’s mass media in particular is attractive as a long term strategy of 
market positioning. Transnational firms related to media, goods manufacturers, advertisers and 
programming distributors among them, covet the urban middle class as a source for continued 
prosperity in the face of anemic growth opportunities in developed countries. Time Warner 
executive, Steve Marcopoto, made this clear in a speech at the 2009 World Media Summit 
Beijing, promoting greater investment opportunities that, at once, would not trouble China’s 
censorship regime. “China’s global development will benefit from ties that would create a 
dynamic international media industry, and fully adhering to the country’s broadcasting code” 
(“Time Warner eyes bigger market,” 2009). The twin factors of an expanding middle class with 
disposable income and a maturing retail distribution system have had a bevy of consequences for 
CCTV and China’s international communication ambitions.  
CCTV’s domestic audience market 
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The growth of consumerism and the availability of expendable income in China have 
sparked widespread interest in Chinese media among multinational firms and marketers. China’s 
growth has been prodigious. Beginning in the lat 1970s, progressive phases of market reforms in 
China’s economic have coincided with a policy-directed growth of CCTV. China’s domestic 
population and strong GDP climb, averaging growth of 9.2%, between 2009 and 2012 
(International Monetary Fund, 2011), have created a base for the spread of China’s media 
presence around the world. Coupled with an increased official awareness of the need for a 
Chinese voice on the international stage, China’s economic boom has facilitated the 
multiplication of channels offered by CCTV domestically and internationally. Between 1986 and 
2004, channel offerings grew from two to sixteen (Hong, Lu, & Zou, 2009, p. 46). Among the 
channels developed in this period of growth were two international channels designed with two 
linguistic publics in mind, CCTV-4 in Mandarin and the English-language CCTV-9.  
The transformations of CCTV involved weaving its political mission with the financial 
interests of transnational corporate media firms. This weaving is reflection of how China has 
redesigned relationship between private capital and state investments in state capitalism. State 
capitalism has shown remarkable resilience throughout the global downturn. As The Economist 
noted in 2012, “[f]or emerging countries wanting to make their mark on the world, state 
capitalism has an obvious appeal. It gives them the clout that private-sector companies would 
take years to build” (“Emerging-market multinationals,” 2012, para. 14).  For China’s 
broadcasting industry, denationalization was not an option. While China’s climate of political 
control explains keeping these industries within the party bureaucracy, government support was 
also a means to achieve parity in the global marketplace as CCTV was revamped for a global 
television distribution markets defined by multinational conglomerates.  
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China’s domestic audience size was a central component in the growth of CCTV. While 
Chinese authorities retain editorial control over newsrooms, the network generates considerable 
revenues as a state-managed business. CCTV’s fortunes mirror the value accorded the 
purchasing power of the emerging middle class by global manufacturers. As Jing Wang has 
observed, CCTV’s state-sponsorship within China has allowed the network to beat out other 
media ventures in advertising revenue “precisely because it is both the government’s mouthpiece 
and a powerful conglomerate” (Wang, 2008, p. 247). CCTV’s opening to commercial revenue 
sources has been so successful the network has returned the surplus to government capital 
reserves. In less than a decade since commercial reorganization under China’s market reforms, 
CCTV was financially self-sustaining, covering its own operational expenses and paying the 
state RMB 1.2 billion (US $150 million) in taxes by the mid-2000s (Hong et al., 2009, pp. 44–
45).  
CCTV in the 1990s: State-Owned Enterprises as exceptions to liberalization? 
CCTV’s global growth and its reception in North America need to be understood in light 
of these encompassing political and economic changes to the media system in China. In 2012, 
China and Russia State-Owned Enterprise (SOEs) amounted to only one-third of total domestic 
production. Such low figures are surprising for national settings in which state-owned sectors 
once constituted the bulk of GDP. But overall shrinkage of state involvement is more an 
indication of retrenchment rather than mere retreat in developing economies. Twenty-eight of the 
100 largest companies among emerging economic powers remain SOEs, and they are the prime 
benefactors of market capitalization in the Chinese stock market (“State capitalism’s global 
reach,” 2012). In China, the top state companies have benefited from the rapid national economic 
growth and internationalization: total assets expanded from $360 billion to $2.9 trillion between 
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2002 and 2010 (Ibid, 2012). The endurance of state ownership has an obvious rationale. China’s 
interest in maintaining control over domestic media is an extension of the “social harmony” 
policies that have been reemphasized in response to the threat of social conflict. But CCTV is 
part of a more general repositioning of state assets rather than the progressive and ineluctable 
privatization that is often the premise of “neoliberalism.” Liberalization, in the Chinese context, 
is a means to strengthen the core state assets and state control.  
CCTV’s internal reorganization was a response to the 1990s drive toward private 
ownership within Chinese media markets. It prompted a proliferation of genres through a change 
in the system of content production. The first advertisements in both state television and print 
appeared in 1979, the same year market reforms were setting in for the country at large 
(Xiaoping, 2001).  Economic reforms for Chinese television and CCTV, however, began in 
earnest in the mid-1990s with the introduction of what scholars of Chinese media labeled the 
“producer system.” Reforms during this phase of CCTV’s organizational restructuring replaced a 
system of party appointments that had populated the ranks of the Chinese television industry 
with a less direct system of control that offered producers greater autonomy in terms of creative 
and managerial labor such as program design, staffing and budget management (Hong et al., 
2009). The use of a producer system, a model familiar to commercial media systems in the West, 
also made advertising the principal financial support as the state began to withdraw subsidies. By 
2001, only .05% of CCTV’s financial resources came from government sources (Xiaoping, 
2001). Observers of Chinese media point out, for instance, how the broad transformations in 
content offerings in the 1990s departed from the mouthpiece model (see Hong et al., 2009). The 
heavy hand of the party loosened, and innovations in CCTV programming like Focus and 
Oriental Horizon gained viewership because of journalistic freedom to pursue stories on 
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provincial and municipal corruption in China. Investigative journalism and documentary 
production became successful new genres as well.  
Still, creative freedom, increased diversity of programming genres and the greater 
emphasis on investigative reporting continued to operate within state-circumscribed parameters 
of legitimate debate. While the reform period has seen CCTV’s functions diversify beyond party 
mouthpiece, the network retained this political role alongside new commercial purposes. The 
CCP’s uses of CCTV, the network’s national scope, and its function as a content feeder to 
smaller regional television mark the limits of serious competition, though provincial media 
organizations offer some challenge collectively.40 Berry (2009), for instance, frames the 
introduction of producer-driven models “as symbolic of a shift in Chinese television away from 
being a pedagogical tool of the party-state apparatus to interacting more complexly with the 
market economy and ideas of public participation” but qualifies that the participation cannot be 
judged by idealized civil society templates of free inquiry (2009, p. 71). CCTV maintained its 
place as the state-corporate gatekeeper to the eyeballs of a growing consumer class and reaps the 
financial windfall from that advantage. 
China’s 2001 entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) accelerated integration 
with global capital, but the perception of the nation’s economic prowess allowed it to avoid a 
more wholesale surrender of domestic communication industries to global markets. Early in the 
2000s, publications like The Economist were still skeptically eyeing China’s commercialization 
of its media system, lamenting the lack of privately owned satellite channels, the prohibition on 
airing foreign content and the relative weakness of the population’s buying power: “[c]ertainly, 
                                                 
40 CCTV’s status in China is not monopoly in a strict sense. Competition from external, private media and regional 
networks spurred CCTV’s restructuring during the 1990s. 
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there is potential:,” the publication stated, “although China’s average viewer is still poor, its 
advertising market is already the second largest in Asia after Japan and it is the fastest-growing 
in the world” (“Face value,” 2001, para. 7). Two years later, advertising markets remained small 
by global standards at US $2.7 billion, but China was in a strong bargaining position with a 
projected 10 percent annual growth in the advertising sector (“Business: Some Iraq, not much 
SARS; Chinese television,” 2003). This position was advantageous for China’s relationship to 
global capital investment, stemming from what Zhao (2003b) identified as a “power bloc” that 
had come to structure Chinese media system priorities: bureaucratic capitalists within the Party, 
transnational corporate capital, and the urban middle class. 
CCTV’s profitability stemmed from innovations in tapping advertising revenues, aided 
by the perception of CCTV as the principle means to reach nationwide audiences. CCTV’s 
central position for domestic and international advertisers coincided with an increased emphasis 
on marketing to reach Chinese viewers and be among the first companies to establish brand 
consciousness. By 2006, the network had developed relationships with China’s wholesalers who 
viewed CCTV’s “golden” time slots with a nearly irrational sense of the channel’s potency as a 
tool for sales (Japan Broadcasting Corporation, 2007). With GDP growth averaging around just 
below 10% for several years approaching the turn of the century, China’s manufacturers were 
attempting to meet expanding consumer demand. Corporate branding at the national level 
quickly became a necessity for ambitious manufacturers looking to establish broad distribution.  
CCTV’s monopolistic relationship with advertisers is significantly different from parallel 
relationships in western contexts. In the United States, for instance, several networks with 
roughly equal market power drive down the cost of advertising. If several networks can offer 
similar, nationwide audiences to potential advertisers, advertisers in turn can take their business 
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to rival networks. China has positioned CCTV as central in the Chinese media system, 
preventing advertisers from pitting networks selling advertising slots against one another. The 
CCTV system pits advertisers against one another, pushing costs for those slots higher. China’s 
media policy requires CCTV’s evening news broadcast be retransmitted through all provincial 
networks. Accordingly, the potential reach of the program is unrivaled. Thirty-second slots are 
valuable as a sole means for product exposure and exact a premium that reflects monopolistic 
distribution. 
In addition to the producer system, the mid-1990s also saw CCTV retool its relationship 
with the global marketing/advertising complex by use of a bidding system. The bidding system 
further pit advertisers against one another and drove up the value of CCTV’s commercial slots. 
The auction, CCTV executives reasoned, could maximize yield through price inflation, relying 
on what Jiang Wang calls the “myth” that CCTV was a must-have for any brand’s success 
(Wang, 2008, p. 263). The auction had the eventual effect of further introducing non-Chinese 
goods manufacturers to the ad market which had been largely made up of Chinese sponsors. 
Through these early auctions, CCTV grew revenue throughout the late 1990s. In 2004, ad 
revenue for CCTV amounted to US $655 million; the auction took in US $725 million in 
November of 2005 (Madden, 2006a). As an indication of the value accorded CCTV, the bidding 
value for a prime time slot on CCTV’s domestic broadcasts rose from US $252,500 to US 
$669,300 between 2000 and 2005. 
CCTV’s supremacy in attracting ad-revenue weakened by mid-decade with increased 
commercialization of the national media environment, giving advertisers more options for 
buying (Wang, 2008, p. 278). But, throughout the early 2000s, CCTV saw an influx of foreign 
companies challenging the ad market which had been dominated by Chinese brands (Madden, 
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2006a, para. 10). Established foreign firms such as Proctor and Gamble (P&G) turned to CCTV 
as a means to gain a share of the growth in domestic consumption as well as create markets for 
established product lines (Backaler, 2010). P&G’s investment in CCTV as a vehicle to enter 
China’s consumer markets was typical of the kind of company Chinese officials found 
compatible with the public’s moral and political wellbeing as defined by the CCP’s version of a 
Marxist/Leninist press. P&G, on the other hand, viewed China as a recreation of unfulfilled 
American mass markets in the early 20th century. The company has invested considerable sums 
in market research to establish the viability of moving their fleet of superbrands into what the 
company identified as “first” and “second” tier Chinese metropolitan markets. Investment in 
Chinese media has appeared to pay off. P&G’s toiletry brand, Rejoice, for instance, has rooted 
itself on retailer shelves with between 25-30 percent of the market and the company’s skin 
products tripled in sales between 2000 and 2005 (“The rise of the superbrands - Consumer 
goods,” 2005).  
P&G was at the leading edge of foreign media firms’ move into China in the first decade 
of the 21st century. In late 2004, P&G became the biggest overall spender through these auctions: 
385 million yuan (US $46.5 million) and profits from the company’s in-country sales rose 140 
percent yearly on average (“The rise of the superbrands - Consumer goods,” 2005). The multi-
brand company purchased 30% to 40% of the prime time slots in 2005 (Madden, 2006a) and 
committed $53.4 million for the following year. Among both Chinese and non-Chinese 
companies, P&G was the biggest spender for time on the Chinese broadcaster three consecutive 
years (Madden, 2006b). With the influx of foreign capital from marketing campaigns initiated by 
groups like P&G, CCTV’s revenue increases were sustained despite growing competition for ad 
dollars. CCTV’s national time slots in 2006 yielded $724 million in advertising buys, $88 
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million more than the previous year (Japan Broadcasting Corporation, 2007). In 2010, the prime 
time auction raised $2 billion in revenues, a 15.6% increase from the year before (Winslow, 
2010b). P&G is not alone in participating in CCTV’s success. L’Oréal CEO Jean-Paul Agon’s 
view of China in 2013 was typical among transnational media companies: “Chinese consumers 
are at the heart of L’Oréal’s focus and energies. A potential 250 million new Chinese consumers 
will be using L’Oréal’s products within the next 10 to 15 years, making China the number one 
contributor to . . . our strategy of universalization” (Davitt, 2013, para. 3).  
Throughout China’s ascendance in the WTO, CCTV was adapting to advertiser needs, 
reflecting its split devotion to political and commercial benefactors. Advertising interactivity, 
consumer interest channels, branded content and product placement helped CCTV maintain its 
attractiveness to marketing firms. As a means to preserve its supremacy in ad sales among the 
burgeoning provincial cable networks, Advertising Age noted how the broadcaster initiated an 
expansion of drama, sports and variety shows, content that is unobjectionable to censors and 
agreeable to both potential consumer and advertisers (Madden, 2006a). 
By the end of 2010, CCTV’s advertising sales division had booked enough sponsorship 
to project 12.7 billion Yuan (US $1.9 billion) in time sales. These sales were up 16 percent from 
the previous year. Within a decade, television advertising increased to seven times amounts 
recorded in 2001. The Economist estimated Chinese television commanded 63 percent of all 
advertising done in China across media in 2010 (“Television,” 2010). Advertising serves not 
only the rising urban consumer but increasingly the rural consumer to fuel growth making it 
likely that investment in the ad sector will outstrip GDP growth for years (Winslow, 2010a). 
CCTV is a well performing nationalized industry with an expanding viewer base of increasingly 
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affluent consumers. With almost unbroken growth, CCTV sold an unprecedented $2.5 billion by 
2012 (“Record take CCTV auction,” 2012). 
The value of the Chinese middle class as a source of continued growth for transnational 
companies of European and North American origin has provided the means for China to 
selectively integrate with commercial juggernauts. The relationship between commercial and 
government enterprise in the case of CCTV has empowered both the advertising industries’ 
biggest global firms and created a sustainable model for the production of media and the China’s 
party-guided journalism. China’s integration with global markets has been a success by most 
commercial standards, but the enduring lack of transparency in political decision-making and the 
inability to tolerate freer journalistic discourse are discouraging to others. The expected 
emergence of journalistic independence with the separation of news budgets from government 
accounts did not take place, despite significant changes such as the move to a producer-system 
and new investigative genres that exposed government corruption. Rather, the forms of 
integration with global capital represented by CCTV illustrate the collusion of consumer culture 
and regimes of controlled public discourse. 
The relationship between CCTV as an ad-time selling network and the government-
orchestrated structures that sustain its market centrality is the larger political context that frames 
CCTV’s growth as an agent of contraflow into North America. Despite relaxed press controls 
introduced by the adoption of a “producer system,” Chinese government authorities continued to 
view the function of the Chinese press as a means to support the party’s ideological vision and 
sustain CCTV’s centrality in the Chinese public sphere. CCTV’s evolution shows a hybridization 
of state and private cooperation as global advertisers subsidize the production of, among other 
media fare, state news for mainland China. This financial basis also affords leverage to access 
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foreign publics. The distinction between government and private media, a foundational 
distinction in liberal conceptions of the public sphere, is better understood as a spectrum with 
new financial models emerging with varying degrees of subsidies from governmental and private 
sources. What does the hybridized form of media production and distribution in emerging 
economies that has come to figure so prominently in global news mean for a global public 
sphere?  
CCTV Moves into international broadcasting 
The embrace of transnational advertising has also enabled its program of ‘soft power’ as 
CCTV has made strategic use of transnational commercial media firms. China’s market 
transformations in media sectors have allowed for the use of domestic media consumers, coveted 
by advertisers globally, to fuel the projection of Chinese media products in multiple languages 
into the media systems of politically valuable target nations like Canada and the United States. 
Domestic audiences were a resource in the strategic integration with global advertising markets, 
but domestic audiences also provide other means of entry into foreign markets.  
Market reforms within China’s state broadcaster have allowed the corporation to expand 
and grow into an international media company, proliferating into an array of channels for foreign 
audiences. In her account of Xinhua’s marketization, Xin Xin characterized the “Going abroad” 
policy change as “the reinforcement of state intervention as an unanticipated outcome of the 
parallel processes of marketization and globalization” (2012, p. 2). China’s broader interest in 
developing a more robust diplomacy apparatus has dovetailed with the economic transformations 
I have discussed. While CCTV transformed from a more staid and familiar party mouthpiece into 
a profitable publicity organ, the CCP has embraced the market as a means to international 
political messaging in print as well. CCP officials began to call for “innovations” at the 
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organization that should, according to official decree, “explore new ideas about using market 
mechanisms to inject vigor into China’s publicity abroad” (“China overseas media group,” 
2009).  
CCTV’s success at home has created the foundation from which to spring into foreign 
markets and foster a global presence in several languages, combining the network’s experience 
dealing with transnational commercial firms with additional government supports for 
international expansion. In 2010, the government set aside (US) $7 billion for international news 
alone, more than 15 times the annual budget of Britain’s investment in the BBC’s parallel 
broadcasting operations (“Waves in the web; International broadcasters,” 2010). The sheer scale 
of these outlays allowed China to introduce a second English-language news channel that year, 
CNC World.41  
China’s interest in obtaining a media presence in North America stems from the need to 
represent China in foreign venues of opinion. As part of the embrace of the concept of soft power 
by Chinese leadership, CCTV is an investment in the engagement of both foreign publics and the 
Chinese diaspora in foreign countries. Ingrid D’Hooghe (2011) describes China’s interest in 
Chinese living abroad as multifaceted. The Chinese communities in North America are targeted 
“. . . because Beijing wants to keep the Chinese diaspora on its side and encourage them to invest 
in China. . . . they [also] play a role in promoting Chinese culture and lobbying for Chinese 
political interests” (2011, p. 23). CCTV also has competition to define the diasporic Chinese 
population around the world. CCTV’s foreign service in Mandarin competes for audiences with 
                                                 
41 The boldness of China’s entry into international journalism as a form of foreign relations, Businessweek  
described journalists as China’s most recent “export” (Dwoskin, 2012). 
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other satellite broadcasters such as Hong Kong-based Phoenix TV and TVB as well as dissident 
media NTDTV (Hing-Yuk Wong, 2009).  
International media is at the forefront of efforts to position national economic ascendance 
as China’s “peaceful rise.” Seeking to emulate other international broadcasters and Al Jazeera 
specifically, the Chinese government began more serious bids for foreign markets in 2007. A 
presidential report to the Chinese Congress emphasized the need to “enhance culture as part of 
the soft power of our country to better guarantee the people’s basic cultural rights and interests” 
(Cushion, 2010, p. 290). In April of 2010, the English-language CCTV News launched for a 
North American audience and made it onto US commercial cable and satellite distribution in 
addition to the 80 million viewers the network claims to have in 100 countries. With a base of 
operations in Washington, CCTV America launched in February 2012 as an additional service 
stemming from China’s increased focus on establishing region-specific presences around the 
world. CCTV America focuses on business news with around 100 employees recruited from Fox 
News and Bloomberg News with a mandate to cover North and South America.  
Executive consultant for the network, Jim Laurie, confronted the question of editorial 
independence by claiming CCTV’s variants in the US had as much freedom as other state-funded 
broadcasters in the same class. “Ultimately, of course the government has control in any state-
operated system, whether it be Al Jazeera, whether it be Russia Today . . . I would dare say even 
France 24 which is another entry into the 27/7 news world.” Editorial control varies between 
Chinese-language and English-language broadcasts (“China Central Television Foreign News 
Bureau,” 2012).  
The rationale for expanding CCTV into English markets, Laurie explains, is 
representation in US public discourse and concern for misperceptions instilled by the one-sided 
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representation of the growing Chinese role in US economic and political affairs. More specific 
than policy movement toward a soft power agenda, CCTV spokespersons point to the one-sided 
nature of major debates regarding China-US relations on US networks in 2012:  
There has been a lot of debate over the last several years about the RMB and the 
proper place it should be relative to the dollar . . . . If you were to watch Fox 
News or CNN or some of the other American media outlets you would feel there 
is really only one side of the story: that the Chinese were out to artificially keep 
this RMB at a particular level in order to bolster the exports of China and in some 
way doom the US to its increasing poverty. The Chinese will accept that position 
but they want to have their say (“China Central Television Foreign News 
Bureau,” 2012). 
 
CCTV frames its expansion as a plea for representation, but it remains careful to do so by 
appealing to representational parity broadly rather than in a strictly nationalistic sense. Much like 
Al Jazeera brands itself as the voice of the global south, CCTV has actively bolstered bureau 
presence in South America and Africa, regions that are increasingly missing from the news 
agendas produced by CNN and BBC.  
Speaking to CCTV’s growth, network representatives point to differences in funding. The 
weakening of Anglo-American journalistic organizations has created opportunities for new 
entrants. Laurie views the growth of CCTV as enabled by the failures in the economic models 
that have supported the “traditional” major players like CNNI and the BBC. Losses in 
advertising revenue in the United States and retractions of government funding in Britain have 
led to newsroom layoffs, the destaffing of foreign bureaus and diminished reporting capabilities. 
But the one region’s loss is another’s gain. As these networks downsize, journalistic talent is 
picked up by growing organizations like CCTV.  
To facilitate entry into global markets under the “going abroad” project, CCTV created a 
commercial arm, China International Television Corporation (CITVC). CITVC is a profit-
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seeking, corporate arm of the Chinese government and is owned by and represents CCTV in 
negotiations with foreign regulatory agencies and cable/satellite distribution companies. China 
International Television Corporation. CITVC was established in 1984 as a state-owned company 
created as a subsidiary of CCTV. In 1997, CITVC reorganized assets and restructured its 
business to become a group corporation. The group combined many facets of the media business, 
business services that are often provided by distinct sub-industries in Western contexts. The 
company deals in program production and distribution while offering technical services, ratings 
analysis and advertising services and is embedded within China’s regulator, State Administration 
of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT).  
According to the company, CITVC “has established a development model with 
traditional media business at its basis, emerging media as the point for growth and capital 
investment as the main method to achieve rapid development and positive return on investment” 
(“China International Television Corporation - Trade in Services,” n.d.). As an extension of the 
state media regulatory system, CITVC performs a dual role in China’s dealings with 
international media. First, it manages capital investments in China’s major media enterprises, 
buying and selling CCTV programs in the international media marketplace (“China International 
TV Corporation Huan Ya Satellite Transmission Co., Ltd.,” n.d.). Second, CITVC is the 
corporate gateway into China, acting as the sole authorized agent managing foreign satellite 
programming distribution within mainland China according to the PRC’s political needs and 
objectives regarding media within and outside of China (Miller, 2007). CITVC’s mandate to 
place CCTV content properties in foreign commercially oriented media systems has a strong 
start since the company has established relationships with Western distributors working with 
SARFT in China. CITVC’s efforts are also helped by a base of familiar advertisers like Proctor 
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& Gamble, Colgate and L’Oreal, all of which advertise on CCTV properties. Ad revenue makes 
up seventy percent of China’s twenty-two state channels (Thielman, 2013a). 
In 2007, the company advertised its annual revenue of 3.65 billion Yuan, up 19 percent 
from the previous reporting period. This amounted to a net profit of 470 million Yuan 
(74,626,252 USD), itself an increase of 21 percent over the same period (China International 
Television Corporation, 2007). As a corporate enterprise, CITVC has engaged in vertical 
integration to support Chinese media abroad. The company diversified its offerings to include 
several media business services including production, distribution, technical provisions, ratings 
assessments and the work advertising agencies. It also plays a more general role as a major 
investor in the industry and capital markets as one of China’s largest media companies. As 
China’s domestic media industry expands, CIVTC represents China Central Television (CCTV) 
in the marketing and distributions of CCTV’s copyrighted programming, mirroring the large 
conglomerates with which Chinese media must compete in the global arena.  
CCTV hybrid funding strategies conclusion: 
By 2012, China Central Television had functioned as a quasi-monopolistic, nation-wide 
media network in China for decades. With CCTV, government officials can communicate with 
the public through channels that are subsidized by a rapidly growing advertising industry. 
Upending the narrative so common to histories of U.S. journalism in which commercial support 
“frees” media from the influence of party and state patronage, CCTV illustrates how advertising 
can play a supportive role in authoritarian media environments. Advertising minimizes 
operational costs of media through which authoritarian political power manages its public 
presence domestically and internationally. It is this perception of CCTV that defines the negative 
public reception of CCTV in Canada’s regulatory process and in U.S. public discourse.  
 134 
 
 
The conventional wisdom that capital liberates is undermined by a cursory examination 
of media in China, pointing to the opposite outcome. Rather than the editorial independence 
some historians retrospectively identified as the logical consequence of commercialization of 
news markets in a process of differentiation, the public space produced by CCTV is conditioned 
by the marriage of reactive state censorship and market demands of advertisers. The addressee 
for CCTV’s domestic service is, at once, the Chinese public under the moral tutelage of the CCP 
and the Chinese consumer sought by national and transnational advertisers.  
The development of a domestic advertising industry has, however, been a boon to the 
internationalization of Chinese media at large, highlighting how domestic population sizes are 
significant in certain forms of media globalization (J. Straubhaar, 2010b). Not only does 
population size serve as a strong predictor of reliance on foreign media imports as Tunstall 
(2007, pp. 4–6) has emphasized but China’s large domestic markets also serve to buttress 
expansion of China’s state network abroad.42 
As it moves into English media markets, CCTV’s self-promotes the network as 
counterhegemonic. The organization portrays its news voice as speaking for the 
underrepresented in global news. While Al Jazeera’s branding firmly positions its news division 
as a sort of global subaltern finally given the venue to bring important but neglected global issues 
into the global public sphere, CCTV has attempted a similar transformation of its image. CCTV 
spokespeople like Laurie take up this rhetoric in describing the value a Chinese perspective in 
                                                 
42 The result of CCTV’s trajectory make it one of the few enduring (SOE) remaining in state hands after a period of 
global privatization during the 1990s that led Robert McChesney to raise concerns about the “rapid rise of a global 
commercial television system dominated almost exclusively by the world’s fifty largest media firms” (1998, p. 13). 
CCTV’s mix of state-backing with the functions of a private-sector multinational complicates a picture of 
commercialism’s total victory. Indeed, the big players in the transnational media marketplace have been repeatedly 
frustrated by China’s use of the market system, News Corporation most notably (Kahn, 2007).  
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media can offer North American audiences. CCTV, according to the network’s public relations, 
fulfills the political tradition of media pluralism, allowing for diverse social interests to have a 
voice in governance. But the argument that CCTV fulfills principles of democratic diversity in 
the U.S. suggests a departure from the nationalist vision of the relationship between democracy 
and media pluralism. Implicitly, the branding of CCTV as a means to diversify news in North 
America entails recognizing foreign powers as a stakeholder in U.S. democratic deliberation. By 
this logic, CCTV fulfills a public need for news in a globalized world. The implied shift from a 
national interpretation of public interest in pluralism to a more global vision of pluralistic 
representation would justify the inclusion of foreign news networks in North American public 
sphere. But it is not clear that this shift has taken place, nor is the public interest value of state-
driven media like CCTV established. The case made by CCTV’s representatives in North 
America implies an erasure of differences between a nationally limited public interest in 
domestic speech pluralism43 and a more global sense of public interest.44 The normative 
foundations of North American media policy do not provide clear answers. Pluralism, as a media 
policy value, has been challenged by media globalization.  
Advocates for the channel’s expansion in North America conflate the efforts of CCTV to 
move into foreign media systems with similar efforts of other national broadcasters seeking to 
grow foreign viewership. However, this ignores the specific political purposes of CCTV. As I 
discuss in chapter five, public controversies surrounding CCTV’s entry into Canada alleged the 
network functioned as a way to extend policies of social control and minority persecution, 
attacking and marginalizing Chinese-Canadians associated with Falun Gong spiritualists, a group 
                                                 
43 For example, the public interest in protecting the speech rights of civil rights advocates in Montgomery, Alabama. 
44 For example, the public interest in facilitating the entry of foreign broadcasters to influence public perceptions 
foreign governments.  
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the Chinese Communist Party declared illegal due to Party fears that the group could generate 
dissent and undermine the authority of the Chinese political system. Yet, as I discuss later, 
neither Canadian nor U.S. regulatory institutions appear prepared to cope with these questions 
about news contraflow. The political instrumentality of CCTV raises serious questions about 
whether or not the news organization promotes or undermines democratic pluralism in media 
systems.  
Global advertisers and transnational corporate entities with interests in Chinese media 
markets will support CCTV as companies seek profitable ventures in China. Through CITVC, 
CCTV’s ability to leverage access to Chinese consumers leads to important questions about the 
ability of national media policy to distinguish between these various ventures in foreign news 
programming. In the United States, a reliance on the market and an absolutist interpretation of 
free expression bar the evaluating foreign content to discern the public-service value a foreign 
broadcaster. The U.S. policy context also fails to provide an effective means to determine if a 
foreign broadcaster is, for instance, systematically misrepresenting global events or use news 
products to marginalize political dissent within the United States (chapter four). Canadian 
regulators more clearly struggled with this question when CITVC petitioned Canadian media 
regulators to allow CCTV news programming into Canada (chapter five). The following chapters 
look more closely at the processes of reception of Al Jazeera and CCTV in Canada and the 
United States to analyze how domestic media policies influence the movement of contraflow into 
North America.   
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Chapter 4 
 A Reinterpretation of foreign news regulation in the United States: Al Jazeera and 
China Central Television 
Chapter Abstract: This chapter examines how the United States media system responded to the 
rise of foreign news channels seeking distribution in U.S. cable and satellite systems. I examine 
U.S. media policy conditions in the United States with an eye for how the regulatory principles 
of free flow, diversity and pluralism have or have not fostered global engagement. I consider a 
variety of regulatory forces that converge on the question of foreign news in the United States 
paying closer attention to the examples of Al Jazeera and China Central Television. Though the 
U.S. maintains policy commitments to free flow and media pluralism, these responses to 
contraflow illustrate forces that shape news flows according to U.S. national security interests, 
exclusive journalistic norms and the demands of national industries. The U.S. commitment to 
neoliberal media governance, roughly defined by market-based regulation and a preference for 
commercially viable global media, disadvantages independent media producers. This includes 
foreign news organizations. Consequently, this condition fosters industrially enforced 
parochialism. In terms of foreign news entry, U.S. regulatory conditions make state news 
organizations more likely to succeed in the market despite a broad normative aversion to 
government involvement in media. 
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Introduction: U.S. Media policy values in globalization 
Foreign news coverage in the United States has been in decline. Reporting on foreign 
affairs from U.S. publications has weakened rapidly in the past decade. A study in American 
Journalism Review, for example, shows a 53 percent decline in foreign news in print between 
1985 and 2010 (Kumar, 2011). In terms of broadcast news, network coverage is inconsistent in 
covering global events, even those directly related to U.S. foreign policy. Between the 2003 and 
2008, coverage of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan dropped by 78 percent (Waldman, 2011, p. 239). 
CNN, once a championed example of news globalization, has taken to shuttering expensive 
foreign bureaus, including the last remaining Western news organization with full Baghdad 
bureau operations in 2013 (Hayden, 2013). The fading vision of the world in U.S. news 
undermines traditional notions of public-interest standards. Many of the news sources associated 
with accessible yet thorough reporting on foreign affairs are under financial strain as advertising 
revenue dries up in the shift to new media marketing vehicles.  
The potential value of foreign news organizations to maintain a sufficiently detailed 
picture of global affairs seems clear. Foreign news expansion offers a means to supplement the 
withdrawal of major commercial operations from serious investments in, for instance, 
investigative foreign affairs journalism. Foreign journalistic organizations provide a more direct 
look into issues around the globe with greater regional familiarity and local contacts. Foreign 
journalism also has the potential to satisfy central values in liberal democratic media systems: 
pluralism, free flow and viewpoint diversity. Viewpoint diversity is frequently overlooked in 
policy debates over foreign news in the United States, but the relationship between American 
media policy values and the growth of foreign news networks needs to be reexamined. This 
chapter takes up two questions. Given the liberal media policy context of the United States, what 
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forces influence the integration of foreign news media? What role do policies of diversity and 
pluralism play in shaping contraflow into the United States? 
In this chapter, I argue that coincident with the advent of a broader range of foreign 
media available for U.S. distribution, liberal principles have come to foster industrial 
concentration in a way that limits the ability for independent producers to gain distribution. 
Foreign news sources are some of the most independent with greater distance from the political 
and economic pressures that shape U.S. commercial journalism. In terms of pluralistic 
representation of international politics, the surge in foreign news represents an opportunity to 
expand diversity. Defining diversity, however, remains problematic in U.S. media policy history. 
Given the absence of coherent policies to address the question of contraflow, foreign news 
seeking space in the United States enters a highly competitive market governed by a regulatory 
structure shaped around the needs of vertically and horizontally integrated programming and 
distribution companies. This market-based approach defines the entry of both Al Jazeera and 
CCTV. As case studies, these expanding news organizations point to the opportunity to the need 
for redefinition of regulatory principles. 
The United States policy context: a parochial free flow 
In comparisons of national systems, U.S. media often exemplifies the “liberal,” or free-
market media system (Freedman, 2008; Hallin & Mancini, 2005; Karppinen, 2013; Robert 
Waterman McChesney, 2004). The U.S. media system defines extreme liberalism on the 
spectrum of national media policy. Liberty of the press, as a constitutional guarantee, is founded 
on a fundamental skepticism of government. The press is to be free from government influence 
to maintain independence and check the threat of governmental corruption, malfeasance, 
incompetence and power generally. U.S. liberalism rose out of the European Enlightenment 
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tradition that rejected princely authority and, in more modern versions, the authority of 
centralized federal governance. The suspicion of government power has been coupled with a 
faith in markets to positively shape public discourse values to achieve diversity and pluralism. A 
more radical shift toward the market over the past four decades has challenged the idea of 
government intervention for diversity’s sake, leading to a reaffirmation of markets as the best 
possible means of allocating communicative social resources. The consequences of these shifts in 
policy have significance across the media system including dynamics of international journalism.  
The neoliberal turn in the U.S. anticipated a more global turn in policy processes that has 
been well documented. Most assessments pointing to a “global neoliberalism” in multiple 
economic sectors under the guidance of transnational corporate firms and multinational 
organizations that, in turn, are driven by the market philosophy associated with the U.S. 
(Chakravartty & Sarikakis, 2006; Herman & McChesney, 1997). A free flow doctrine has been 
the keyword for many of the basic policies of the U.S., both nationally and internationally. As 
Monroe Price has noted, international norms like free flow are increasingly “used swordlike by 
those external to the state, often NGOs and media corporations with existing global power, to 
encourage a more favorable legal regime within a state” (2004, p. 34).  
The outward reach of U.S. media has been debated for decades and continues to incite the 
ire of those seeking to protect local or national culture from U.S. commercial exports. But recent 
decades have seen some flagging in the centrality of U.S. media in other regions of the globe. 
Media imperialism arguments have accordingly adjusted focus from a strict national model of 
global influence. Herman and McChesney (1997), for instance, emphasize a corporate and 
commercial complex as the guiding development at supranational level rather than American 
imperialism. A more detailed view of shifts in media production at the national level points to a 
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more multifaceted set of changes even if corporate commercialism defines the macroeconomic 
picture. As Tunstall (2008b, p. 449) notes, the 11 most populous nations with 60 percent of the 
world’s population have become media independent, breaking away from dependency noted by a 
previous generation of scholarship on global flows of media. The result is a more multipolar 
media world in which flows are no longer predictably from developed nations in a periphery-
center model.  
Some researchers have begun to examine features of this multipolarity in global media 
power and its influence on information flows (Seib, 2008, 2012; Sparks, 2003; J. Straubhaar, 
2010b; D. K. Thussu, 2007), but less attention has been paid to the flow of media into the United 
States and how national policy environments invite or repel foreign cultural perspectives (c.f. A. 
Valdivia & Curry, 1996). One observation in the study of media globalization is increasingly 
common: “the state matters” (Morris & Waisbord, 2001). Kristina Riegert (2011, p. 1570) also 
points out that, beyond explicit state media policies, “linguistic, political, and cultural barriers 
are important reasons why global news is not as global as it purports to be.” Riegert’s point 
remains true of “global news” in United States. Journalism, heavily protected from overt 
government influence in the United States, remains subject to significant normative guidelines 
based largely in more cultural rather than legal expectations. The values embedded in formal and 
informal regulation of news media remain regionally rooted and variously codified in national 
law. U.S. assumptions about journalism, what it looks like and what purpose it serves, remain the 
hegemonic model on the global stage even if it is in its “twilight” (J. Nerone, 2012).  
Differing communication traditions lead to cultural and legal conflict in media 
globalization. Though free flow policies continue to define U.S. free speech jurisprudence and 
the Federal Communication Commission rule-making, the promise of newly diverse news 
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sources from the international arena is undermined by the industrial conditions rooted in the U.S. 
policy context. In addition to industry conditions, international news is regulated by a variety of 
factors beyond the FCC. A full analysis of media regulation related to foreign media must 
consider an expanded set of influences, including acts of Congress, U.S. foreign affairs agencies, 
activist opposition in the United States and the distribution industry as has evolved under the 
principles of U.S. media regulation.  
Free Flow 
Among the concepts defining U.S. policy, free flow endures as a touchstone policy value 
bound up with notions of pluralism in U.S. media politics. Pluralism, diversity and free flow are 
unsettled terms given new developments in international news.45 References to free flow and 
diversity litter policy statements, but there are limits to this flow. Kimberly Zarkin has noted a 
central point of policy confusion for the FCC. The Communications Act of 1934 denies the 
commission censorship powers in the name of free speech while later sections of the Act 
criminalize “any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication” 
(2003, p. 3). Because liberal democratic governments are reluctant to legislate matters of content 
permissions or requirements, content regulations are often vaguely defined (discussed below). 
Structural regulation has, however, provided a more legally palatable alternative, influencing 
media behavior through anti-trust provisions. But ownership restrictions, if they are assumed to 
be effective, influence content and, thus, come dangerously close to violating free expression 
                                                 
45 Herbert I. Schiller and the activist policy scholars associated with UNESCO spearheaded the media imperialism 
argument throughout the 1970s with a focus on “American” hegemony through media exports and an American led 
corporate order that used free flow as a ruse for ideological support for commercial expansion.  This chapter departs 
from the outward look from the US to examine how new multipolarity in global media has influenced the “free 
flow” arguments in the US and how the assertion of commercial prerogative has created its own regulatory system 
and the consequences of the regulatory values as they influence the reception of foreign perspectives in news.  
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principles. Non-intervention defines U.S. policy, resonating with a larger suspicion of 
government in U.S. political culture. The tension between safeguarding democratic media 
conditions with government and threatening them with government characterizes shifts in 
electronic mass communication policies in the latter half of the 20th century.  
Free expression rights appear frequently in the FCC policy documents as rationale for the 
limited role of the agency. The FCC often describes its mission as a passive promoter of market 
competition.46 This restriction on power gets its most rhetorical emphasis in content regulation. 
The Commission describes these limits as a dedication to Constitutional limits: 
The First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech . . . protects programming 
that stereotypes or may otherwise offend people with regard to their religion, race, 
national background, gender, or other characteristics. It also protects broadcasts 
that criticize or ridicule established customs and institutions, including the 
government and its officials. The Commission recognizes that, under our 
Constitution, people must be free to say things that the majority may abhor, not 
only what most people may find tolerable or congenial (FCC Media Bureau, 
2008, para. 20). 
 
The FCC limits its authority to cases in which programming is obscene or promotes “imminent 
lawless action.” Broadcast journalism is a similarly protected species. The Commission explains 
that “. . . in light of the fundamental importance of the free flow of information to our 
democracy” the Commission restricts content regulations to hoaxes that cause public harm and 
“news distortion.” Both violations require compelling evidence to merit FCC intervention (FCC 
Media Bureau, 2008, para. 22–25).  
FCC policy mirrors classic formulations of free expression in foundational liberal thought 
                                                 
46 The FCC’s role in promoting democratic communication is nearly lost in its website’s self-description. Among the 
bullet points listing its purpose: “promoting competition,” “investment,” [s]upporting the nation’s economy” by 
supporting competition, revising media regulations to support new technologies as well as diversity and localism. 
See archived FCC website (“What We Do | FCC.gov,” 2013). 
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on communication rights (c.f. Mill, 1989 [1859]). Media organizations and related businesses are 
protected from government censorship. This follows from an interpretation based on shielding 
minority views held to be repugnant by a social majority. This ethos is at the root of liberal 
pluralism, though the policy values associated with it have changed over time. The broad change 
has been defined by increased reliance on markets resulting in a regulatory structure favoring 
large-scale corporate entities and the privatization of public interest.47 
Critics of absolutist interpretations of free speech rights have raised concerns that the 
material conditions of modern communication no longer justify absolutism. This has to do with 
the structure of electronic mass communication and evolving case law that has positioned the 
First Amendment AS a defense of unequal access to communication resources in the service of 
commercial interests. As McChesney (2008, p. 255) succinctly points out, [o]ver time the media 
system became vastly less competitive . . . . barriers to entry made new competitive challenges 
almost impossible.” The increased difficulty in entering the public sphere as a speaker made the 
rationale for conceiving of the First Amendment as a universal right untenable. Freedman (2008) 
echoes this point about corporate appropriation of free speech regulation and court judgments. 
The First Amendment has not only come to disproportionately serve corporate power, but the 
“ambiguities and inconsistencies” of speech rights in the U.S. have been exploited in ways that 
“reflect neo-liberal certainties about the efficacy of the market” and has lost its social purpose in 
as much as it sheds public values in favor of ensuring fair market conditions (2008, p. 63).  
Neoliberal conditions in the U.S. media system are expressed in multiple policy decisions 
                                                 
47 It is worth noting instances of positive government support for “good” information. While censorship is 
antithetical, the promotion of certain forms of content are more acceptable. C. Edwin Baker notes postal subsidies to 
news, public libraries, subsidies for research and press releases from government offices (2002, p. 99). 
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over the 20th and 21st centuries that, taken together, point to the effects of privatization on public-
interest regulation within the United States. These moves also illustrate an early separation from 
the global community.48 The 1980s was a time of intense deregulatory fervor coinciding with a 
broader economic policy shift that showed hostility toward regulation of markets (D. Baker, 
2007). In 1981, public interest mandates were defanged by removal of advertising “conduct 
codes” by the National Association of Broadcasters, the elimination of public interest radio logs 
by the FCC and the watering down of the license renewal application process (Freedman, 2008, 
p. 69). The 1980s also saw the deregulation of cable and broadcasting industries (see M. Zarkin, 
2012), and the abolition of the Fairness Doctrine. Much of this transformation relates to 
ownership regulation and questions about the relationship between media ownership and 
viewpoint diversity as a means to establish a pluralistic representation for democratic 
governance.  
Ownership and the reinterpretations of diversity regulation 
Principles of diversity are protected from overbearing government power to 
monitor and shape content, but there was an early concern about centralized and 
concentrated ownership patterns in media industries. The FCC developed rules to 
maintain structural diversity with an anti-trust mindset, famously forcing the breakup of 
NBC in 1941 for alleged anti-competitive practices. Recognizing the structural conditions 
of communication, there have been significant regulatory attempts to militate against 
concentrations of such power as a violation of the democratic value of diversity.  
                                                 
48 Though at the time the US and Britain’s turn away from welfare state-styled governance was a departure from the 
norm, the liberalization of telecommunications industries and broadcasting would take root in the larger global 
setting. Where it was a departure, it became the norm within decades.  
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Vertical integration regulation such as Financial and Syndication49 and Prime Time 
Access50 rules grew out of a concern that ownership is fundamentally related to viewpoint 
diversity. Such rules intended to structure the system in such a way as to prevent 
independent voices from being marginalized within the proverbial marketplace of ideas.51 
The diversity of viewpoints was and remains the ultimate aim of FCC and related anti-
trust policies. Along with the courts, the FCC seeks to influence the structure of media 
markets to achieve the desirable end of fair representation of ideas in the public sphere, a 
regulatory philosophy captured by Justice Brennan’s iconic opinion citing the “national 
commitment” to “uninhibited and robust” debate (Brennan, 1964).52 These rules, among 
others, meant to check disparities in power that grow out of electronic mass media as a 
limited resource and prevent the profit motive from over-determining a value within a 
commercial media system. Profit is fine, U.S. courts have repeatedly affirmed, but it 
cannot become a central value to the detriment of more political or social purposes linked 
to media’s informational purpose in self-governance.  
U.S. policy has consistently sought diversity but done so at the risk of violating 
non-interventionism.53 Diversity-supportive policies that intervene in the “private” realm 
                                                 
49 Also known as the Fin-Syn, these rules were intended to prevent the limitation of viewpoint diversity by barring 
large broadcast networks from owning the content production companies that supplied programming. In theory, the 
large network could have garnered undue market power if production and distribution were not separated.  
50 A rule setting aside one “prime” hour for local stations to offer local programming and preserve localism. 
51 The “marketplace of ideas” metaphor has been discredited as misleading in recent decades. I use it here to 
represent the thinking of the court but remain skeptical of the ideological underpinnings of the term. (See Horwitz, 
2005; Nerone, 1995; Peters, 2004). 
52 In this case, the Supreme Court was reaffirming the principle of a legal commitment to public debate. The Sullivan 
decision was mainly concerned with questions of protection for statements that were made through advertising and 
factually incorrect. The Court determined that Frist Amendment protection should be extended to such statements, 
throwing out the libel claim that placed the case. 
53 See Bollinger (2010a) for a considered discussion of free speech protections and their potential reinterpretation for 
“global dialog.” 
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have an uneasy relationship with First Amendment prohibitions. If industry conditions 
and market power tend to limit the range of voices available, competing values of 
governmental restraint and diversity are at odds. Various interpretations of how to foster 
diversity have pushed the courts to vacillate on the subject. In 1945, the Associated Press 
v. United States made clear the court’s concern over commercial power’s potential to 
damage public discourse. The First Amendment, the court noted, 
rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information 
from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public, that 
a free press is a condition of a free society. Surely a command that the 
government itself shall not impede the free flow of ideas does not afford non-
governmental combinations a refuge if they impose restraints upon that 
constitutionally guaranteed freedom. Freedom to publish means freedom for all 
and not for some. Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but 
freedom to combine to keep others from publishing is not. Freedom of the press 
from governmental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction 
repression by private interests. (in Horwitz, 2005, p. 181) 
 
This sort of concern for private power in the United States has been in eclipse. Despite the 
routine invocation of diversity as policy goal, the U.S. system has offered limited support to 
traditional mechanisms that ensure media diversity: strong public broadcasting, content quotas, 
subsidies, and direct support for independent production and distribution. Since the elimination 
of proactive measures like the Fairness Doctrine and rules preventing anti-competitive 
concentration, viewpoint diversity advocates have relied on media ownership restrictions. 
Viewpoint diversity in electronic media has been the common sense goal of the courts and FCC 
policy for most of the past century. How to achieve that diversity has been elusive. 
 Horwitz’s (2005) review of the legal challenges to anti-concentration FCC rules for 
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diversity in media underlines how the fate of diversity is bound up with its definition. Early court 
opinions provided only vague formulations. It was not until the civil rights era that diversity was 
tied to minority rights. With the political empowerment of the civil rights era, ownership 
regulation was strengthened by tying viewpoint diversity to measurable minority ownership. 
Media diversity advocates could rely on concrete figures as a civil rights issue of representation 
and participation in public discourse. By the 1980s, the courts under Reagan adopted a 
conservative formalism in equal protection for First Amendment interpretations. Successful 
formal challenges to FCC minority preferences had the effect of challenging the legitimacy of 
ownership restrictions. As Horwitz observes, “[c]orporations have successfully used the new 
formalism to challenge media ownership policies as not meeting heightened First Amendment 
scrutiny. So even as media corporations are becoming larger and presumably more powerful, 
ownership regulation are being rescinded or struck down” (2005, p. 184). Civil rights era 
justifications for ownership regulation fell out of favor, the FCC embraced market principles, 
invalidating ownership rules as either capricious or obviated by new spectrum abundance 
through technological advances.54 Critics of proactive diversity policy and structural restrictions, 
often industry lobbyists, challenged the evidence of concentration’s harm to the public good. 
 In the post-civil rights era, diversity as a policy value relied on market competition and 
empirical proofs to show viewpoint diversity. The public statements of FCC officials outlined a 
position favoring non-intervention in matters of ownership concentration as a First Amendment 
principle. Still, the concern for viewpoint diversity remained. The Commission’s non-
interventionist spirit stemmed from the renewed focus on quantitative evidence of concentration 
                                                 
54 The technological utopianism and deregulatory fervor inherent led to the minimization of a spectrum scarcity 
argument that had justified government intervention. The challenge to scarcity rationales informed the 1996 
Telecommunications Act which favored competition across previously separated regions. (See Aufderheide, 1999) 
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and negative externalities resulting from vertical and horizontal integration [trends]. The reliance 
on econometrics designed by industry rendered many public interest goals invisible to 
policymakers (see also C. E. Baker, 2002; Karppinen, 2013). The FCC’s method for gauging 
viewpoint diversity within markets, the Diversity Index, relied on a quantitative assessment of 
municipal markets but left critics of concentration dissatisfied. The shortcomings of the 
measurement led U.S. courts to discredit the methodology’s reliance on anti-trust analysis at the 
cost of media’s unique features as an industry (Freedman, 2008, p. 109).55 Policy specific to 
preventing concentration in industries like cable also suffered under the new demand for 
evidence of public harm in the language of market economics. U.S. courts struck down 
commission rules safeguarding the U.S. cable television industry from anti-competitive market 
concentrations citing the commission’s aim to limit the number of subscribers a distributor could 
serve nationwide to 30 percent as capricious and arbitrary.56  
The United States and the early emergence of global news; two sides of state intervention 
There is growing attention to the international dimensions of news media in U.S. policy 
arenas. A 2011 report for the FCC summarized the deteriorating state of international reporting in 
U.S. news and the potential role of foreign news.  
The decline of overseas bureaus also has made Americans more dependent on 
foreign-owned news outlets. This has advantages and disadvantages. Foreign 
media may have deeper understanding of an area, more sources, and perhaps more 
clout with local citizens. During the unrest in Egypt, American journalists and 
                                                 
55 New permissiveness in vertical integration is exemplified by the merger of Comcast and NBC/Universal in 2010 
with public interest conditions the distribution company consistently resists implementing (Gardner, 2013). This sort 
of industrial concentration remains beyond critique in mainstream policy discussions due to the lack of concrete 
metrics to justify regulation.  
56 See Time Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 2001) and Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 579 F .3d 
1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
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citizens often found that some of the best coverage came from Al Jazeera. . . . 
Meanwhile, the BBC’s U.S. website draws more traffic than all but a few U.S 
newspapers. On the other hand, some foreign-run news services are actually state 
owned and are more likely to offer a perspective that serves that country’s 
interests (Waldman, 2011).  
 
While there is growing awareness of the potential use of foreign journalism to supplement 
waning capacity and credibility of U.S. commercial news industries, the engagement with the 
broader world of journalism entails clashing news cultures and competition to define global 
norms. The FCC’s report nods to this when it touches on the question of independence of foreign 
news, implicitly recognizing deviation from normative expectations about the relationship 
between government and media in the proliferation of global news producers. U.S. domestic 
non-intervention sits uneasily with the growth of nationalist news channels, and the hybrid mix 
of state and private capital that make nationalist news difficult to categorize for questions of free 
speech.  
 This kind of disjuncture in communication system values leads some to view the ongoing 
process of news globalization as a means to foster U.S.-styled media reform. For advocates of 
extending U.S. news values into the globe, it is common sense that the communication laws and 
customs so useful to American democracy are suited to lifting up the global public sphere as a 
whole. First Amendment scholar Lee Bollinger is one of the most prominent academic advocates 
of an enlightened foreign media policy that does so. Putting U.S. communication policy in a 
global context, he writes, 
Globalization intensifies our need for the press to remain free and independent so 
that it can report accurately on the world, from the world, to the world. But at the 
same time, the Internet and other global technologies are undermining the 
business model that has hitherto kept the press operating, causing a contraction of 
journalistic engagement with the world, in a world not entirely well situated to 
foster objective reporting of the news. (2010a, p. 5) 
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Bollinger reveres U.S. journalism and aims to maintain the functional ideals of the U.S. national 
setting as we enter an era in which journalism transcends national boundaries. He argues that 
“we need to do on a global stage what was done on the U.S. national stage over the twentieth 
century” by breaking down the informational isolationism produced by economic conditions of 
national broadcasting (2010a, p. 6).57 Despite calls for a more proactive U.S. policy to support 
news production proposed by scholars like Bollinger (2011; 2010b) and others (C. E. Baker, 
2002; Robert Waterman McChesney & Nichols, 2010)(C. E. Baker, 2002; McChesney & 
Nichols, 2010), the case for government assistance for U.S. journalism swims against the tide.  
Managing global flows: foreign or domestic policy jurisdiction? 
 The kind of non-interventionism that has defined the FCC is, however, notably lacking in 
other U.S. agencies that have policy interest in foreign news. Contraflow entails a larger set of 
regulatory influences. An expanded sense of regulation includes Congress, the State Department 
and public-interest lobbies. American media policy in this sense has two separate legal regimes 
for domestic media and foreign media. As with many national responses to contraflow, these 
engagements blur the line between domestic and international policy as the U.S. communication 
system negotiates the emerging global public sphere.  
Limiting foreign speech as foreign policy 
 The overwhelming focus on First Amendment restraints on Congress and the 
                                                 
57 Bollinger’s appreciation for US media policy and law is more nuanced than the State Department’s strategic 
foreign policy aims. Bollinger, for instance, advises structural reform of US media that would allow greater “global 
dialog.” One proposal was to attach a requirement for distributors to make space for foreign news providers as a 
condition of increased market concentration and the relaxation of restrictions on vertical integration. Bollinger takes 
a position that space should be made for foreign voices in the US, but he also expresses a common strain of 
evangelical internationalism that tends to favor US journalistic norms as a universal good regardless of culture, 
political circumstance and regional history. This evangelism is not new, fitting with the longer history of attempts to 
export the First Amendment (See Blanchard, 1986). 
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constitutional binding of the FCC can obscure other avenues of speech restriction within the 
powers of U.S. legislation. Congressional acts do not have international authority but exert 
effective pressure on the regulatory regimes of foreign governments and private distribution 
companies with transnational footprints. Efforts to quiet objectionable speech from abroad have 
varying power to shape patterns of international communication in the U.S. context. Some 
groups having more impact than others due to how advocacy is framed. The following examples 
illustrate how more effective strategies for limiting international flows are framed as foreign 
policy and national security matters.  
 The blurring of domestic and foreign policy is especially pronounced in the U.S. 
Department of State’s assessment of Al Jazeera as the network gained global notoriety between 
1997 and 2003.58 The State Department is invested in foreign public opinion, making new news 
players an area of interest for the agency, yet its role as media regulator is rarely considered. The 
rise of regional tensions and the department’s investment in managing the perception of regional 
publics pushed the agency to formulate policy in response to what Al Jazeera scholar Marc 
Lynch (2007) called the “restructuring of the Arabic public sphere.” The State Departments 
response, outlined in an internal policy paper (Sharp, 2003) illustrates the media interventionist 
mandate of the U.S. government in contrast to the FCC’s self-restricted role. The white paper 
summarizes the most relevant characteristics of Al Jazeera for American foreign policy in 2003 
and touched on its finances, its editorial independence from Qatar and policy options to manage 
AJ’s potential negative effects regarding perceptions of U.S. foreign policy abroad. The paper 
noted the network’s growing influence and described Al Jazeera’s coverage as sympathetic to 
                                                 
58 The rise of AJ’s profile led scholar Marc Lynch to dub this period the “Al Jazeera Era.” (See Lynch, 2007). 
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Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda. Policy options formulated in the paper considered how to answer 
the image problems created by an Arab network that “claimed editorial independence” from the 
region’s authoritarian governments, suggesting “direct” and “indirect” means of influence. Direct 
measures included the creation of additional U.S. Arabic-language media in the region,59 tying 
foreign aid to favorable “media reform” and buying commercial time on Arab networks to shape 
content.  Indirect policy measures suggested increased official engagement with the network, 
favoring more friendly Arab satellite channels by encouraging advertisers to spend money on 
rival news organizations and, more broadly, “[e]ncourage more privatization of media” through 
the State Department’s Middle East Partnership Initiative (Sharp, 2003). The State Department, 
too, appeared to be cognizant of the transborder flows of information, noting that U.S. 
commercial news agencies relied on Al Jazeera for information on the ground when military 
operations forced most Western reporters out of newsworthy conflict zones (see Samuel-Azran, 
2010).60 
 In conjunction with the State Department, Acts of the House and Senate related to media 
the Congress deems anti-American participate in a sort of preemptive strike to tame public 
opinion abroad and quell contraflow in the name of national security. A prime rationale for 
limiting global flows of news is national security. H.B. 2278 in the 111th U.S. Congress proposed 
limiting the expression of anti-American sentiments in global media by placing restrictions on 
                                                 
59 In 2004, the State Department followed through by creating Al Hurra. The channel has suffered from a credibility 
gap and assessments of its success have largely been negative (see Baylouny, 2005; Dabbous & Nasser, 2009). 
Funding was also given to the METV project, directed by the BBG. 
60 AJ was one of the few news agencies with a deep cultural/political knowledge of region to inform its stories and 
the social connections to news sources. Despite this reliance, mainstream US news often prefaced stories taken from 
AJ as “deviant” and a departure from US journalistic conventions. See Samuel-Azran (2010). 
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those broadcasting dissent (Rep Gus Bilirakis, 2009). While the bill begins with common 
homage to the U.S. model of freedom expression, it outlines the limits of expression rights in the 
threat presented by foreign media’s transnational mobility in satellite carriage: 
Television channels that broadcast incitement to violence against Americans, the 
United States, and others have demonstrated the ability to shift their operations to 
different countries and their transmissions to different satellite providers in order 
to continue broadcasting and to evade accountability (2009, sec. (a)(3)).  
 
The bill sought to designate satellite providers transmitting media associated with terrorist 
groups as themselves “Specially Designated Global Terrorists.”61 The bill went further to suggest 
offending satellite operators should suffer punitive measures and “urge[s] all government and 
private investors who own shares in satellite companies or otherwise influence decisions about 
satellite transmissions to oppose transmissions” of violent anti-Americanism in these media.  
 Though H.B. 2278 languished in committee during the 2009 legislative session, 
restrictions like those proposed by Congress have precedent. In 2004, Congress found that 
satellite news channel Al Manar was too closely associated with anti-Americanism and took 
action to sever its access to private satellite broadcasting services. Congress found that the 
channel’s programming, “in accordance with Hizballah’s policy, openly promotes hatred of and 
graphically glorifies and incites violence, including suicide bombings, against Americans, 
Israelis, and Jews” (U.S. House of Representatives, 2005, p. 16454). Hizballah is both a militant 
resistance organization in Lebanon and an active part of the political establishment with 
parliamentary seats in the Jordanian political process. The State Department’s placement of the 
                                                 
61 The bill specifically cites al-Azsa TV, al-Manar TV, al-Rafidayn TV while including any channel that may fall 
within the definition of “global terrorist” organization as defined by the US government. It is unclear if the bill’s 
sponsors were unaware of the U.S. State Department’s previous action against Al Manar (see overview following) or 
if the Congressional authors were seeking to extend U.S. authority over transnational satellite media content. 
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group on a “Terrorist Exclusion List” prompted removal of the channel by the sole satellite 
company broadcasting in North America.  Section 411 of the USA Patriot Act of 2001 (8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182) gave authority to the Secretary of State and Attorney General to jointly designate 
terrorist organizations for immigration purposes. The “Terrorist Exclusion List” designation 
“bolsters homeland security efforts by facilitating the [United States government’s] ability to 
exclude aliens associated with entities on the TEL from entering the United States” (Department 
of State, 2004). These forms of control in the realm of international communication are 
increasingly common as a means to control media space (Hassanpour, 1998; Monroe E. Price, 
Haas, & Margolin, 2008). Emerging pathways for foreign media and the U.S. response to forms 
of transnational communication strain the commitment to the free flow and free expression 
principles. We can see in bills like H.B. 2278 Congressional attempts to endorse free expression 
as a universal value transcending national borders while carving out exceptions in cases of 
foreign policy matters.  
Cases like these illustrate how foreign policy provides a legitimizing discourse for 
placing limits on media, but foreign policy considerations lead supranational bodies like the 
European Union to place similar limits on foreign media. Moving to further isolate Iran in 
diplomatic battles over its nuclear program in 2012, the European Union expanded an economic 
blockage to include telecommunication service firms hosting Press TV, Iran’s English-language 
news service (Erdbrink, 2012). Press TV’s subsequent turn to its official Youtube channel as an 
alternative means of distribution also met resistance when the Anti-Defamation League called 
attention to the channel’s use of new media, claiming online distribution violated sanctions and 
allowed Iran a “propaganda tool to promote a wide range of pernicious anti-Semitic conspiracy 
theories in English to a worldwide audience” (Mackey, 2013, para. 4). Press TV was duly 
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removed by the video-sharing site managers. 
Following the decision within the European Union, the U.S.-based United Against 
Nuclear Iran (UANI), led by a George W. Bush-era diplomat, Mark D. Wallace, continued the 
isolation of Iran by silencing Press TV. In 2012, UANI pressured Asia Satellite 
Telecommunications Co. Ltd. (AsiaSat) to “end all business activities in Iran and specifically 
cease the broadcast of all Iranian regime transmissions” citing Iran’s violation of international 
nuclear norms and the country’s role as a state sponsor of terrorism (Sandberg, 2012). UANI and 
allied opponents of the Iranian regime claimed U.S. law as a legal basis for removing the channel 
from satellite distribution networks.62  
Limiting foreign speech as domestic policy: anti-foreign media activism in the United States 
Public-interest groups like UANI with leadership already connected to the political elites 
gain traction by positioning their advocacy as a foreign policy concern.63 Advocates seeking to 
limit foreign news without the legitimacy of terrorism or isolating “rogue nations” are more 
likely to be subject U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence. The FCC’s non-interventionism places 
limits on public-interest lobbies that take a protectionist stance as foreign media attempt to enter 
North American markets. As a result, anti-propaganda campaigns gain little traction and develop 
decentralized tactics for limiting the circulation of foreign media.  
Al Jazeera’s growing public profile drew strong criticism from right-leaning political 
factions within U.S. politics at the prospect of the channel’s North American distribution (see, for 
                                                 
62 The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA) and the Iran Threat 
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 are two key U.S. statutes that provide the basis for this indirect form 
of censorship that ostensibly aims at limiting economic relations with Iran. 
63 Zarkin (2003, p. 7) notes two different strategies used in the regulation of indecent speech in the U.S. Insider 
strategies, most often government relations firms, have contacts within the agency and strong familiarity with 
protocols of formal channels to address the commission. Outsider strategies, by contrast, seek influence in less direct 
ways such as grass roots mobilizing and public campaigns. 
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example, Kincaid, 2011). Many commentators characterized the channel as enemy media, 
drawing parallels with World War II propaganda. These groups describe their work as 
investigative journalism in the public interest (Accuracy In Media Staff, 2010) and combine 
journalistic techniques with political advocacy on a broad range of issues. This is the case with 
media critics like Accuracy In Media (AIM). AIM is a conservative media watchdog64 that has 
spearheaded protectionist media activism in U.S. politics, raising awareness through publicity 
campaigns promoting the exclusion of Al Jazeera from carriage deals in Canada and the United 
States and describing the network as “Terror TV.” The group has taken strong positions against 
foreign influence as part of the organization’s larger purpose to combat the U.S. political left. 
AIM works in concert with a set of right-leaning groups, creating coalitions through themed 
conferences to generate action on a range of conservative issues.  
Cliff Kincaid has become the public face of such opposition to Al Jazeera, creating a 
splinter group, America’s Survival, Inc. (ASI). Kincaid’s central concern is with the 
propagandistic potential of foreign broadcasters in the United States. For Kincaid, Al Jazeera is 
little more than a covert form of propaganda promoting the agendas of U.S. enemies:  
It is a voice of the Muslim Brotherhood and associated terrorist groups. Al Jazeera 
has fooled many into thinking it is somehow independent of the regime and 
dedicated to objective news reporting. Hence, the autocratic Emir of Qatar is 
perceived as someone committed to freedom of the press, even though freedom of 
the press does not exist in Qatar itself. (“Personal Interview,” 2012) 
 
In contrast to advocates of global dialog like Bollinger (see also Powers & el-Nawawy, 2009) 
                                                 
64 The organizational mission statement states that AIM “exposes politically motivated media bias; teaches 
consumers to think critically about their news sources; and holds the mainstream press accountable for its 
misreporting” (Accuracy In Media Staff, 2013). Many may dismiss AIM and its associated activists as fringe, but 
this would be a mistake. AIM funds rightist investigative journalism training programs, provides internships in 
conjunction with the Washington, D.C. news museum and engages with academic conferences like the Popular 
Culture Association (Aronoff, 2013).  
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and the realpolitik analysis of global media scholars like Philip Seib (2008) Kincaid’s activism 
portrays media linked to foreign governments as indistinguishable from historical examples like 
the World War II-era Tokyo Rose. Anti-propaganda zeal has prompted Kincaid to publicly object 
even to the multinational ownership of News Corporation, pointing to members of the Saudi 
royal family who own stock in the company.65  
These positions clearly mark the limits of viewpoint diversity. Groups like those led by 
Kincaid have greater tolerance for foreign media that conform to Western notions of financial 
independence,66 but the laissez-faire model of media governance in the U.S. limits the legal tools 
available to U.S. opposition to foreign media. Restrictions on government involvement have led 
such media isolationists to rely on decentralized forms of resistance as an adaptation to the lack 
of content regulation within the U.S. AIM and a set of splinter groups that share conservative 
activist figures have sought a way to police expression of nationalist news media within the 
context of the market-liberal system.  
These efforts include filing complaints with the Federal Election Commission and the 
Department of Justice. AIM has also sought to generate negative publicity through documentary 
production and pressuring commercial distributors by circulating petitions to “stop Al Jazeera” 
(Kincaid, 2011). In addition to general publicity work through AIM and routine appearances at 
                                                 
65 As a result, Kincaid views policies in support of foreign perspectives as a violating of the public trust. Referring to 
the non-profit carriage of Russia Today (RT), Kincaid outlines the general principles of the broader conservative 
isolationist response to foreign broadcasters. “RT is broadcast by MHz networks, a division of Commonwealth 
Public Broadcasting, and available through 30 public TV stations and Comcast cable in the Washington, D.C. and 
other big city metro areas. Commonwealth Public Broadcasting receives over $2 million a year in federal and state 
subsidies. We do not believe American taxpayers should be forced to underwrite foreign propaganda broadcasts into 
the U.S.” (“Personal Interview,” 2012)  
66 Though AIM and Kincaid’s America’s Survival, Inc. have not explicitly outlined ethnicity as the cause of their 
opposition, close institutional connections with figures like Pamela Geller is cause for speculation about the racial 
dimension of anti-foreign media advocates. Geller, for instance, actively publishes books on how to resist the 
“Islamization of America.”  
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the National Press Club (Cliff Kincaid & Charles Ortel on “Al-Jazeera, Global Jihad, and the 
Suicide of the West,” 2011), groups like ASI couple media outreach with pressure on members of 
Congress to launch official investigations of Al Jazeera as a “terrorist entity,” and allow Congress 
to treat the channel as they had Al Manar in 2004. These anxieties regarding foreign media also 
reflect common concerns that American audiences, steeped in Western press norms, are 
particularly prone to being fooled by pretenses of news neutrality. As a result, conservative 
isolationists stake out their own limits to free expression. Kincaid outlines this perspective on 
anti-propaganda limits to the First Amendment: 
Our First Amendment recognizes the rights of private sector media organizations 
to be free from federal interference and control. State-controlled or funded media 
organizations do not necessarily qualify for that protection because of their very 
nature . . . when foreign-funded media enter the U.S. media market, the American 
people have a right to know, under the law, who is behind them, and whether they 
constitute a threat to their safety and well-being and their democratic form of 
government. (“Personal Interview,” 2012) 
 
It is easy to dismiss the conservative isolationist response to foreign media. Efforts to 
limit foreign media in the United States exist at the margins of U.S. political culture. Kincaid’s 
attempts to cajole congressional figures have had no success in terms of initiating official 
investigations. The movement’s failure is due, in part, to the political dissonance in the advocacy 
AIM and ASI endorse: a conservative platform promoting limitations on media circulation. 
While criticism of foreign media may appeal to cultural purists and nationalist American 
worldviews, it runs up against the dominant strain of liberalism of mainstream conservative 
republicans, chief targets of AIM and ASI advocacy in Congress. Still, the agenda he and fellow 
activists pursue has strong resonance with the Congressional proposals like H.B. 2278 and the 
limits to free expression negotiated by such legal restrictions on distribution.  
 Though the anti-propaganda furor of activists like Cliff Kincaid resonates with the larger 
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anti-government ideology in U.S. politics, it has failed to take hold. By 2012, Al Jazeera’s 
incremental entry into U.S. satellite and cable packages forced the channel’s most ardent critics 
to moderate their position. An anti-propaganda platform had failed to galvanize the political 
mainstream against Al Jazeera, though groups continued to take small actions against the news 
organization.67 Kincaid-led opposition has come to demand labels for any news that receives 
funding from a foreign government, citing the Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA). 68  
Industry as principal regulator of flow 
 U.S. public-interest group advocacy on foreign media’s entry has marginal influence. 
Instead, industry is the principal regulator of international flows into the U.S. media system. As 
discussed above, competition among corporate players has been the preferred instrument in 
American policy circles for ensuring that contrasting voices and competing social/political 
interests can be evaluated in democratic deliberation. The entry of CCTV and Al Jazeera into 
U.S. markets illustrates important aspects of how this policy environment integrates foreign 
news. While both have struggled to gain broad distribution, both have used the advantages of 
state support to establish distribution. 
 Foreign networks face the same struggle as any independent channel seeking carriage. 
Barriers to entry for cable channels are high due to the entrenched relationship between massive 
incumbent players in distribution (Time Warner, Comcast) and those in programming (Disney, 
                                                 
67 The enduring animosity toward Al Jazeera is expressed small protests like that seen in the Knox Museum in 2011 
when the American history museum invited an Al Jazeera producer to speak on the network’s coverage of 
democracy movements in the Middle East. The museum was caught in a political firestorm as opposition to Al 
Jazeera called attention to the event and rallied protesters (“Knox Lodge Opens Fire on Knox Museum Over Al-
Jazeera,” n.d.). See also the hostile reception of Al Jazeera reporting staff in Golden, CO in 2008 (Milbank, 2008). 
68 As an example of the decentralized legal strategies to police foreign media, ASI cited the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act in a complaint to the Federal Election Commission. The group requested an investigation of Russia 
Today Television (RT) for fundraising and electioneering in support of Ron Paul during the 2012 U.S. presidential 
primaries (America’s Survival, Inc., 2012). 
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Viacom, etc.). This condition reinforces the status quo by favoring preexisting large-scale 
programmers. The system in place for programming selection in the United States disadvantages 
small distributors as well as small, independent producers. The market conditions produced by 
mergers and concentration in both distribution and program providers have created dysfunction 
in which little competition exists to keep costs within the range of smaller media companies.  
To highlight the gatekeeper function of commercial distribution, it is worth reviewing 
some of the consolidating trends in cable since 2000.69 Over 5000 distinct cable systems serve 
U.S. communities, but matters of efficiency have rationalized consolidation of management and 
ownership. This has led to 1157 cable companies providing multichannel service or “MVPDs”70 
(Federal Communication Commission, 2012, para. 28). Throughout the period Al Jazeera’s 
network executives were initially seeking deals for carriage of English-language programming in 
North America (2005-2007), Comcast was amassing substantial market share, taking ownership 
of smaller cable systems and expanding its own subscriber base. As Comcast’s acquisition of 
NBC concluded in 2011, the company had captured nearly 22 percent of the U.S. pay TV market 
(“Comcast Market Share,” 2011). In 2007, Comcast’s principal commercial rival, Time Warner 
Cable, followed suit, reaching 13.4 percent market share (“Time Warner Cable’s Stablizing Pay-
TV Market Share Is Key To Outlook -,” 2013). The combined holdings of the top two 
distributors amounted to nearly one-third of U.S. cable households. The top five MVPDs in 2006 
                                                 
69 The era of communicative abundance, highlighted by Brian McNair (2006) for instance, is not merely the 
multiplication of voices. The vertical and horizontal integration that structured the cable industry in the first decade 
of the 20th century took place even as the proliferation of foreign broadcasters created more voices seeking space in 
U.S. cable line-ups. These two processes, one centripetal and one centrifugal, create an abundance of voices while 
limiting competition that might give different voices expression through variation in content. Regardless, the 
bottleneck represented by massive and entrenched industry players is an overlooked form of public sphere regulation 
in contemporary U.S. regulation. 
70 Multichannel Video Programming Distributor 
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served 79 percent of all cable MVPD subscribers. By 2010, the top five had 80 percent (Federal 
Communication Commission, 2012, para. 30).   
These market conditions have created a disparity in market power during negotiations for 
channel carriage. MVPDs have greater bargaining power according to subscriber numbers while 
programmers offer content in the form of channels or a suite of channels. Programmer bargaining 
power depends on the popularity, real or potential, of the content and determines what 
distributors are willing to do for that programming. The largest programmers own several cable 
channels and enjoy strong bargaining power as a result. Describing the process of gaining 
carriage on national cable, public-interest researcher Adam Lynn (2012) outlines a tiered system 
that captures the basic dynamics of carriage negotiations. Top-tier programmers, like Disney, are 
paid fees and retain the ad revenue they generate. Second-tier programmers are paid smaller fees 
and also retain ad revenue they generate. Third-tier programmers receive no money from 
distributors and keep the ad revenue. Independent programmers often fall into the fourth tier 
(Lynn, 2010). These upstarts may receive no money from large distributors and give up some 
amount of ad revenue determined through the process of negotiation. Sometimes these new 
channels allege having given up ownership stake in their company to gain distribution.71  
Critics of concentration argue for regulatory reform addressing the problem since 
independent and new content is more likely to be shut out and innovative programming silenced. 
Large cable companies that would be subject to such public-interest regulation counter that non-
affiliation is not the issue and that distribution decisions undermining independent production are 
likely related to distributors’ sense that independents “add little value or diversity” (Federal 
                                                 
71 FCC rules prohibit negotiation practices that require ownership stake or exclusive rights to programming as a 
condition of carriage (see 47 C.F.R. subsection 76.1301(a)-(b)).  
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Communication Commission, 2012, para. 55). But “value” can reflect complex international 
investment strategies.  
CCTV in the United States: “borrowing the ship to go to sea” 
 The economics of distribution did not prevent CCTV from gaining market entry due to 
the value distributors saw in the channel’s home market. Though China’s soft power efforts in 
the United States have attracted some attention from scholars of international affairs (c.f. Nye, 
2013), CCTV’s expansion into the United States stirred little public controversy by comparison 
to its expansion in Canada (see chapter 5) and in Africa (see Xin, 2009). China’s state 
broadcaster has gained distribution quietly in the United States. Since the debut of news 
programming in English in 2000, China has invested heavily in broadening the distribution of its 
media products by targeting private industry as a vehicle for public diplomacy.72 The effort has 
involved intensive rebranding and programming revamps between 2000 and 2010.  
 China’s home market had provided sound financial footing for the broadcaster (see 
chapter three). Economic reforms allowed non-Chinese manufacturers and retailers to compete 
for a piece of the expanding consumer class in China’s first and second tier urban centers. Both 
foreign and domestic advertising dollars flocked to China’s state broadcaster (Fowler, 2008).73 As 
a state-owned enterprise, CCTV had strong success through strategic integration with foreign 
commercial media firms.  
 A similar situation defined the relationship between U.S. distributors and China’s state 
                                                 
72 A strategy Chinese officials called “borrowing the ship to go to sea.”   
73 The coveted “30 seconds of gold,” a time slot during which CCTV broadcast throughout China’s provincial 
networks, became the benchmark for a company’s success. This created what some identified as a bubble in the 
market At the high point of CCTV’s yearly auction for ad space, some analysts were speculating that the prices had 
outstripped realistic appraisals of returns on the media investment. Indeed, overinvestment in advertising expenses 
was credited with the financial collapse of at least one Chinese firm. See chapter 3 for a more detailed analysis of 
CCTV as a hybridized funding model for transnational communication. 
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broadcaster. Western media companies have had little hope of launching channels in mainland 
China (“Television,” 2010).74 Where barriers to market entry in the United States made the 
distribution of Chinese state programming unlikely, the Chinese state stood between foreign 
firms and the Chinese public. Chinese officials saw potential in leveraging their domestic 
viewers as a means to export programming. Thus, one high-ranking official outlined strategies 
for the new China’s new English-language news: “[w]e will allow them to land in China only if 
they help us to distribute our programmes in their home markets” (C. Chan & Yuk-min, 2002, 
para. 30). As a strategy, distribution reciprocity allowed China to gain a foothold in U.S. markets. 
 In 2001, Time Warner (then AOL Time-Warner) negotiated with CCTV to swap Chinese 
markets for U.S. publics. Time Warner would carry CCTV International (then CCTV-9) in New 
York, Houston, and Los Angeles in exchange for distribution rights in China’s wealthiest 
province75 (Smith, 2001).76 Time Warner’s programming, China Entertainment Television 
(CETV), was considered a long-term investment rather than a profit vehicle by Stephen J. 
                                                 
74 Rupert Murdoch has been a famous example of commercial industry being bent to Chinese state power in pursuit 
of Chinese media markets. Murdoch’s public statements about satellite television’s being a threat to authoritarian 
regimes nearly lost him ownership stake a company that had been seeking to enter Chinese telecommunication 
markets. An example of the company’s overcorrection for this gaffe came from Rupert Murdoch’s son, James 
Murdoch, who curried favor by labeling China’s Falun Gong dissidents a “dangerous” and “destabilizing” force 
(Iritani, 2001). China’s strict foreign ownership laws had limited News Corp’s investment strategies which one 
market analyst called “[l]iberalization through the backdoor” (Iritani, 2001, para. 5). 
75 Guangdong Cable TV Networks, Ltd. 
76 Though CCTV’s propaganda purpose had little significant political backlash, the same cannot be said for Chinese 
telecommunications equipment manufacturers. The ideological aversion to government involvement in media has 
justified a range of restrictions on telecommunications equipment and next generation content delivery systems. 
Congress, for instance, has issued warnings to avoid telecommunications manufacturers too closely tied to Chinese 
state power for fear of covert surveillance (U.S. House of Representatives; Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, 2012). Recommendation two in the Intelligence Committee report on Chinese telecommunications 
equipment providers states, “[p]rivate-sector entities in the United States are strongly encouraged to consider the 
long-term security risks associated with doing business with either ZTE or Huawei for equipment or services. U.S. 
network providers and systems developers are strongly encouraged to seek other vendors for their projects. Based on 
available classified and unclassified information, Huawei and ZTE cannot be trusted to be free of foreign state 
influence and thus pose a security threat to the United States and to our systems (U.S. House of Representatives; 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 2012, p. 47).  
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Marcopoto, the company’s Hong Kong-based executive. The deal also allowed Chinese 
authorities to bring the channel under the authority of national censors. CETV had been available 
to the area illegally through black and gray market sales. Cooperative agreements with U.S. 
firms created trust that would place Time Warner in the good graces of party leaders, though the 
company would sustain losses in the short term. CETV offered “no sex, no violence, no news.” A 
similar deal was struck with Adelphia Communications in 2002, adding 2.3 million households 
in Southern California to CCTV’s potential viewership (“Adelphia Inks Deal with CCTV,” 
2002).  
 China’s engagement with U.S. companies led to the formation of China Radio, Film and 
Television Group. The conglomerate was formed as a vehicle for overseas expansion and 
industry consolidation to generate greater market power to match global media firms with plans 
to expand overseas bureaus from thirty to seventy within the decade (Chan & Yuk-min, 2002, 
para. 4).77 The chief Chinese official guiding the transformation, Zhu Hong, characterized 
China’s renewed interest in media power in economic terms: “[w]e have to follow the global 
trend of mergers and acquisitions to gain market share in the marketplace, in order to shore up 
our business and ensure we won’t lose out in the stiff competition” (Chan & Yuk-min, 2002, 
para. 20).78 By 2008, the conglomeration strategy had given Chinese negotiators some degree of 
parity with other global media companies. CCTV easily secured contracts with mainstream 
commercial satellite service providers in 2006 and 2008 to reach Direct-to-Home customer base 
                                                 
77 The Group became China’s largest media company after acquiring content assets from China’s regulator, State 
Administration of Radio, Film and Television (Chan & Yuk-min, 2002). By 2010, CCTV alone would have 50 
bureau around the world.  
78 In 2004, CCTV announced four additional channels for foreign audiences as a “brand-building exercise” more 
than revenue generating move. Still, as a multichannel, international media company, CCTV had earned 70 billion 
Yuan in 2002 and 80 billion Yuan in 2003 in advertising revenue (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 2004). 
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(“Intelsat Renews CCTV,” 2008). A deal with Cisneros Group, a global privately held media 
firm, facilitated CCTV’s entry into Ibero-american markets in a deal Telecommunications 
Business called a “breakthrough agreement in international communications” between “great 
cultures.”  
 Time Warner’s entry in 2002 with China Entertainment Television (CETV) was heralded 
as a significant moment of economic liberalization for China, celebrated in the atmosphere of 
China’s ascendency to the World Trade Organization. The company was the first to convince 
Chinese regulators to grant concessions to foreign media owners. By 2009, Xinhua’s president Li 
Congjun hosted World Media Summit79 in Beijing. In a speech, Time Warner’s Marcopoto, co-
chairperson at the summit, said “China’s global development will benefit from ties that would 
create a dynamic international media industry, and fully adhering to the country’s broadcasting 
code . . . . [China] will grow its own Time Warner. We at Turner want to, and will continue to be, 
part of that transformation” (“Time Warner eyes bigger market,” 2009, para. 13). To this end, 
China had spent a reported $6.4 billion on the global expansion of state media operations by 
2011 (Branigan, 2011). 
Al Jazeera in the United States: politics of distribution 
Digital distribution strategies and subsidized non-commercialism characterized Al 
Jazeera’s early push into the United States, but these strategies did not earn the channel major 
distribution deals. For Al Jazeera, successes in places like Asia were a sharp contrast to 
expansion in U.S. markets. At Al Jazeera’s launch of its English channel (AJE) in late 2006, the 
network hoped to have 40 million homes lined up. Exceeding its benchmark, AJE launched with 
                                                 
79 AP, Reuters, Xinhua, Kyodo, ITAR TASS, News Corporation, BBC, CNN and Google 
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a base of 80 million viewers, none in the United States. The apparent aversion to new 
international news providers prompted one industry observer to blame the “xenophobic giant 
media companies that control what this seemingly parochial nation watches or, in this case, does 
not watch on television” (Paskowski, 2006). After spending tens of millions to build high-
definition broadcast facilities in the United States, Britain, Qatar, and Malaysia, AJE found cable 
and satellite providers reluctant to bring the channel into their packages due to its parent 
company’s perceived association with terrorism. 
Al Jazeera’s image problem in the United States stemmed, in part, from the war of 
information waged shortly after 9/11. Disagreement over Al Jazeera’s framing of U.S. policy in 
the region engendered an atmosphere of suspicion. Administration officials began pressuring the 
Qatari emir to rein in the negative tone of the coverage. The broadcast of Osama bin Laden’s 
taped announcements that followed in October continued to erode relations, leading high-level 
officials to accuse the network of airing propaganda and portraying the Arab broadcasts as an 
enemy communication weapon for coded messages. Such hostility toward the media outlet 
became less rhetorical when, in November 2001, U.S. military forces fired missiles into Al 
Jazeera’s office in Kabul, Afghanistan. With Iraq in 2003, the network again became a 
centerpiece. Cabinet officials reiterated their attacks on the network. The 2004 State of the Union 
address also maligned the network as a source of “hateful propaganda.” By the time the invasion 
was a fait accompli, U.S. forces had twice bombed broadcast facilities and held AJA cameraman 
Sami Al Hajj as an untried enemy combatant in Guantanamo Bay (Pew Research Center, 2006).  
Such consistent characterization of the network as an enemy news source had tangible 
effects on the network’s ability to function. Newsgathering access and ad revenue dried up as a 
consequence of the tumultuous political atmosphere. Advertisers AOL and Yahoo! quickly 
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retracted ad campaigns on the network. Al Jazeera reporters complained of difficulties in finding 
willing interviewees, and, in response to coverage during the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, the 
New York Stock Exchange banned several Arab broadcasters from reporting on the trading floor. 
After the fall of Iraq, the Iraqi interim government, under U.S. leadership, suspended Al Jazeera 
reporters, further limiting the network’s newsgathering capabilities (Pew Research Center, 2006). 
Operational impediments followed from the prejudice instilled by the war of news frames. 
DataPipe and Akamai Technologies, media companies that had signed contracts to provide 
technical support and broadcast equipment, pulled out of supply and service agreements. Day-to-
day business was set back when insurance companies refused to offer policies to broadcasting 
staff, and Al Jazeera’s Washington bureau lost its office space when a U.S. television production 
company nullified its lease. Al Jazeera’s virtual space also came under attack from hackers, 
redirecting traffic to porn sites or overwriting the channel’s home page with messages like “Let 
Freedom Ring” to disrupt page viewing (Miles, 2006).  While many of these setbacks in day-to-
day operations have clear links to the political atmosphere, much of Al Jazeera’s struggle for 
major distribution deals is the result of industry concentration.  
Industry analysts point to the loose relationship between the politics surrounding Al 
Jazeera and the private decisions of distributors. Industry analyst Paul Maxwell summed up the 
position of U.S. cable distributors the year Al Jazeera launched AJE: “With the climate in the 
U.S. and the way the [Bush administration] government behaves toward the network, who needs 
the bother?” (Halloran, 2006, p. 38). The early experience of distributors confirms this suspicion. 
Three years after its 2006 launch, Al Jazeera’s English news channel had found only two U.S. 
distributors. The first, Buckeye Cablesystem, is a private cable operator with an audience of 
147,000 homes in northern Ohio. Buckeye accepted the channel shortly after AJE’s launch, 
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causing Buckeye owner Allan Block to receive threats from an angered public. Municipally 
owned Burlington Telecom of Vermont added 1,000 viewers (Luce, 2007), though Youmans 
(2011)has documented the public objections raised around distribution in Vermont.  
Outside of these early limited successes and the Arabic language channel’s availability 
through Dish TV’s specialty packages, cable distributors passed over Al Jazeera channels. An 
examination of U.S. deals the network inked between 2006 and 2011 shows that success came 
through two avenues. The first is public interest/nonprofit. It was Burlington Telecom’s public 
mission and the retransmission services of the nonprofits MHZ Networks, LinkTV, and Free 
Speech TV that facilitated AJE’s early expansion over and against the failures to gain traction 
through mainstream private avenues. The second avenue, while private, was through smaller 
cable distributors such as Buckeye. Despite comments from industry figures about the reluctance 
to carry the brand due to political circumstances, the explanation for Al Jazeera’s shortfall in the 
United States is not primarily political. More subtle influence through the administration’s public 
battle with the network may have influenced what Washington insiders referred to as “optics,” 
but there is thin evidence that pressure from political officials was decisive. The economics of 
distribution in the United States created the conditions for distributors to pass over AJE even 
before considering political appearances.  
On the surface, this reasoning on the part of distributors appears inapplicable to the 
decisions to deny AJE mainstream distribution. The channel offered unique international 
programming and arguably from a substantially different political and cultural orientation than 
peer networks. There were loud calls for the channel from consumers and the press for its 
independent perspective. While the hostile political environment in the United States was 
substantial during its initial network growth, AJE’s halted entry from 2006 to 2011 was mainly 
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the result of structural issues related to industry concentration. With little evidence of financial 
benefit for distributors and no set of committed advertisers, AJE had little bargaining power. As a 
result, AJE content managed to appear on U.S. television through public-interest and nonprofit 
sectors of U.S. broadcasting as well as small distributors that were less competitive with larger 
companies. Many outlets aired only portions of the programming, placing the news hour among 
a buffet of international news content.  
As of 2012, Al Jazeera’s availability in the US remained limited with one notable 
exception. Segment retransmission continued through Direct TV’s “public interest” package and 
the full Arabic channel in Dish Network’s Arabic package. Similarly, piecemeal network growth 
has progressed through programming deals with public service broadcasters like KCET80 (Jensen, 
2011) and smaller cable companies that serve small networks of cities. In terms of major 
distributors, two million subscribers were added in a deal with New York City’s Time Warner 
Cable and Verizon FiOS. The story of AJE’s early network expansion into North America 
highlights the role of public and noncommercial mechanisms in North America as a means to 
diversify the public’s informational resources.  
Buying a back door: Al Jazeera’s acquisition of Current TV 
The scattered distribution AJ executives cobbled together in this way was dissatisfactory. 
New York City distribution through Time Warner was only a portion of the cable company’s 
national scope. A more robust distribution profile was considered vital for the channel’s long 
term success. This is because advertising revenues have a couple of different functions in the 
success of the programmer. Advertising, first, has obvious implications for programmer 
                                                 
80 Notably, AJ’s addition to the former PBS affiliate gave KCET a ratings boost of 135 percent in 2011. 
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revenues. Normal commercial programming relies on such revenue for operational expenses. Al 
Jazeera’s ability to rely on state funding makes it somewhat immune to advertiser demands. 
However, securing advertiser contracts has a secondary value in securing distribution. The 
common practice of offering a portion of advertising revenues as a cost of carriage on cable 
networks means distribution is contingent on showing the promise of profitability in this area. 
On the other hand, advertisers are wary until a channel has reasonable distribution deals. AJE 
had stalled in expanding household availability through its piecemeal method, and major 
distributors continued to appear reluctant to make space.  
A shift in Al Jazeera’s fortunes came in early 2013 with the acquisition of Current TV for 
a reported $500 million. Current TV, a struggling news channel created by former Vice President 
Al Gore and Joel Hyatt years earlier, had poor ratings performance: 22,000 households compared 
to the 1.9 million tuned into Fox News during the same period (Addley, 2013). Current TV’s 
value was in the distribution deals the channel had established under Gore and Hyatt’s 
leadership. Current reached 60 million U.S. homes compared with Al Jazeera English’s 4.7 
million (Edgecliffe-Johnson, 2013).  
With Current TV’s distribution contracts, Al Jazeera launched Al Jazeera America 
(AJAM) in August of 2013 and reinvested in news production, staffing the enterprise with 900 
journalists in 12 cities. Two months after the acquisition, AJAM received 18,000 applications for 
170 openings (Powell, 2013). Al Jazeera executives identified the network’s profit potential in 
the American viewer’s appetite for “unbiased coverage” that was “missing from the 
marketplace.” “There will be less opinion, less yelling and fewer celebrity sightings,” said Ehab 
Al Shihab, AJAM’s interim chief executive. “We are not infotainment. We are in-depth and 
informative” (Steel, 2013a, p. 14).  
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As the deal went through, however, Time Warner nullified its contract with Current TV 
and, by extension, the channel’s new owners, reducing AJAM’s launch distribution to 41 million. 
AT&T would also drop the channel from its U-Verse line-up the night before AJAM was to 
debut, removing an additional 5 million households in Texas and California. Al Jazeera 
immediately filed suit claiming a breach of contract (Steel, 2013b). AJAM eventually regained 
Time Warner homes in non-public negotiations by offering the cable company marketing and 
advertising sales support (Stelter, 2013).  
Negotiating U.S. television economics raised concerns about the network’s ability to 
maintain its trumpeted independence. The network’s attempt to appeal to American audiences 
involved hiring a number of staff from existing news media in the United States. The new 
president of AJAM, for instance, would be ABC News veteran, Kate O’Brian. Contrasting itself 
with Al Jazeera English, AJAM promised American news for the American audience. Executives 
originally planned to use AJE programming but, fearing the brand carried too much anti-
American baggage, opted for original all-American content. More damaging, AJE’s staff chaffed 
publicly when editors removed an op-ed by Columbia journalism professor, Joseph Massad, 
from the network’s online portal after the article had been attacked by pro-Israel media figures. 
Staff began anonymously commenting on the influence of “risk-adverse” consulting firms like 
DLA Piper and Qorvis Communications that many saw as neutering the channel’s critical force 
(Greenwald, 2013). A prominent journalist for Al Jazeera, Marwan Bishara, wrote network 
executives to criticize what he saw as accommodating the demands for U.S. distribution at the 
cost of journalistic integrity by minimizing the network’s adversarial stance:  
Have we signed a deal where AJAM program/content must be substantially 
different from AJE? Really!!!! . . . . Does the fear of contractual obligations with 
carriers etc. mean it’s necessary for some to do whatever they want with 
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Aljazeera, including banning AJE altogether from America and web livestream, 
just when they themselves try to make the case for a 21st century type of 
television news!!! . . . . And now have we moved from the main idea that the 
strength of AJN lies in the diversity, plurality and even accents of its journalists to 
a channel where only Americans work . . . . (Greenwald, 2013, para. 8–9) 
 
Organizational change at the network was also taking place in the months preceding the 
acquisition of Current TV. In contrast to early expansion strategies, much of the global public-
mindedness based in non-commercialism appeared to be waning as Qatar invested in the new 
channel BeIN Sports (Belson, 2012). Coincidentally, the network cut staff at the Kuala Lumpur 
center by 80% as network development funds diverted to soccer broadcasting rights (Nicholson, 
Campbell, Panja, & Richenberg, 2012). At once, a member of the Qatari royal family and natural 
gas executive, Sheikh Ahmed bin Jassim al Thani, took over the network directorship, 
undermining the channel’s claim of independence (Stebbins, 2011). Tony Burman, himself 
instrumental in Al Jazeera’s entry into Canada in 2009,  questioned changes in the network in the 
run up to the creation of AJAM: “In order to win over America’s media and political elites, Al 
Jazeera’s senior management in Doha is placing its ‘brand’ of fearless, provocative international 
journalism at considerable risk” (Burman, 2013, para. 10).  
Conclusion: U.S. regulation in the era of global media 
Horwitz (2005) has pointed out that there is limited evidence that ownership regulation 
results in the desired viewpoint diversity, at least according to the forms of proof policymakers 
and legislators rely on. These cases, though, point to the role of concentration in disadvantaging 
independent production. Both AJ and CCTV gained entry by leveraging resources unavailable to 
homegrown independent voices. The combination of the U.S. policy context, weakening foreign 
news resources in the U.S. commercial news industry and the growth of foreign networks points 
to questions about the role of foreign news in the United States and interpretations of public-
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interest principles. Can we rely on market mechanisms to provide a pluralistic media? Can a free 
market of concentrated industries adapt to new notions of pluralism in the age of global 
interconnectivity?  
U.S. policies of non-intervention have allowed a redefinition of the public interest in 
commercial terms. The erosion of public-interest regulation and anti-concentration rules redefine 
media as a commodity and private property. Economic efficiency stands in for public-spirited 
pluralism. This places limits on the kind of media pluralism that can take shape with important 
consequences for the foreign mediascape represented in the U.S. public sphere. U.S. liberalism 
has been widely interpreted as a negative value in U.S. media policy. An anti-government 
political philosophy animates restrictions on government power. The anti-tyranny spirit is woven 
into American DNA, protected as the first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution.  But speech 
rights and the media policy values that followed from the American interpretation of liberalism 
are rooted in a national perspective and contingent on regional media norms. As news cultures 
become more accessible to one another, these norms are challenged and their universality tested. 
The examples in CCTV and Al Jazeera suggest continued relaxation of media ownership 
has limited foreign media to those who provide value to major distributors. Plurality through the 
market tends toward parochialism in as much as distributors prefer more profitable domestic 
media. The result is a market-shaped intellectual isolation from international debates. The market 
does, however, respond to forms of financial power, making the U.S. media system receptive to 
contraflow backed by massive government investment. In both cases market power dictated what 
kind of contraflow could enter.  
Al Jazeera’s funding from Qatar and long-term investments in their online presence, a 
strong branding campaign, and sustained excellence in news reporting that earned international 
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acclaim all contributed to the network’s eventual entry. But the conditions of Al Jazeera 
America’s entry highlight the pay-to-play culture of American media business. Where growing 
consumer demand and a popular profile could not convince large cable managers to include the 
foreign network beyond niche retransmission, Al Jazeera relied on deep pockets of its national 
benefactor to buy its way through the backdoor. CCTV gained entry by leveraging its home 
market, tapping into its power as a state-owned enterprise. The Chinese government’s 
monopolistic control of its domestic media system meant the burgeoning Chinese middle class 
could be used to entice AOL-TW to swap U.S. distribution for access to China.  
Free flow justifies imbalances in the process of reception, obscuring the role of power. It 
functions as what scholars of democratic deliberation call an “exclusive norm” (Young, 2002) in 
media governance despite the aura of non-intervention it carries. In conjunction with other 
features of neoliberal media policy, the reliance on market dynamics as the prime regulator 
prevents paternalistic governmental authority from playing an overbearing and anti-democratic 
role in shaping media systems. But this policy formation also prevents public policy from 
playing a more positive role to mitigate the harmful externalities in relying on the market to 
provide for pluralism and diversity. The role of “negative policy,” or a policy of non-
intervention, has an unappreciated influence on the U.S.’s relationship with foreign news. This 
has become apparent with the proliferation of global voices.  
Media regulation principles need rethinking in light of increased international flows. 
Viewpoint diversity and representational pluralism (political visibility and participation) may be 
redefined once again. As they had been with the rise of civil rights and the increased expanding 
political agency of domestic minorities, a new conception of those deserving of representation 
may begin with the recognition of foreign news as a resource for competent decision-making 
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about the U.S.’s relationship with the globe. This kind of change risks opening the gates to a 
flood of state-based media, but there is strong evidence this form of diversity could enrich public 
sphere diversity and breathe intelligence into public deliberation on U.S. foreign affairs. 
The goal of a policy structure that invites global diversity is a revamped civic knowledge 
for the 21st century. It can no longer remain mired in a parochialism that reduces public discourse 
to elite views of foreign affairs. Through positive content regulation and support for global 
diversity beyond that which is commercially viable for large firms, U.S. citizens may develop 
deeper knowledge of world affairs and gain agency over one of the largest portions of the 
national budget and make more informed decisions about cases for war. This would mean 
embracing free expression’s most important tenet by inviting criticism of the U.S.’s role in the 
world and giving it a place in American public discourse.  
Inconsistency in application of liberal pluralism and the free flow doctrine reveal how 
these policies obscure matters of choice and mask asymmetries of power in determining the 
nature of the media system. Choices that determine the nature of the U.S. relationship to foreign 
news sources are political but remain beyond the capacity of public scrutiny due to the 
assumption that choices of the marketplace are governed by neutral mechanisms, safeguarded by 
the First Amendment and the philosophy of non-intervention. Power is hidden by the FCC’s 
emphasis on constitutional restraint and the turn to the market as the means to allocate 
communicative power among a shifting set of stakeholders in communication policy. Challenges 
to pluralist values have become clearer with the proliferation of news broadcasters from outside 
the United States, undermining claims of governmental policy agnosticism based in liberal 
notions of non-intervention.  
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Chapter 5 
Chinese Media in Canada: social conflicts, media activism and the geopolitics of 
international media flows 
 
Chapter Abstract: This chapter outlines major events in legal conflicts over Chinese and Arabic 
media in Canada between 2000 and 2009. I discuss a number of decisions related to the 
regulation of foreign media in Canada, focusing on the battles over the distribution of China 
Central Television (CCTV) and Al Jazeera (AJ) with a focus on CCTV. The judgments of 
Canadian media regulators illustrate how principles of pluralism that have provided the 
normative basis for policy decisions are challenged by media globalization. The analysis 
suggests pluralism needs to be rethought in light of the mainstreaming of news-diplomacy and 
the multipolarity of news flows in the 21st century. The regulatory decisions involve weighing the 
possibility of foreign news violating abusive speech prohibitions. In this chapter, I question the 
normative dimensions of these debates, proposing that questions of power are ignored by the 
current system, particularly when debate is restricted to a choice of free expression versus social 
responsibility. The chapter briefly discusses features of Canadian multicultural/media policy and 
the contours of the conflicts imported with foreign news media. I then offer an analysis of the 
decisions from a radical pluralist perspective to reveal how the distribution of communicative 
power remains agnostic to disparities of material and political power of stakeholders in the 
Canadian public sphere. 
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Introduction 
Chapters two and three point to the hybrid techniques of media production and 
distribution in global media flows. The marriage of government and commercial forms of 
finance is in resurgence in this context, coinciding with the rise of a more multipolar economic 
world. This funding model also coincides with increased penetration of developed and saturated 
North American markets, new news producers often explicitly branding themselves as 
completing a picture of the world with the explicit suggestion that Anglo-American media offer 
an incomplete picture of the world. Russia Today, rebranded as RT after its 2005 launch, asks 
potential viewers to “Question More.” France24 launched with the provocative motto 
“Everything you are not supposed to know” (“Live from Paris,” 2006). These suggestive 
branding campaigns build on popular distrust of mainstream commercial media and purport to 
provide diverse and robust news in a time when many North American news organizations 
endure contracting news budgets, shifting technological platforms, thinning ad spending and a 
withering foreign bureau system (Hayden, 2013; Pew Research Center, 2009, 2013).  
While economic shifts in advertising revenue have forced 20th century business models of 
commercial journalism to pare back and re-strategize, government sponsorship has allowed 
foreign news programmers like China Central Television (CCTV) and Al Jazeera (AJ) to expand 
bureau networks and programming distribution in the wake of traditionally dominant players’ 
retreat. In the case of CCTV, I argue in chapter three that the broadcaster’s integration with 
transnational capital as a media sector State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) provided the basis for 
China’s state broadcaster to expand its horizon and move into new national arenas as a global 
broadcaster. Not only did CCTV’s embrace of advertising revenues as a domestic network in the 
early 1990s allow the station to become profitable but the relationships fostered provided the 
 179 
 
179
organizational experience and cultural capital to navigate foreign media systems. This provided 
the basis for the revitalization of Chinese soft power in the global arena by strategically 
harmonizing its political objectives with those of transnational advertisers. As a commercially 
viable media company, it could make political use of commercial revenues. Al Jazeera, despite a 
reputation for fierce independence from authoritarian regimes (El-Nawawy & Iskandar, 2003), 
remains a quasi-government venture and serves diplomatic functions while also pursuing 
lucrative assets as a network (Belson, 2012; “The Politics of Al Jazeera or the Diplomacy of 
Doha,” 2005). Both are examples of commercially competitive diplomatic vehicles that misfit 
Western analytic categories. As a result, it is no surprise that regulatory debates in Canada came 
to center on how to view CCTV. The political work these news organizations did for their 
patrons was a problem in North America. 
This chapter outlines the public and regulatory battles over the importation of Chinese 
and Arabic media in Canada between 2001 and 2006. These battles serve as a means to evaluate 
the capacity for national media regulation to effectively and democratically respond to the 
growth of foreign media networks into North America. I examine four battles over Canada’s 
reception of foreign news, one in which the Canadian Radio-Television Telecommunications 
Commission (CRTC) evaluated competing claims about Al Jazeera Arabic’s (AJA) fitness for 
distribution in Canada and three in which the distribution of Chinese media became the subject 
of legal disputes in three forums: the Canadian Broadcasting Standards Council, the Canadian 
courts and, finally, the CRTC. Based on a critical assessment of the quasi-judicial decisions, I 
argue that the liberal and pluralist principles of Canadian regulation prevent a full consideration 
of how power functions in an age of global media contraflow (D. K. Thussu, 2007).  
The chapter is organized into three sections. The first discusses the Canadian regulatory 
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context and offers a brief history Canadian multiculturalism and media pluralism. The second 
outlines the main features of the social conflicts surrounding CCTV’s move into Canada. Finally, 
I take up these four decisions that defined the contest over foreign media in Canada to analyze 
the norms that govern regulatory decisions and how three venues of Canadian media regulation 
employed North American norms of impartiality in making decisions about foreign media in 
Canada and, as a result, ignored asymmetries of power. Taking a position on the normative 
dimensions of global media integration, I argue that, despite legal protections for pluralism and 
multiculturalism, Canadian media governance shows signs of naïve pluralism and ignores power, 
guided by a construction of policy as an impartial and apolitical space.  
Liberal and deliberative pluralisms: the radical pluralist critique of Canadian media governance 
Normative theory is, as Christians, et al, describe, “best understood as a repertoire of 
explanatory resources, a continuing conversation that can be called into play when a given 
context lacks clarity about democratic procedures of public discourse” (2009, p. 67). To evaluate 
Canada’s handling of conflicts over Arabic and Chinese media, I use radical pluralism as a lens 
to shed light on the relationship between Canadian regulatory norms and their relationship to 
economic and political power in making decisions about the distribution of another form of 
power: communicative power (Karppinen, 2013). As discussed in chapter 1, the radical pluralist 
model stands outside of two dominant models of democratic governance related to media 
pluralism: the liberal and deliberative models. Media governance in the United States 
demonstrates heavy reliance on market forces to govern media content and, by extension, foreign 
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news entry.81 By contrast, Canadian media governance has a more elaborate regulatory system 
for channel additions which includes public comment. The liberal and deliberative models of 
media governance are reflected in the US and in Canada.82 The key difference between the two in 
terms of media policy is the institutional space for citizens to challenge major decisions in 
distribution through the deliberative space provided by the CRTC. 
In keeping with radical pluralism, my analysis is a critical assessment of how Canadian 
media governance copes with challenges to pluralism presented by international news flows. 
Radical pluralism does not posit new universal principles to guide media regulation, i.e. 
absolutist notions of free speech found in the liberal tradition and idealistic models of consensus 
that define the deliberative tradition. Rather, the value of a radical pluralist critique “lies above 
all in generating a series of challenging dilemmas or in problematizing monistic orthodoxies of 
all types” (Karpinnen 2013, p. 59). As a theoretical position, radical pluralism stands outside of 
both the liberal and deliberative models. Radical pluralism more acutely focuses on questions of 
power that are obscured by deliberative policy processes governing the distribution of 
communication resources and thus provides ground for criticism of Canadian media policy.  
 The Canadian legal-regulatory context: a brief history of multiculturalism 
Canada is an interesting case study of media pluralism policies due to its specific history 
as a politically liberal democracy in close proximity to the US and the social struggles over the 
bilingual makeup of the Canadian population. The evolution of its media system reflects both 
protectionism and openness, a schizophrenic condition driven by a fear of being culturally 
                                                 
81 As discussed in chapter 4, national security and terrorism-related concerns are the exception to U.S. policies of 
non-intervention in media markets. 
82 The terms Liberal and deliberative, in my usage here, are more focused on forms of media governance rather than 
system-wide descriptors as found in Hallin and Mancini’s Comparing Media Systems (2004). 
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overwhelmed-- losing the center of Canadian identity --and undermining domestic 
multiculturalism by insisting on an essentialist conception of what it means to be Canadian. A 
brief history of these policies provides the background for my discussion of recent conflicts over 
foreign media that present new challenges for national pluralism policies in the age of media 
globalization. 
Canadian media regulatory policy has been fundamentally shaped by its relationship to 
the United States (Marc Raboy, 1990a). Foreign ownership, for instance, has been a prime 
concern for the CRTC. To maintain sufficient Canadian character in industry, the CRTC prohibits 
the licensing of non-Canadian applicants. The Broadcasting Act, for example, gives significant 
regulatory power to the CRTC in a "control in fact" test. This test allows the CRTC to deny a 
broadcasting license to any company the commission determines violates the spirit of the law. 
Even if the share of votes among investors with controlling stake in a media firm appear to make 
the company “Canadian-owned,” the CRTC can prevent acquisitions and mergers that risk 
ceding control of Canadian media to non-Canadians (Armstrong, 2010, pp. 205–206). These 
restrictions regarding foreign media and foreign ownership underline a policy-driven concern for 
maintaining an authentically “Canadian” media industry.83 
Contemporary policy efforts to maintain Canadian national identity grew from early 
efforts to establish national unity through the new technology of radio in the 1920s. For many 
national policymakers creating legislation to govern the new medium, nationalization of 
broadcasting was a logical means to this end. The majority of nations developing radio policy 
felt the new medium too important to be left to market forces (Emery, 1969; Wood, 1994). 
                                                 
83 Maintaining Canadian ownership and content is additionally supported through the national public broadcaster 
(CBC) and subsidies for local news and arts. 
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Likewise, concerns over national identity frequently led to the designation of a national language 
and similar official and unofficial endorsements of certain cultural practices around family, 
customs, culture and political thought. Identity preservation was similarly hardwired into the 
Canadian government’s relationship with broadcasting. Since the 1929 Aird Commission’s 
decision to establish public broadcasting and privilege a public system over a more fully 
commercial model developing in the United States, defending Canadian identity from dissipation 
has been a central mandate of Canadian broadcasting authorities’ stated mission (Armstrong, 
2010, p. 26; Marc Raboy, 1990a, p. 49). The Aird Commission described Canadian broadcasting 
as a “force in fostering a national spirit and interpreting national citizenship,” but made some 
room for diversity of national identity along provincial lines (Royal Commission on Radio 
Broadcasting, 1929).  
The changing nature of Canadian identity as well as the changing regard for cultural 
diversity in liberal democracies during the latter half of the 20th century influenced media policy. 
Canada’s media policy and official multiculturalism became sensitive to the needs of subnational 
cultural and linguistic communities within the larger national community. While Canada’s 
earliest cultural policy took on this more monolithic approach to domestic culture, it was 
challenged by the separatist movements in French-speaking Quebec in 1968. The response was 
an embrace of a bilingual Canadian identity. The accommodation of two linguistic cultures in the 
late 1960s set a precedent for multiculturalist media policies in later decades, followed by the 
broader multiculturalism policy of 1971 and the passage of Bill C-93, the Canadian 
Multiculturalism Act of 1988 (Thomas, 1992). 
The 1991 Broadcasting Act codified the multicultural obligations of the Canadian 
broadcasting system. Relevant portions of the Act capture both impulses to protect national 
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identity while legally inscribing a “Canadian interest” in linguistic and cultural plurality. The 
legislation84 provided official recognition of linguistic and cultural diversity within the Canadian 
population, prioritizing both an authentic Canadian identity while avoiding the monolithic 
interpretation of that identity. These policies foregrounded the need for Canadian media to be 
inclusive and represent actually existing diversity of social interests. As Goff has put it, “[r]ather 
than attempting to create a national identity that transcends the linguistic, regional and ethnic 
divisions within the Canadian community, the federal government has co-opted these differences 
and made them synonymous with ‘Canadian’” (2006, p. 42). 
The Broadcasting Act offers additional institutional support for multiculturalism by 
outlining the obligations of Canadian broadcasters and programming distributors. Canadian 
media law compels companies to both preserve Canadian identity and facilitate diversity of 
content to reflect a “mosaic” model of that identity. This tension becomes most clear in 
regulations governing multi-language programming. Broadcasting law makes room for non-
Canadian contributions to Canadian television, allowing for multicultural inclusiveness in media 
through “third-language” programming: 
(f)   each broadcasting undertaking shall make maximum use, and in no case less 
than predominant use, of Canadian creative and other resources in the creation 
and presentation of programming, unless the nature of the service provided by the 
                                                 
84 (d)   the Canadian broadcasting system should 
(i)   serve to safeguard, enrich and strengthen the cultural, political, social and economic fabric of 
Canada, 
(ii)   encourage the development of Canadian expression by providing a wide range of 
programming that reflects Canadian attitudes, opinions, ideas, values and artistic creativity, by 
displaying Canadian talent in entertainment programming and by offering information and 
analysis concerning Canada and other countries from a Canadian point of view, 
(iii)   through its programming and the employment opportunities arising out of its operations, 
serve the needs and interests, and reflect the circumstances and aspirations, of Canadian men, 
women and children, including equal rights, the linguistic duality and multicultural and 
multiracial nature of Canadian society and the special place of aboriginal peoples within that 
society . . . (Government of Canada, 2012, my emphasis). 
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undertaking, such as specialized content or format or the use of languages other 
than French and English, renders that use impracticable, in which case the 
undertaking shall make the greatest practicable use of those resources; 
(Government of Canada, 1991 emphasis mine). 
 
Critical media scholars have framed the Canadian-ownership exemption for third-language 
programs as a matter of civic participation. Raboy, McIver and Shtern (2010, p. 113) note how 
“[t]he success or failure of Canadian media in fulfilling [its multicultural mandate] can be 
considered either an enabling or disabling mechanism that stimulates inclusion and participation 
in civil life.” Canadian regulators attempt to resolve the potential exclusive effects of insisting on 
Canadian content by including multiculturalism as a core evaluative criterion in approving 
content for distribution.  
Still, the commercial context of Canadian broadcasting continued to exert influence and 
structure the operational logic among in conversations among media system stakeholders. 
Critical assessments following the 1991 Act remained skeptical that such public policy would be 
effective given the weakening of the public-interest at large through increased commercialization 
of the Canadian media system (Marc Raboy, 1990a; for history, see Smythe, 1981). According to 
Eric Thomas (1992), Canadian broadcasting policy structured industrial and public interests in 
such a way that an “economic imperative in broadcasting pose[d] a specific threat to ethnic and 
racial minorities.” Maximizing audience market shares “has tended to exclude ethnic and racial 
minorities from television programming on the basis that their numbers were negligible.” 
Thomas goes on: 
Paradoxically, the same market approach that favoured the exclusion of ethnic and 
racial minorities from broadcasting is now [1990s] being used by various pressure 
groups to convince advertisers and broadcasters that minority groups represent a 
significant untapped market. Given the locus of broadcasting, i.e., profit, such 
economic arguments may well prove to have greater success than those based on 
notions of public service, culture or nationhood. If the cultural policy goals . . . are 
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to be translated in broadcasting, it would seem that such goals would have to pass 
by the commodification of culture, with the obvious dangers of stereotyping and 
fetishism of folklore (1992, para. 58). 
 
Though media pluralism became a value with legal force in Canadian policy, the broadly 
commercial basis, what Thomas calls the “economic imperative,” remained the overarching 
condition following the 1991 act, favoring arguments that illustrated economic potential rather 
than public policy principles.  
Examining the years following, however, it is clear that Canadian policymakers were not 
willing to pin the hopes of maintaining media multiculturalism to the economic self-interests of 
commercial industries alone. The CRTC’s has continued to shape market forces to meet the 
social needs of an empirically multicultural nation. Peter Foster, director of the CRTC’s 
television division, rationalized the need for public regulatory oversight as fulfilling an ethical 
obligation that commercial motivations ignore: 
The CRTC’s cultural mandate would not exist if the market would provide the . . .  
programming . . . The joke [among CRTC staff] is that the floors become the 
ceilings. If you require a broadcaster to do 60%, that’s what they’ll do. Not a half 
percentage more. I think that is proof right there. In the absence of those 
requirements . . . the bottom line is ultimately more lucrative . . . .” (personal 
interview Foster, 2012) 
 
Foster’s experience in media governance underlines the limits of the Canadian commercial 
media system. Canadian media policymakers cannot rely on market forces to enable robust 
participation in Canadian civic life across cultural and linguistic divisions in Canadian society.  
In addition to multicultural legal frameworks, Canadian media regulation features strong 
public participation in decisions about third-language programming. The CRTC process of 
deliberation provides a venue for significant public involvement in media policy decisions 
(Raboy et al., 2010). Still, the carriage approval debates surrounding Al Jazeera Arabic in 2004 
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and the legal challenges to Chines media illustrate fundamental tensions in reconciling policies 
of pluralism with free expression principles in the context of Canada’s commercial media 
industries. As the following case studies detail, the expansion of foreign news into Canada 
between 2001 and 2006 tested the careful balance between policy sought to strike in protecting 
Canadian identity while inclusivity.  
Al Jazeera Arabic and prior restraint: “putting the Genie back into its bottle” 
Al Jazeera sought Canadian distribution for its Arabic news programming in 2004. The 
CRTC’s call for public input and the objections to its entry put the Arabic broadcaster on trial as 
questions of the news channel’s independence from Qatar, the portrayal of Israel and its 
representation of Jewish people became central to the CRTC’s decision. The CRTC allowed the 
channel distribution but attached monitoring conditions that forced distributors to record and 
monitor the channel, making carriage expensive for commercial cable and satellite distributors. 
The judgment suggests how the public-inclusive regulation of abusive speech has the 
consequence of limiting political speech and news contraflow. It also highlights the difficulty in 
applying national standards to journalism originating in different political and cultural context. 
The cultural tensions that came to light with AJA’s request for distribution were on display in the 
deliberative model of the CRTC. Looking at the public-interest group debates over bring AJA to 
Canadians illustrates how divisions between “permissible” political debate and that which 
exceeds the political and becomes “abuse” hampered contraflow and media pluralism. 
Commercial distributors seeking to carry AJA’s news to Arabic-speaking Canadians 
rationalized the addition with both self-interested and high-minded arguments. Al Jazeera’s non-
availability in Canada, distributors argued, had exacerbated piracy of U.S. satellite programmers 
that had AJA as part of a niche programming package (see Taylor, 2006). Advocates for the 
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channel made a strong case for AJA’s service to Canada’s Arab communities as well. Canadian 
sponsors of the channel85 described it as “a strong promoter of freedom of expression” providing 
“unbiased and accurate coverage” while offering Arabic-speaking Canadians “increased viewing 
choice.” Al Jazeera would “help keep Arab Canadians informed in their mother tongue” 
(Government of Canada, 2004a, para. 4). As a condition of entry, Al Jazeera attempted to 
preempt economic objections to entry by agreeing to not compete for advertising with Canadian 
media companies or claim exclusive rights to its programming (Government of Canada, 2004b, 
para. 4). While these appear to be extraordinary concessions, AJA’s funding model enabled the 
news organization to expand programming into foreign markets without too great a concern for 
revenue sources in Canada.86 
Economic issues were not the main sources of tension in the public responses to the 
request. Cultural issues animated the majority of public filings with the CRTC. Supportive 
submissions to the Commission numbered near 1200 and opposing submissions amounted to 
near 500 filings. Proponents included groups like the National Council on Canada-Arab 
Relations (NCCAR), Canadian Arab Federation (CAF) and several civil liberties organizations as 
well as local and national Arab community organizations. The channel’s advocates anticipated 
the channel’s controversial nature and submitted that  
although not all Al Jazeera reporting is agreeable, Canadians have the right to be 
exposed to different voices in order to have balanced perspectives . . . . opposing 
the presence of Al Jazeera in Canada undermines Canadian core values of 
freedom of thought and speech, ultimately serving extremists, alienating 
moderates and dealing a blow to Canadians’ collective freedoms. (Government of 
Canada, 2004b, para. 22)  
                                                 
85 Videotron Itee, the Canadian Cable Television Association and Reach Media Inc. sponsored the request to add Al Jazeera to the 
list of eligible satellite channels. 
86 These revenue losses incurred by these concessions for “landing rights” in Canada were also offset by limited commercial 
returns for programming in the Middle East and North Africa. The bulk of funding, however, remained in Qatari largesse.  
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Advocates made the case that both Canadian liberalism and multiculturalism were on Al 
Jazeera’s side.  
Two versions of Canadian multiculturalism competed at the CRTC. The proponents of 
AJA’s integration into the Canadian public sphere trumpeted multiculturalism as a positive right 
for communities to have access to cultural and political information. The argument was for 
greater pluralism in expanding the range of perspectives available within Canada. But the legal 
language protecting multicultural society also worked against Canadian media pluralism. AJA’s 
opponents argued that “freedom of expression is not absolute and must be viewed in light of 
other important values that safeguard the dignity and equality of all persons and groups in 
Canadian society.” Approval of AJA’s distribution “would fly in the face of the [Broadcasting] 
Act’s cultural diversity objective and would undermine the safety and dignity of Jewish people in 
Canada . . . .” (Government of Canada, 2004b, para. 29). The coalition opposing distribution 
demanded a guarantee against hate speech toward Canadian citizens. 
Despite the multicultural arguments for the Arabic channel’s inclusion, the conditions 
attached to AJA’s approval amounted to a conscious refusal on the part of the regulator. The 
CRTC’s decision did not bar AJA from distribution in Canada. Rather, the decision made market 
integrating of AJA financially unfeasible for commercial distributors. The monitoring conditions 
the CRTC attached to the approval were the responsibility of the commercial distributors. 
Canadian interest groups prompted the restriction by claiming that AJA did not comply with 
Canada’s broadcasting standards. The evidence of “hateful language aired on Al-Jazeera” 
presented by the Canadian Jewish Congress, the B’nai Brith Canada, and Honest Reporting 
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Canada87 justified governmental restriction on contraflow.  
The surveillance condition resulted from a compromise brokered in the regulatory 
process that took into account the limits of Canada’s national regulatory powers over foreign 
broadcasters. Outright denial of the channel was the only way forward, according to opposition 
groups like the Canadian Jewish Congress (CJC). They pointed out that, unlike licensed 
Canadian broadcasters, the CRTC had no regulatory authority over channels added to cable and 
satellite packages once the Commission granted distribution rights. While domestic media firms 
in violation of Canadian broadcasting standards could be denied license renewal, the 
Commission had little leverage over foreign media companies committing similar infractions. 
Jewish community advocate, B’Nai Brith, argued that once AJA was allowed in, the “genie 
would be out of the bottle” (Government of Canada, 2004b, para. 33). 
In AJA’s favor, the CRTC reasoned that the offending comments put before the 
Commission by community organizations were several years old and infrequent relative to the 
entirety of AJA’s content and appeared reluctant to prohibit distribution. Indeed, some of the 
evidence against Al Jazeera included reporting on the racially charged statements of Osama bin 
Laden. A denial on this basis would invite criticism of the CRTC for shielding Canadian citizens 
from newsworthy information rather than from “abuse.” Similarly, supporting groups promoting 
Canadian-Arab relations acknowledged the anti-Semitic nature of comments but pointed out that 
references to Jews as “apes and pigs” and other offensive statements came from viewer emails 
and argued recognizing “the existence of anti-Semitism” was not the same as promoting hatred. 
AJA could provide a “forum in which [anti-Semitism] can be challenged” (Government of 
                                                 
87 Honest Reporting Canada describes itself as “an organization dedicated to defending Israel against prejudice in the Media” and 
lists its successes in “prompt[ing] hundreds of apologies, retractions, and revisions from news outlets. These efforts are changing 
the face of the media and reporting of Israel throughout the world” (http://www.honestreporting.com/a/page.asp?page=12). 
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Canada, 2004b, para. 66). Furthermore, representatives of the Al Jazeera Network addressed 
these concerns by guaranteeing AJA would not air content violating Canadian standards.  
Others supporting approval pointed out that there were already mechanisms in place 
protecting Canadian citizens such as the Canadian Broadcasting Standards Council, the CRTC’s 
power to delist channels, as well as criminal hate speech law and defamation laws. But these 
regulatory tools were useful only after infraction. At issue was whether prior restraint was a 
legitimate course of action given the unique characteristics of regulating a transnational 
broadcaster. 
The CJC, which had taken a lead in assembling evidence against AJA, aided in 
formulating the ultimate solution. Since AJA programming would be beyond Canadian law, the 
CJC suggested that Canadian distributors should be held responsible for the channel’s content. 
The CRTC (Government of Canada, 2004b, para. 62) responded favorably, concluding that  
. . . the objective of its abusive comment regulation justifies limiting the right to 
freedom of expression. The harms flowing from abusive comment threaten the 
values of equality and multiculturalism, values enshrined in Canadian 
broadcasting policy objectives. 
 
The Commission’s staff remained uncomfortable with an outright denial while also skeptical that 
existing tools could suffice. All means of controlling abusive speech that had teeth necessitated 
broadcasters be Canadian. The limits of Canada’s national regulation led the commission to 
require surveillance as a condition of market entry, but the brokered solution remained a 
problem, giving private distributors the unprecedented and unwanted role of censor. According to 
the approval’s compromise, distributors would be liable for the content they carried. As a means 
to “keep the genie in the bottle,” a broadcast distribution undertaking (BDU) such as Rogers 
Cable would, first, be required to keep an audio-visual recording of each program for four weeks 
 192 
 
192
to allow review by the commission and oppositional stakeholders should accusations of abusive 
speech arise (Government of Canada, 2004b, para. 76). Second, a BDU choosing to carry AJA 
must “alter or delete” any comment that might violate broadcasting standards in advance of the 
content reaching Canadian televisions (Government of Canada, 2004b, para. 78).  
The commission placed the burden of safeguarding multiculturalism on licensed 
Canadian distributors as the only means of leverage over Al Jazeera. The surveillance solution, 
the Commission asserted, was not too onerous for BDU since distributors already maintained an 
archive of recordings, but hidden costs remained. For a BDU to edit or delete programming in 
advance of distributing live news, it would need to maintain translation staff versed in Canadian 
content regulations capable of making immediate decisions about content.  
The attempt to adjust regulation to suit transnational news broadcasting fundamentally 
challenged the Canadian traditional media policy governing cable networks. In contravention of 
neutrality principles that did not hold carriers responsible for content they did not originate, the 
brokered deal forced commercial distributors to take on a new role that was both disruptive of 
established regulatory principles and costly. Though AJA offered substantial concessions to bring 
Arabic news programming to Arabic speakers in Canada, the complexities of national regulation 
in the era of transnational broadcasting limited the media pluralism and multicultural content 
AJA could provide. The unprecedented nature of the monitoring solution points to the need to 
examine the forms of power considered by the Commission in rendering its decision. 
Questioning power in the AJA decision 
Legal language safeguarding multicultural society limited Canadian media pluralism. 
The CRTC monitors media flows for the benefit of national citizens but has little capacity to 
consider the relative power of the competing stakeholders in contest. Most often, this objection 
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comes up when public interest appears to be subverted by more powerful industrial interests. But 
AJA triggered a struggle among Canadian public-interest groups, both sides arguing that 
multiculturalism was on their side as Canadian minorities. Power, then, is less easy to discern in 
debates, leading analysts to restrict the decision to a question of free expression versus 
censorship in the name of greater social harmony. Odartey-Wellington (2013), for instance, 
describes the decision as a struggle to strike a balance between the competing interests in the 
regulatory process, justifying regulatory power over expression as a means to protect the voices 
of the less powerful in Canadian society. The CRTC’s restriction on AJA is, he argues, a 
defensible act of regulation in the public interest: 
While the AJA decision prompted strong accusations of CRTC censorship, this 
could be countered by the argument that since the airwaves are a scarce public 
resource, broadcasting is a power resource. Without an effective regulator, it is 
argued, anarchy could result, and, potentially, the weak and marginalized would 
be further dominated and marginalized by the powerful (2013, p. 153). 
 
Odartey-Wellington frames the decision as a choice between empowering regulators versus 
allowing the marginalized to suffer but examining the decision as abstract competing principles 
ignores a broader geopolitical context of global media distribution decisions.  
Rather than viewing the decision as another Canadian affirmation of social responsibility 
over free expression, we can see this regulatory process as pointing to new and emerging 
challenges to official views of national multiculturalism brought on by contraflow. Yet there is 
little consideration of the decision in terms of how it reflects a larger geopolitical configuration, 
foreign policy or the status of Arab representation in Canada since 2001 (Bouchard & Taylor, 
2008).88 Framed as a question of whether or not Arab political realities can be “heard” in Canada 
                                                 
88 See Bouchard and Taylor for a critical assessment of how the Canadian press discussed “accommodation” policies for ethnic 
minorities after September 11, 2001.  
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due to the rhetorical form that political reality takes in journalistic discourse, the CRTC’s 
mandate to protect the weak from marginalization is more complicated than such binaries allow. 
A brief review of the evidence in the AJA decision of 2004 raises questions about the use 
of abusive speech regulation its relationship to the preservation of political power. AJA was 
treated by opponents as a mouthpiece for Arab aggression toward Israel and anti-Semitism.89 The 
evidence against Al Jazeera offered by public-interest groups appeared, at times, to conflate 
aspects of Al Jazeera’s coverage that helped portray Al Jazeera as a high risk for abusive speech. 
Some conflations are reflected in the following arguments opposing AJA: 
• Assertions that members of the public calling in to voice opinion represented the political 
view of the news network 
• Assertions that reporting on significant events such as tapes from Osama bin Laden was 
an endorsement of the political statements of those covered 
• Refusals to distinguish between political statements challenging Israeli foreign policy and 
racial prejudice aimed at ethnic Jewish identity and religious Judaism  
 
With the AJA decision, the CRTC was in a bind, caught between these competing 
definitions of liberal multiculturalism. Prohibiting the offensive language of the Arab public 
sphere, some argued, amounted to denying the political reality of a relevant global community. 
Given the evidence marshaled, the CRTC’s process can be criticized as a platform which allows 
public-interest groups to silence anti-Semitism, regardless of the news-worthiness of covering 
the political beliefs that define Arab public spheres. In sum, coverage of certain political beliefs, 
however erroneous and misguided the politics may be, is prohibited in the name of Canadian 
multiculturalism but the effect is to bury representation of Arab public concerns and important 
aspects of international politics until a more sanitized form can emerge. The question of Al 
                                                 
89 Many of the offensive comments from callers to the show are clearly anti-Semitic by North America standards and, therefore, it 
was within the CRTC’s purview to prohibit its circulation according to Canadian broadcasting law. This is especially true since 
the potential audiences may also interpret political polemic as ethnic abuse. 
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Jazeera’s abusive speech unavoidably butts against broader geopolitics and the relationship 
between power and specific, internal Canadian political affinities related to international 
politics.90  
Chinese media, Falun Gong and Canadian media regulation 
In 1996, only four years after the establishment of Falun Gong as a unique brand of 
Buddhist meditative exercises, Zhuan Falun, the central text for the quasi-religious community, 
was banned by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The ban was part of a larger orchestration 
of government power to stifle the rapid social growth of Falun Gong in China. The Falun Gong 
community itself fell out of favor with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1999.91 Ten days 
later, the Party enacted the legal ban on practicing the teachings of Li Hongzhi, Falun Gong’s 
spiritual leader. In the decade that followed the banning of Zhuan Falun, similar battles took 
shape around media outside of China as the CCP extended its state network, CCTV, into Canada. 
How did middle management in a Canadian regulator come to be a site of adjudication 
between China and a group Chinese officials would refer to as both a cult and domestic 
terrorists? To get at the context of Canada’s media system requires outline the origins of the 
tension. This chapter cannot offer an exhaustive account of the conflict between the CCP and 
Falun Gong communities, but a brief overview serves to illustrate the motivations that energized 
activists in the context of Canadian media policy. I will briefly outline the history of the conflict, 
highlighting what would become a competition do define Chinese identity at home and abroad. I 
                                                 
90 The radical pluralist perspective is useful in making this move from normative debates that refrain from questions 
of power or dismiss forms of exclusion legitimated by the language of multiculturalism and consensus through 
public participation. If pluralism policies have always been concerned with providing the less powerful with a means 
to participate in mass media, is there an obligation to carry this concern for disparities in power to the international 
level?  
91The police force created to manage what official decree deemed a “domestic threat” posed by Falun Gong, the 6-10 Office, 
takes its name from the date it was formed. 
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then briefly outline the nature of China’s renewed interest in using media as a form of public 
diplomacy. This push to repackage Chinese state media for North America coincided with rising 
tensions with the Falun Gong movement. By 2006, the movement in Canada had organized into 
politically viable networks of resistance in efforts to combat the CCP’s persecution. These 
networks of resistance were central to the media activism that sought to stop Chinese media at 
Canada’s shores.  
Origins of the conflict; global mediation of the conflict 
Falun Gong, according to then CCP President Jiang Zemin, was a threat to Chinese 
society and the project of socialist progress. In interviews with foreign media, Jiang described 
the philosophy of Falun Gong as “feudal superstition.” Shortly after the official restrictions on Li 
Hongzhi’s teachings, Jiang explained China’s aggressive policy to the international community 
in official pronouncements and the international press by linking Falun Gong to suicidal and 
homicidal cults that have threatened social stability in democratic national settings. Falun Gong 
was to China what the Branch Davidians in the United States, the Aum Shinrikyo in Japan and 
the Order of the Solar Temple in Europe were to their respective home countries (Embassy of the 
People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, 1999, para. 1).  
Zhao (2012) has observed how the conflict between Falun Gong and the CCP amounted 
to “regimes of truth” competing to define Chinese culture. The conflict, for Zhao, exemplified 
how teleological modernization theses of development fail to account for media systems beyond 
Western contexts as “the Chinese media system was caught in an intensive battle with . . . 
another regime of truth – that of the quasi-religious, nativist, and postmaterialist Falun Gong 
movement” (Zhao, 2012, p. 149). Zhao calls attention to the conservative impulse of Falun Gong 
and its contrast with the culture of consumption that has accompanied the growing middle class 
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in China to make sense of the banning and media offensive. China’s economic reforms and labor 
displacements point to rationales for why Chinese officials paid the Li Hongzhi’s popular 
meditation-philosophy any mind at all. But the contest expanded to more global proportions 
shortly after  
A statement from Zhao Qizheng, the director of the Foreign Propaganda Office of the 
CCP Central Committee, effectively summarizes the CCP’s emphasis on the battle for 
international public opinion, reinvigorated in the contest with Falun Gong. 
During this struggle, [we] need to make best use of the favorable opportunities, 
actively launch the campaign, favorably control the warfare, try to take 
preemptive measures, and try to dominate the overseas media. Our goal is to have 
the overseas media follow our steps. … make a full play of our strengths, focus on 
important aspects, make unremitting efforts, so as to make breakthroughs in those 
important countries, targets, and media, etc. (World Organization to Investigate 
the Persecution of Falun Gong, 2008) 
 
The media campaign initiated to contain the perceived threat of Falun Gong coincided with a 
dramatic shift in the CCP’s vision of the international media landscape and how to use CCTV to 
promote China’s interests abroad. Chinese officials formulated new strategies in the use of their 
burgeoning media production capacity through CCTV by looking to strategic integration of 
foreign media systems. This meant using market mechanisms and navigating the regulatory 
apparatus of foreign media systems. The conflict with Falun Gong functioned as a sort of de 
facto testing ground for CCTV’s viability as a political mouthpiece in North America.  
The importance of media permeates the conflict. In a technological feat, a Falun Gong 
member interrupted a Chinese satellite feed that reached across the country in 2002 and replacing 
it with commentary on the benefits of Falun Gong as a means to correct the misrepresentation of 
the group in Chinese media (“Falun Gong Hijacks Chinese TV,” 2002). The importance placed 
on media is also spelled out in official responses offered to Western media outlets. Washington, 
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D.C. embassy staff member Xie Feng’s first news conference with Western news agencies in 
2002 began with an appeal for international coordination against Falun Gong, by then officially 
labeled a “quasi-terrorist” organization. As part of a general campaign to link Falun Gong to 
global terrorism, Xie stated that "[b]y openly and deliberately attacking the Sinosat in contempt 
of international laws and the regulations, the Falun Gong cult was unscrupulously breaking the 
order of wireless communications and launching a challenge against civilization.” Xie went on, 
"The international community should unite in condemning and punishing this cult," (Demaria, 
2002).92 
CCTV’s Chinese-language exports were part of the broader media offensive to control 
dissent and change opinion outside China in line with the CCP’s nationalism, but it should be 
noted that this use of media met some resistance within China’s English journalism, known in 
2000 as CCTV-9. The initiation of an English news broadcaster was intended to offer a Chinese 
perspective to combat the negative coverage that Beijing felt dominated Associated Press TV, 
Reuters Video News and CNN. It represents the early efforts to have greater voice in global 
English news circulation (Jirik, 2004). As Jirik has documented, the Party-directed vilification of 
Falun Gong in 1999 caused pangs of conscience among the English division: “management at 
one point faced stirrings of newsroom revolt, fuelled by sheer boredom at the relentless 
coverage, and the lack of professional pride reporters could take in this kind of work” (2004, p. 
135).  
One of the initial tasks of China’s renewed media diplomacy offensive was explaining its 
policies toward Falun Gong. The domestic persecution of Falun Gong prompted negative 
                                                 
92 CNN’s title for the story seemed to ignore the counterpoints offered by the reporter. “China: Falun Gong a global 
threat.” 
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international reactions, fueling the preexisting narrative about China’s willingness to tolerate 
human rights abuses for political stability. China has been an ongoing case study for groups like 
Amnesty International (Amnesty International, 2013) and activist networks emerged to challenge 
China’s domestic policies. At the forefront of these networks, the World Organization to 
Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong (WOIPFG) began documenting the Chinese 
government’s actions, compiling testimony and other evidence of human rights abuses. 
WOIPFG’s mission was to bring the struggle to an international audience as a means of defense 
and peaceful resistance.  
The group’s four hundred and forty-four page founding publication, Investigation Reports 
on the Persecution of Falun Gong (World Organization to Investigate the Persecution of Falun 
Gong, 2003), is a carefully referenced narrative of China’s moves against Falun Gong 
communities in China and abroad. It is the first compilation of what had been less formally 
understood as the group’s systematic oppression in China and self-consciously functioned as an 
introduction to Falun Gong as a persecuted minority. The language in the introduction is crafted 
to characterize China’s policy as genocidal. The argument for genocide is by analogy, opening 
with Elie Wiesel’s reflection on the Holocaust and the moral obligation to prevent it. The preface 
goes on to situate China’s policies as “history repeating itself.” “Today,” the preface continued, “. 
. . genocide is happening in the People’s Republic of China. The government is targeting for 
elimination people who believe in Falun Gong (WOIPFG, 2003, p. iv). The spiritual movement, 
they argue, “‘is today to China’s masters what the Jews were to pre-war Nazi Germany: a 
convenient scapegoat used to explain away the failings and insecurities of the state and its 
leadership’” (WOIPFG, 2003, pp. iv–v).  
The conflict between Falun Gong and the Chinese administration was thus mediated as a 
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battle of competing metaphors before the international community as much as through media 
globalization. Zemin’s preferred frame saw Falun Gong as a quasi-terrorist cult, violating laws 
established by the International Telecommunications Union under the direction of a corrupt 
leader. Falun Gong’s defenders portray Zemin as a continuation of Nazi indifference to humanity 
in the cold march toward control through persecution. The conflict surrounding the campaign to 
halt China’s attempt to internationalize the control of the spiritual community became the subject 
of Canadian media policy shortly after the 1999 banning of the group within China. The CCP’s 
media offensive at home, in the age of global media, could not remain nationally contained for 
long and, as Falun Dafa moved into new national contexts, so did Chinese media.  
Canadian media governance and Chinese media: norms in the governance of the social conflicts 
emerging from contraflow in Canada  
 The CCTV decision issued by the CRTC is one of multiple disputes around the role and 
legitimacy of Chinese media in Canada. The battle ranges across print and broadcast and hinge 
on the question of foreign state influence in Canada. Anti-communist media activists and groups 
against state media generally challenged the advance of China’s influence through media on 
multiple fronts from 2000 through 2010. This decade corresponds with the struggle of Falun 
Gong to combat the “extension of persecution” beyond China’s national territory through media 
(World Organization to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong, 2003, p. 359, World 
Organization to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong, 2008). The conflict took on legalistic 
form in Canada’s Broadcasting Standard Council (CBSC), defamation suits within the Canadian 
judicial system and the CRTC review of non-Canadian programmers.  
Three cases outlined here represent the struggles surrounding foreign media in Canada 
and how battles over foreign media entry entail encompassing themes such as immigration and 
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human rights. Staid administrative logics for cultural representation and diversity within Canada 
become a realm of contest for autonomy from state power, but analyzing of these cases from a 
position of normative theory allows a discussion of contradictions that result from contraflow. 
The following cases related to CCTV’s entry exemplify some of the challenges in liberal media 
governance of a pluralistic media system. Within the following regulatory venues, Canadian 
authorities applied preexisting Canadian standards and law to the public arguments against the 
presence of CCP-supported media in Canada.  
Case 1: Canadian Broadcasting Standards Council (CBSC): redistribution of CCTV content 
In 2001, a news report produced by CCTV and rebroadcast by Canadian licensed 
broadcaster Talentvision came before the Canadian Broadcasting Standards Council (CBSC). 
The Council had received complaints from Falun Gong activists who claimed that the report 
inaccurately asserted a relationship between the Falun Gong and acts of violence. The segment, 
introduced by Talentvision’s Canada-based anchor, broadcast graphic images of the crime scene 
and the confession of the alleged murderer which implicated Falun Gong cultivation as the 
motivation for killing members of his family.  
A translated transcript provided by complainants to the Canadian broadcasting standards 
group illustrates the central concerns of Falun Dafa’s defenders: 
Talentvision Anchor: On the 25th, in Beijing, a Falun Gong follower brutally 
murdered his father and wife, and seriously injured his mother with his own 
hands. The means he used to kill his parents and wife was extremely cruel. He 
explained that this would send him and his family to the "World of Ultimate 
Bliss" where they could share eternal happiness. (R. Cohen et al., 2002, p. 1) 
 
The CCTV report that followed went to great lengths, by North American journalistic standards, 
to connect the murders to Falun Gong. The voiceover of the original CCTV anchor aired on 
Chinese networks emphasized the brutality of the crime. After describing how the Beijing 
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“[p]olice officers who arrived at the scene” were “shocked” by the “extreme cruelty,” the alleged 
killer, Fu Yi-bin, provided an on-screen interview to explain his motives: 
Fu Yi-bin: After I killed the three of them, their spirit and their body would enter 
my lower abdomen directly. There, they will form a universal system similar to 
the one of the Sun, the Earth, and the Moon. This system will rotate in my 
Dantian [lower abdomen area], which is the central foundation of the rotating 
Falun (2002, p. 2) 
 
The voiceover in the CCTV segment goes on to offer more information about the assailant’s 
religious motivation, explaining that “[i]n order to achieve individual ‘perfection’, Fu Yi-bin 
brutally chopped his father and wife to death, and seriously injured his mother. Firming up the 
murder’s connection to Falun Gong, the voiceover noted how the confessed killer “was a caring 
and loving son and husband. All that changed when he started practising Falun Gong in 1998” 
during which time the man became “spiritually controlled by Li Hong-zhi and the Falun Gong 
evil cult . . .”  
For Falun Gong practitioners who had lived through the banning of Falun Gong books 
and public gatherings in the late 1990s, the story was familiar. CCTV functioned as a mouthpiece 
for a state that had deemed Falun Gong a threat; such stories had been used to marginalize Falun 
Gong within Chinese society since 1999. The retransmission was the first encounter Chinese-
Canadians had with this use of CCTV in Canada. An activist involved in the case described why 
it was important to combat CCTV’s portrait of Falun Gong. While negative depictions of the 
democracy movement might be easily dismissed, descriptions of Falun Gong could be a first 
impression. 
In comparison to the student movement [1989] the Falun Gong overseas? Nobody 
knows. What is Falun Gong? It is like the world is unfamiliar. But what happened 
is they started hate propaganda. People who practice Falun Gong know about it. 
So that hate propaganda was taking effect. So it is not like the democracy 
movement; everyone knows it . . . . (Personal Interview 2012) 
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Through efforts of activist coalitions, the CRTC and the CBSC received complaints from 
individuals and a mass complaint organized by the Falun Dafa Association of Canada (FDAC) 
with over 1000 signatures. The complaints claimed Talentvision TV, in rebroadcasting the CCTV 
programming, had aided the Chinese state’s persecution of a group protected under Canadian 
law. Many complaints described CCTV as handmaiden to state oppression, hinting at the legal 
consequences of Talentvision’s retransmission of the content and the incompatibility of CCTV’s 
government mandate with Canadian communication customs. One complaint outlined how “the 
unlawful persecution of Falun Gong in China is now being perpetuated in Canada via live, 
unscreened satellite feeds of CCTV hate inspiring programming,” describing CCTV as “Chinese 
government propaganda being broadcast over Canadian airwaves. . . ” (R. Cohen et al, p. 2). 
Individual complaints focused on the ethical question triggered by CCTV’s role as a “state-
controlled network” and the harm done to the Chinese community within Canada. “It is 
unacceptable to me to see CCTV 4 news being freely broadcasted [sic] in Canada, spreading lies 
and deceiving innocent Canadians.” Another letter writer asks the CRTC to “request Talentvision 
to stop spreading lies and promoting hatred among Chinese Canadians.” The Talentvision 
segment having aired in Canada as “[l]ive and unscreened satellite feeds” coming “directly from 
China onto Canadian cable television stations” appeared in several complaints with common 
references to the Canadian government’s responsibility to prohibit both hate-inspiring and 
propagandistic programming on Canadian airwaves. One complainant cited CRTC broadcasting 
regulations, noting that the retransmitted segment violated Canadian law in airing obscene 
pictures, in presenting misleading news and in broadcasting abusive content (R. Cohen et al. p. 
2-3).  
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Talentvision’s official response to the criticism and the regulator’s discussion captures 
many of the tensions in imported news programming, touching on the acceptability of state news 
in liberal media systems and the divergence in media industry ethics between cultural contexts, 
all beneath the overarching contradiction of free speech privileges being afforded a media 
organization originating from a national context that does not recognize similar free speech 
principles. The company’s rejoinder to the complaints expressed “regrets” and offered self-
defense by claiming the organization “uses the best news sources available.” Talentvision’s 
president countered, “[b]eing state-owned does not disqualify CCTV from being a legitimate 
news source.” The defense also stated that “Talentvision will not knowingly act as a propaganda 
agent,” holding to human rights and freedom of the press under Canadian law (Cohen et al, p. 3). 
Through the bureaucratic language in the regulator’s discussion, one can sense the difficulty 
presented by the case. Mediating between Falun Gong and Talentvision involved making 
judgments about unfamiliar, quasi-religious groups, foreign forms of journalism in contested 
translation and the motivations of various parties that brought the story into Canada. Much of the 
difficulty stemmed from a lack of definitional criteria for effective application of Canadian 
media policy. Citing ethical codes established by the Canadian Association of Broadcasters 
(CAB) and the Radio and Television News Directors Association of Canada, the CBSC’s 
decision said a review panel “unhesitatingly subscribes” to Talentvision’s view that state control 
did not disqualify a news source (7). Though “references to Falun Gong in the news report 
constituted unfair comment,” the board’s final assessment found no fault on the part of the 
broadcast license holder in having retransmitted the offending material. The board went further 
to indicate the limits of its ability to regulate of foreign content, stating that “[w]hether or not the 
view of the Chinese Government toward Falun Gong is or is not accurately described by the 
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[FDAC] (and the Panel expresses no view on that issue), the Panel’s decision must relate solely 
to Talentvision and what is has broadcast” (6).  
The struggle against CCTV in the institutional setting provided by Canadian media 
governance is marked by limitations related to bureaucratic scope and definitions. The board’s 
dismissal of the “state propaganda” argument offered by the FDAC stemmed from a funding-
source agnosticism that runs throughout Canadian regulatory code and effectively restricted the 
scope of what the panel needed to consider in their adjudication of the dispute. This refusal to 
consider “origins” of news is rooted in a lack of definitional criteria to distinguish between state-
run media and public broadcasting common to Canadian and European broadcasting systems 
(c.f. Lincoln, Tassé, & Cianciotta, 2004).93 Another blow to the FDAC’s case for a defense 
against CCTV’s negative portrait was also definitional. The panel found that, though relevant 
journalistic ethical codes prohibited the use of race, national or ethnic origin, or religion in news 
pieces unless directly relevant, Falun Gong did not qualify as any of these protected groups. 
Regardless, the panel did express general skepticism about the story Talentvision 
rebroadcast. The CBSC noted how the news piece departed from “North American” standards of 
news and law, considering the story’s description of the suspect’s background “highly unusual 
and irregular.” “Since Fu Yi-bin was apparently not a public figure, there would certainly not 
have been any justification to identify him and his criminal act so constantly as Falun Gong-
related” (Cohen et al., 2002, p. 8 [emphasis in original]). The piece was “not journalism”: 
Whether or not such a report is acceptable, even if not commendable, in Mainland 
China, the Canadian broadcaster of this imported report must ensure that it meets 
the standards of broadcast journalism of this country. The Panel finds that the 
                                                 
93 See 3.1 "Defining Public Broadcaster" in the cited Integration and Diversity report by the Department of Canadian 
Heritage for a later discussion of the absence of this criteria and its concrete effect on policy decisions regarding 
foreign media. 
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report has not been done in a "fair manner", as prescribed by [Canadian ethical 
codes]. (2002, p. 8) 
 
This lack of fairness in the piece as well as repetition of violent imagery led the Council to find 
Talentvision as a license holder in breach of the industry ethical guidelines but no punitive 
measures were levied and no threat to the license was at stake. Still, grassroots organizing had 
effectively challenged the uncritical importation and the hearing itself was important for Falun 
Gong’s defenders.  
Case 2: The Epoch Times vs. La Presse Chinoise 
As tensions grew between the multinational Falun Gong community and the Chinese 
regime in 2001, the ethnic press in Canada provided a localized forum for debate over Falun 
Gong as a movement, its purpose, its place in Canadian cities. Two distinct positions on Falun 
Gong were represented in two publications. The general-interest Chinese-language94 print 
publications, La Presse Chinoise and The Epoch Times, came to represent anti-Falun Gong and 
pro-Falun Gong positions in major cities like Montreal. Both publications were billed as general 
interest, third-language papers but both were also explicit in their positions regarding Falun 
Gong. La Presse Chinoise routinely inveighed against the group while The Epoch Times 
provided defensive articles, often focusing on the attacks themselves as an expression of China’s 
growing overseas influence.  
Between November 3, 2001 and February 9, 2002, La Presse Chinoise published a series 
of stories as a supplemental “special edition” with inflammatory language that characterized 
Falun Gong as the cause of “mental illness,” promoting “bestiality and other perverted and 
                                                 
94 All quotes are taken from official legal transcripts provided to the Canadian Superior Court which were agreed 
upon by all parties to the suits that resulted from the special edition. 
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deviant sexual practices,” and requiring practitioners to participate in “homicide,” “suicide,” and 
”lose one’s human essence.” Many of the themes in the special edition echoed the PRC’s official 
descriptions of Falun Gong as antithetical to Chinese culture and the Chinese state: the practice 
of spiritual cultivation “cause[s] the break-up of families,” and compels “sabotage against the 
PRC” (Zhang v. Chau, 2005, para. 8). The initial publication from November 3, 2001 captures 
the spirit of the Le Presse Chinoise’s attempt to socially marginalize Falun Gong within 
Montreal’s Chinese communities. The author, purported to be a reformed Falun Gong 
practitioner, attacks the founder’s “hidden” motivations: 
How could such a great law of the universe allow its disciples to commit suicide 
and immolate themselves but no one can even find their sarira [body]? This is 
enough to prove the extent to which these people are fooled. These kinds of 
malicious actions to produce murder are still continuing and spreading! It shocks 
all the kind-hearted people in the world! The black hand has already reached 
Canadians! (Zhang v. Chau, 2005, Schedule A, p. 16). 
 
The response of the Canadian Falun Gong community was immediate. Local practitioners 
tried to obtain all copies in circulation. Others went to the newspaper’s offices to request a 
retraction. After a war of words in the rival publications, Falun Gong members filed suit in 2002, 
claiming that the owner of La Presse Chinoise, Crescent Chau, committed libel seeking the 
redress of damages from Mr. Chau’s libelous statements which were “false or grossly inaccurate 
distortions made for the purpose of inciting hatred against the practitioners of Falun Gong, 
causing derision from the Chinese community against Falun Gong in Canada and justifying the 
persecution of Falun Gong practitioners in the PRC (Zhang v. Chau, 2005, para. 32). The court 
assessment criticized the form of journalism within the Canadian Chinese press departed from 
expectations that would be applied to journalism originating in Canada. The court noted that 
“Neither Mr. Chau nor the newspaper belong to any professional journalistic organization in 
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Canada” (Zhang v. Chau, 2005, para. 13). The judge in the case went further in her role as press 
critic, stating that “[a]s a publisher or newspaperperson, Mr. Chau is not impressive. The general 
impression the Court got from his testimony was that the newspaper was simply a pretext to sell 
advertisements: the content of the ‘articles’ was of little importance” (Zhang v. Chau, 2005, para. 
14).  
Chau’s self-defense emphasized the difference between Canadian and Chinese print 
cultures and appealed to both the culturally specific rhetorical traditions in the Chinese press in 
Canada and the freedom of expression afforded by Canada media law. Chau argued: 
. . . Falun Gong is a controversial and contested movement; as to the 
inflammatory style of the impugned articles, [Chau’s legal team] submit it is in 
keeping with the customary rhetoric used in Chinese language community 
newspapers; they deny the damages allegedly suffered by the petitioners and 
plead fair comment and freedom of expression (Zhang v. Chau, 2005, para. 14).95 
 
The Superior Court’s final decision dismissed the charges brought by the Falun Gong 
community, stating that the evidence did not sustain the claim that the articles were grossly 
inaccurate or published to incite hatred and derision. A Falun Gong practitioner described the 
legal battle as more important than the outcome would suggest:  
It [was] a huge thing because we refused to be persecuted. . . . But because we are 
volunteers, we have no money. When we won the lawsuit, you know, we need 
money for petitioners. It was like they were really trying to really destroy us. But 
I think, uh, they got afraid [because of] our effort (personal interview, 2012). 
 
The dismissal was a blow to Falun Gong’s attempt to escape what they saw as politically 
motivated misrepresentation, but the Canadian system had afforded a place to challenge what 
they claimed were baseless depictions intended to marginalize the Canadian community.  
                                                 
95 The court recognized the difficulty of dealing with translations, compounded by the differing print tradition within 
the Canadian ethnic press: “Moreover, the original language comes from a different cultural tradition, which adds a 
further degree of separation between the original words and the judge (Zhang v. Chau, 2005, para. 31). 
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Case 3: CCTV and the Canadian Radio-television Telecommunication Commission 
The third example of Canadian media regulation involves human rights and anti-
propaganda activists petitioning the CRTC to forbid the circulation of CCTV. CCTV, Falun Gong 
members claimed once again, was the expression of Beijing’s intention to influence the 
perception of dissent within the immigrant Chinese communities. The Falun Gong community’s 
experience of Fairchild’s retransmission of CCTV content allowed the group’s political arm, the 
Falun Dafa Association of Canada (FDAC), to mobilize a volunteer base against the channel’s 
bid for a more significant presence in Canada though direct broadcasting. The previous ruling by 
the Canadian broadcasting standards board against Fairchild, the FDAC protesters hoped, would 
set a precedent for limiting the Party’s media arm in Canada; they organized opposition and 
joined coalitions with other invested public-interest groups such as Canadians Against 
Propaganda and think tanks critical of Chinese diplomacy. 
The CRTC received a request to add the “Great Wall Package”96 to the list of approved 
satellite services for distribution in 2005. As is required by CRTC filing guidelines, the Canadian 
Cable Telecommunications Association (CCTA) acted as the Canadian sponsor for the set of 
Chinese-language media in the regulatory process. The package included nine non-Canadian, 
Chinese-language channels,97 among them CCTV-4, China’s government-run news channel. 
CCTV-4 and CCTV Entertainment, as well as the global marketing agent representing the 
channels in international distribution negotiations, China International Television Corporation 
                                                 
96 Channels in the package included CCTV-4, The Satellite Channel of Southern Television Guangdong, Southeast 
TV Station, Jiangsu International TV Channel, Beijing TV, CCTV Entertainment Channel, Dragon TV, China 
Yellow River Television Station, and Hunan Satellite TV. 
97 Canadian media and cultural policies have developed a socially conscious bilingual structure to accommodate 
French as well as English-speaking populations. As a result, media in other languages are considered “third-
language.” 
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(CITVC), were all described as “nationally owned” while the remaining channels were products 
originating from China’s provincial, less centralized networks. The nature of the channels ranged 
in genres: lifestyle, sports, entertainment, educational. The programming offered anything from 
lessons in Kung Fu or Chinese chess to programs that “capture the pulse and essence of city 
living in China” (Government of Canada, 2006).  
As a measure of the controversy surrounding Chinese media in Canada, a flood of written 
statements inundated the Commission. The CRTC issued a standard call for comment on the 
addition of the channels for distribution and received two hundred individual comments, 2,000 
letters, and 7,000 signatures (Government of Canada, 2005c). Relative to other calls, the public 
response to the request for Canadian distribution was not unheard of, but the ensuing debates 
illustrated cleavages and fault lines that were unfamiliar to the Commission staff. Supportive 
comments did make familiar arguments about the need to offer third-language programming. The 
CRTC summarized the comments received, dividing them into supportive and opposing 
petitions. Supporters:  
submitted that it was extremely important to have full access in Canada to 
television channels from the mainland of China and Hong Kong in order to give 
Mandarin- and Cantonese-speaking Canadians the same cultural and social 
opportunities that Chinese communities have in other countries around the world. 
(Government of Canada, 2006, sec. 6)  
 
Opposition fell along predictable lines for those who had followed the controversy. Activists 
against entry argued the stations being considered were not normal media the CRTC commonly 
considered but were instead “‘many channels but one voice’ of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP), consisting of propaganda that includes lies, fabricated stories, or pieces of misleading 
news.” 
As with the standards board decision, the CRTC’s embraced a liberal agnosticism. The 
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Commission imposed limits on the scope of democratic deliberation, limits that gave advantage 
to state media and narrowed the appeals of the opposition. The CRTC confirmed that its 
“mandate and responsibility are to consider issues that relate directly to the sponsored services 
themselves, rather than the policies, alleged or not, of the government of the PRC” (s.82). Within 
these constraints, the debate became a question of CCTV’s right to communicate without 
governmental interference versus the government’s right to restrict speech freedoms in light of 
the potential for social harm. The test was whether or not CCTV-4 exhibited a pattern of airing 
abusive comment, engendering hostility toward an identifiable group within Canada. The 
CRTC’s staff weighed if CCTV’s reporting on Falun Gong merited either denial or something 
analogous to the censorship conditions placed on Al Jazeera a year earlier. 
But this presented a difficulty for the Commission’s staff. Determining what statements 
constituted abuse and verifying that abuse would be more difficult than the case presented by Al 
Jazeera. Claims of false or misleading representations in CCTV news segments submitted by the 
opposition did not resemble typical examples of abusive speech such as those that justified the 
monitoring conditions placed on Al Jazeera’s approval. In contrast to Al Jazeera, the abusive 
speech on CCTV alleged by Falun Gong could only be verified by vetting the truth of the claims 
made by CCTV’s reporting. Those opposing Al Jazeera Arabic could point to translated copies of 
uncensored opinion shows and programs that aired comments from members of the public. The 
text alone could stand as evidence of easily recognizable abuse. Jews were “apes and pigs” 
according to one excerpted transcript. CCTV’s opposition claimed the “abuse” was fabricated 
reporting. The claim of abuse could only be verified by the Commission through an investigation 
into the truth or falsehood of the events in question. All of the misrepresentations cited by Falun 
Gong’s defenders took place in China as much as 10 years earlier. This was well beyond the 
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scope of the CRTC. 
CITVC’s representatives before the Commission seemed to recognize this problem of 
vetting the claims made against the network. In countering the claim that CCTV falsely linked 
Falun Gong to a public self-immolation incident within China, CITVC argued that “there is no 
reason why the Commission should be involving itself in the consideration of the veracity of an 
incident that occurred five years ago” (Government of Canada, 2006, sec. 67). Since systematic 
and long-term study of the domestic political conflict and CCTV’s coverage was not within the 
mandate of the CRTC, CCTV could only be considered in the same light as Western-styled 
public broadcasters.  
Conclusion: questioning the CCTV decision 
As a quasi-judicial body, the Commission views its work as legally limited to the 
execution of policy objectives outlined by departments and cabinets and legislation. Rather than 
interpreting the law, a frame of “execution” allows the Commission to limit the terms of debate, 
admissibility of evidence and the scope of the Commission’s social purpose generally.  In the 
case of CCTV and its relationship to a significant subnational minority, what might be seen as 
the practical agnosticism of the Commission must also be recognized as blindness to a set of 
factors: 
• disparities in the relative material conditions of the stakeholders 
• the importance of media in symbolic power and the potential for symbolic annihilation 
• state-directed media as an extension of state policies that violate the North American 
norms such as journalistic autonomy  
 
The ironies and contradictions in these decisions about domestic media policy typify 
what Chakravartty and Zhao call “uneven global encounters” in international media power 
(2008, p. 15). Domestic regulatory structures remain ill-equipped to make broad judgments about 
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the geopolitical conflicts that color foreign media entry. CITVC’s use of Canadian diversity 
principles as an argument to obtain distribution while holding no parallel pluralism principles in 
China was a central tension, but it was one that the CRTC’s deliberative model was forced to 
ignore. The material differences between the stakeholders in this policy decision could not be 
considered due to the liberal ethos that shaped Canadian governance of foreign media. 
Conclusion 
How did principles of media pluralism in the regulatory process weigh the competing 
claims and arguments? Will these arguments be effective if these trends in international 
journalism continue? Are the norms that police journalistic media in Canada structured in such a 
way as to be disabled from considering emerging aspects of power in a multipolar world? Media 
have been the focal point for battles over representation within Canada, but the emergence of a 
multipolar media world presents challenges to national regulators that go beyond free speech 
debates and “disappearing” national boundaries (Morris & Waisbord, 2001). Media integration 
fosters conflict, requiring a degree of reconciliation when forms of news and professionalism 
compete.  
There are two aspects of this decision that normative theory can shed light on. First, 
CCTV’s 2005 bid for entry was striking for how it put two liberal policy values in competition. 
Supporters claimed CCTV offered the Canada’s immigrant population a connection to home and 
made Canadian television reflective of the multicultural population. A liberal conception of 
media pluralism, too, supported adding CCTV as another voice in the marketplace of ideas. But, 
according to the opposition, Canadian multiculturalism and social harmony were threatened by 
CCTV, both in the general sense that CCTV was not an independent source of news and the more 
specific sense that CCTV’s political function actively sought to marginalize a religious-ethnic 
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group as a way to silence dissent. The principles of Canadian media policy were strained as a 
liberal conception of pluralism provided rationales for competing stakeholders.  
The second aspect stems from the Commission’s refusal to consider the “origin” of the 
broadcast and instead to rely on rules of debate that barred argumentation based on a media 
organization’s political orientation. Despite the failure of this line of reasoning in previous 
Canadian judicial settings, anti-CCTV activists continued to emphasize CCTV’s mouthpiece 
function in addition to the claim of abusive speech that was more in line with the Commission’s 
mandate. CITVC’s representatives in Canada counter-argued that those opposing the entry of 
CCTV were “attempting, through this latest round of material, to denounce the Chinese 
government for its policies and decisions and, in particular, for the banning of Falun Gong” 
(Government of Canada, 2006, para. 60). CITVC further claimed that it was inappropriate for the 
regulatory body to consider the program originator’s political posture, despite the clear 
possibility that CCTV-4 could act as an extension of the CCP’s goals to marginalize political 
opposition. The domestic policies of the Chinese politburo, they argued, were not the 
Commission’s concern. By framing the evaluation of CCTV’s representation of Falun Gong 
practitioners as a question of political orientation rather than a question of human rights, 
advocates for CCTV’s entry in to Canada appealed to the commission’s reluctance to act as 
illiberal censor.  
The high stakes involved in these decisions involve public intelligence of global issues, 
human rights, free expression and the self-determination of community identity. These issues 
merit a reconsideration of the underlying administrative logics that have brought legitimacy to 
the modes of public discourse in North America and justified media regulation for the social 
good. Media globalization is prompting a new look at the normative foundations of decisions. 
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Normative theory is thus valuable in the age of global media flows to question how assumed 
norms “[legitimate] a particular model of public discourse in a specific historical period by 
rooting it in an acceptable foundation of moral givens” (Christians et al., 2009, p. 73). The norms 
governing judgments about media integration I’ve discussed point to the need to recognize media 
globalization as a site of cultural struggle and, thus, the role of power in interconnectivity 
through media. Apolitical judgments of very political processes may legitimate systems of 
inequality despite the best intentions of regulators. 
The judges in the defamation case brought against Chau’s Le Presse Chinoise referenced 
North American standards of professionalism to condemn Chau while dismissing the charges. 
The standards council offered a symbolic demerit on Talentvision’s record as a Canadian 
broadcast licensee for having been a poor steward of foreign content’s entry into the nation while 
also laying out a clear limit to how much the council would police discourse. Again, political 
motivations would be outside of jurisdiction. The CRTC, too, outlined this limit and for good 
reason. Governmental selection of the political views may or may not circulate in public 
discourse is a moral hazard to robust public discourse. Yet, such a noble limitation of 
governmental authority, a cornerstone of the liberal tradition, also ignores the asymmetries of 
power in global news flows. Political agnosticism amounted to the inability to address issues of 
power directly affecting members of the Canadian public. 
Liberal, deliberative and radical pluralist models offer different visions of inclusiveness 
in the creation and execution of policy.  For instance, Christians, et al, argue that a “key 
condition for establishing a satisfactory normative formula that harmonizes the moral claims of 
all social actors is the quality of dialogue between the social actors” (2009, p. 78). The judicial 
tendency to discard the concerns held by certain social actors suggests a deliberative model that 
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arrives at consensus only by invalidating dissent, one that harmonizes by muffling discord notes. 
It may be argued that the liberal spirit of diversity triumphed since all voices were “allowed” 
circulation and the affected publics could consider more points of view. Those that praise the 
deliberative model of the CRTC can argue that these legal spaces are not equipped to debate the 
normative foundations of the debates they host. But the liberal conception of diversity can only 
be fully self-satisfied in as much as it suspends a realistic assessment of the uneven power. It is a 
sort of equality under the law that forbids both rich and poor from sleeping under bridges, as 
Anatole France once quipped. A radical pluralist analysis, on the other hand, allows for these 
alternative normative frameworks but questions these premises by avoiding a sense of resolution 
through consensus that implies power-free deliberation. There were and continue to be 
consequences for those that lacked material power within the normative structure of Canadian 
media governance.   
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Chapter 6 
A paradox of pluralism: 
Canada’s regulatory response to global media growth 
Chapter abstract: Between 2004 and 2008, Canadian policy developed a more open posture 
toward foreign news media. In this chapter, I detail the CRTC’s decision-making process. The 
CRTC’s publicly guided development of a policy toward foreign media provides a contrast to the 
Market Liberal model of foreign media governance in the United States. The cultural policy 
within the Canadian Broadcasting Act of 1991 shapes public debate on foreign media and the 
social functions it serves. Stakeholders in Canada’s engagement with foreign news actively 
interpret the public policy through deliberation over the merit of bringing foreign news into the 
Canadian media system. The debates produced narratives of inclusion and exclusion. Foreign 
news serves several purposes in these narratives. It brings diversity to the Canadian media 
system. It can connect immigrant communities to their country of origin. Foreign services can 
also serve transnational political identities as Canadians exercise their voting rights in foreign 
political systems. After early setbacks, Al Jazeera successfully entered the Canadian public 
sphere with its English-language network. China Central Television was granted distribution 
rights despite generating intense controversy. In conjunction with these approvals at the CRTC, 
the denial of the Italian public broadcaster, RAI, initiated a broad review of the procedures to 
admit third-language services. RAI’s supporters argued the Canadian regulator was obligated to 
approve RAI so Italian-Canadians could participate in Italian politics. The opening of the 
Canadian system to news from abroad through this public process represents one way a 
conscientious national policy toward foreign media can develop. But the process also illustrates 
how media policy values produce paradoxes. Reviewing the CRTC’s decisions regarding Al 
Jazeera, CCTV and RAI, this chapter points to the paradoxes of national regulation as the 
Welfare Liberal regulatory model adapts to new patterns in global news flows. 
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Introduction 
Canadian media policy is a prime example of a regulatory framework aimed at sustaining 
and supporting national culture. The Canadian system seeks to achieve social goals such as the 
production of uniquely Canadian content for Canadians and adequate multicultural 
representation of Canadian society. These policies ensure Canadian ownership of national media 
industries to prevent the eclipse of Canadian culture. It is a set of policies designed to stave off 
what critical political economists of the 1970s called “media imperialism,” or the capacity for 
one national communication system to saturate another, undermining domestic media production 
and cultural sovereignty (H. I. Schiller, 1992). In many ways, Canada’s political stance regarding 
foreign media is a policy implementation of cautionary advice from the imperialism school of 
thought, withstanding challenges from the free trade paradigm. Canada’s concern for preserving 
a Canadian cultural space through media regulation remains valid forty years after the initial 
formulation of the imperialism theses. U.S. media companies still seek Canadian consumers, and 
the flow from south to north continues to present problems for Canadian policy makers.  
But other aspects of this media landscape are rapidly changing: the growth of 
international connectivity and the appearance of new players in 24/7 news media. The expansion 
of foreign networks into Canada has pushed policymakers at the Canadian Radio-television 
Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) to reevaluate the institutions that buttressed Canadian 
culture industries and limited non-Canadian media. Since 2000, this reevaluation has 
incrementally opened the Canadian regulated system to global voices from less represented 
regions of the globe. These “opening” revisions reflect an attempt to integrate Canadian 
television with the more multipolar media world that will define the 21st century without giving 
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up regulation altogether. The opening of the Canadian system also represents the recognition that 
foreign news is important for Canadian citizens whose political identities overflow national 
confines.  
In previous chapters, I argue that Canadian media governance insufficiently recognizes 
new lines of power introduced by agents of contraflow like Al Jazeera (AJ) and China Central 
Television (CCTV). These criticisms notwithstanding, the CRTC’s process is a positive contrast 
to the non-interventionist regulatory model in the United States. This chapter discusses these 
battles over foreign media to highlight both the public responsiveness of the Commission in 
shaping the nation’s relationship with foreign news and the paradoxes that result as national 
regulation evolves to meet contraflow.  
The chapter focuses on the controversies surrounding the Italian public broadcaster 
Radiotelevisione Italiana (RAI), the pan-Arab broadcaster Al Jazeera and China’s state-run news 
channel CCTV. With RAI, Italian-Canadians advocated for fuller integration with global media. 
Opposition to Al Jazeera’s entry cited the potential for abusive speech and argued against 
integration with the network’s uninhibited journalism. Discontent over the initial denial of RAI 
and the censorship condition imposed on Al Jazeera forced the regulator to reevaluate its 
approach to foreign media. These revisions were tested two years later by the pleas of Chinese-
Canadians to reject CCTV as propaganda. But, the battle to open up for RAI also facilitated the 
entry of China’s state-run broadcaster despite evidence presented that CCTV’s form of 
journalism had a mission to demonize minority communities in Canada. The gradual opening of 
Canada’s system did allow for greater diversity but did so by consciously tolerating the risk of 
inviting voices hostile to elements of that diversity.  
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The process I describe is the most explicit political portion of cable and satellite 
distribution guided by national policy.98 I focus on the process because this is a rare space for 
public intervention in the realm of international communication. The contours of the public 
debates over foreign media offer insights about the opportunities in foreign media as well as 
challenges for national policymakers in multicultural national settings.  
CRTC confronts new broadcasters: Structural adaptation to contraflow? 
The CRTC’s decision to allow Al Jazeera Arabic (AJA) through the regulatory gate in 
2004 caused a stir in Canada’s media politics (see chapter five). Popular interest in the 
regulator’s decision to approve the addition of the Arabic channel with “monitoring” conditions 
went beyond the usual telecommunications and media industry players who often populate the 
regulatory docket. The galvanizing popularity of the maverick news broadcaster caused the 
Arabic channel’s application to draw numerous comments in regulatory hearings as well as 
Canadian and US public debate.99 The public call for comment posted by the commission 
attracted activists’ attention and garnered more than 1200 entries of support and 500 in 
opposition for the public record, a substantial expression of non-industry public involvement in 
commission business. Public-interest groups sprung up to meet AJA at the border, challenging 
the news organization’s professionalism and adherence to Canadian broadcasting standards 
(Dakroury, 2005b; Davis, 2013; Odartey-Wellington, 2013; Marc Raboy et al., 2010). But Al 
                                                 
98 A note on the relative power of citizen groups: decisions about distribution are ultimately the prerogative of 
commercial powers. Canadian sponsors, most often major cable and satellite distributors or industry associations 
(Broadcast Distribution Undertakings or BDUs), initiate the political approval process and make the final decision 
about distribution after approval. Once approved, DBUs are under no obligation to insert the channel in their lineup. 
99 Al Jazeera Arabic’s addition to the channels approved by the CRTC for distribution was so polarizing that it drew 
the attention of conservative media watchers from the United States. Entry into Canada, one media activist observed, 
was entry into a North American market and, thus, that much closer to “corrupting” US public discourse. See Cliff 
Kincaid’s work for Accuracy in Media for an example of the sudden US interest in Canadian regulatory decisions. 
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Jazeera is only one of a series of important cases that illustrate how the Canadian regulator is 
responding to the pressures exerted by a changing global media environment. Considering them 
together, we can see the trajectory I identify as a regulatory opening. 
Structures of institutional reception such as regulatory agencies and market factors 
remain in place despite celebrations of an emerging global public sphere and the demise of the 
nation. Various forms of regulation function as filters, allowing some voices into the nation and 
prohibiting others. They maintain what Monroe Price has called the “sovereignty” of information 
space (2004, p. 32). The power of satellite television, sometimes viewed as the means to 
overcome the ethnocentrism of journalism and bring disparate cultures in contact, only creates 
the technological possibility. The benefits of intercultural journalistic exchange as the 
cornerstone of global civic culture remain elusive.  
At once, these filters are poorly defined due to rapidly changing and interrelated 
conditions of technology, industry and globalization. Kai Hafez, skeptic of overdrawn claims 
about media globalization, describes the potential for satellite journalism as unrealized. “Direct, 
authentic access to the cultural production of other states, unfiltered by the journalism of one’s 
own country,” he notes, “remains an enormous, unused resource of globalization” (2007, p. 56). 
The nation-state, far from withering, remains definitive in global media circulation, organized 
around less static linguistic, historical, and cultural borders. The analysis of regulatory decisions 
regarding foreign media’s “fitness” for entry reveals how national filters are affirmed or 
modified to maintain exclusions or become more inclusive of foreign content. 
Canada’s response to new players is interesting given Canada’s history of policy support 
for Canadian cultural products as a means to ensure the vitality of Canadian culture at large. 
While the CRTC’s track record of civil society group inclusion has raised concern for some 
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(Armstrong, 2010), the CRTC acts as a platform for citizen participation by offering a venue for 
the Canadian public to ask private distributors and programmers to justify the decisions that 
shape the Canadian media system. Analysis of this activism, a national and subnational response 
to new patterns of global media flows, exemplifies how media globalization is experienced by 
localized communities as stakeholders in such regulatory decisions. This paper goes beyond 
individual cases to illustrate a potential model for regulatory change by looking at a set of CRTC 
decisions between 2004 and 2008. These decisions show a pattern of regulatory opening but one 
that cannot be understood as mere regulatory capture by global neoliberal trends. Canada’s 
defensive regulatory posture toward foreign media gave voice to a diverse range of stakeholders.  
Regulatory conflict surrounding these reconfiguring flows of news show how these 
venues can become sites of geopolitical battle as new economic and political forces enter the 
global arena. The new glut of international news broadcasters seek to define news agendas that, 
in turn, frame how the international community identifies and approaches matters of global 
significance. These regulatory decisions suggest how new national responses to flows of news 
shape imagined communities that imbricate to form an uneven and fragmented global public 
sphere in the 21st century. 
Canadian identity politics: prehistory to the Canada’s opening to foreign news 
The relationship between the US and Canada has long been troubled by the trade in 
media products. Since the birth of US commercial networks, Canada has resisted being treated as 
an extension of the US market by US firms (Marc Raboy, 1990b). As early as 1929 with the Aird 
Commission recommendation of a public broadcaster model (Royal Commission on Radio 
Broadcasting, 1929), media policy in Canada has paid special attention to fostering Canadian 
content. The dominance of the US in terms of program sales, format sales, and channel exports 
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has colored Canadian national media policy. Through restricting content imports from its 
southern neighbor, providing incentives for co-production, and funding the Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation, Canadian media policy has sought to strengthen the fabric of a 
distinctly Canadian society.  
Media systems as sites of cultural production and reproduction have great social and 
political importance with respect to issues of identity, and this is a centerpiece of contemporary 
Canadian policy toward foreign media. Canadian policy is premised on the assumption that 
media function as a significant thread of the social fabric that coheres cultural understanding, 
providing a shared set of references and meanings that make up the abstract sense of having an 
identity in common with others. Government supports for media sectors such as subsidy and 
content quotas in the name of national culture appear in the policy frameworks of European 
countries and in European Union at large, both national and supranational levels (Goff, 2006).  
Questions of subnational as well as national identity have been consistent themes in 
Canadian politics for decades, and efforts to accommodate cultural difference emerge 
periodically as central themes in Canadian governance. Monolithic or static definitions of 
national character lost much of their purchase in the complex social realities of the late 20th 
century, and new conceptions of citizenship have challenged national models of unity that often 
sought to assimilate indigenous cultures and immigrant populations (c.f. Aksoy & Robins, 2003; 
Calhoun, 2002). The media policies forged in the early 20th century pursuit of unified national 
character have undergone similar revision in Canada and inform the CRTC’s approach to the 
new availability of foreign news broadcasters. 
Canadian media politics are often cited as examples of national efforts to maintain 
sovereignty in the face of challenges from outside, but the changes in policy toward foreign 
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media have much to do with the similar contests for “internal” sovereignty within the state 
stemming from these questions of multicultural make-up of immigrant nations like Canada and 
the United States.100 Ensuring the multicultural character of Canadian television falls to the 
CRTC. 
The CRTC was created by the 1968 Broadcasting Act as the principle licensing agency 
and regulatory body, tasked with executing some of the main tenets of the Act. The 
commission’s priorities have shifted over time to keep up with technological, industrial, and 
social change, but one core function has been the maintenance of Canadian cultural production 
through a variety of mechanisms (Government of Canada, 2008b). The CRTC derives its 
regulatory mandate from the 1991 Broadcasting Act which maintains the Canadian government’s 
authority to license and otherwise regulate Canadian airwaves. Section Three of the updated 
Broadcasting Act outlines how the broadcasting system should “encourage the development of 
Canadian expression by providing a wide range of programming that reflects Canadian attitudes, 
opinions, ideas, values and artistic creativity.” Section Three also stipulates that the system 
should “serve the needs and interests, and reflect the circumstances and aspirations, of Canadian 
men, women and children, including equal rights, the linguistic duality and multicultural and 
multiracial nature of Canadian society and the special place of aboriginal peoples within that 
society” (Government of Canada, 1991). This section constitutes the broad mandate of the CRTC 
which, in turn, functions as a quasi-judicial body that interprets the Act and renders decisions 
about licensing and content on a day-to-day basis (Armstrong, 2010). 
                                                 
100 The Canadian government has made efforts to maintain legitimacy through a politics of recognition and political 
incorporation, even defining Canadian multiculturalism over and against the assimilationist mentality of “melting 
pot” analogies that commonly define US approaches multiculturalism (see chapter two). 
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The evolution of Canadian broadcasting law reflects these larger changes in management 
of internal diversity, what Stephen McDowell (2001) has called the internal debate on 
sovereignty. Divisive language politics during the 1950s and 1960s highlighted the animosity 
between English and French population groups. Francophone complaints of Anglophone 
dominance raised political sensitivity to linguistic policy. These debates, stemming in part from 
Quebecoise threats of secession led to official recognition and accommodation of both languages 
and cultural heritages. In addition to the official bilingualism introduced by the Trudeau 
administration in the 1970s, Canadian multiculturalism in broadcasting policy has promoted 
representational diversity in media. Official bilingualism, multiculturalism, and recognition of 
First Nations are internal adaptations to maintain cohesion threated by social and cultural 
fragmentation. As McDowell notes, Canadian governance has sought to incorporate difference 
through recognition, coordinating with civil society groups and ethnic communities in national 
projects (2001, p. 125). Despite the “neomercantilist” turn to a market paradigm during the 
1980s and the erosion of budgetary commitments to national culture, tenacious advocacy in the 
legislative process leading up to the 1991 Act won incorporation of language that uplifted 
multicultural and multiracial priorities in the policy mission of the CRTC (Marc Raboy et al., 
2010). Moving into the 21st century, this legal language is the basis of the CRTC’s treatment of 
non-Canadian programming as a tool for representational parity in media. By conducting home-
language programming through Canadian-owned channels, the Canadian media system allows 
immigrants to identify with countries of origin as well as Canada.  
Both Al Jazeera and CCTV were highly parallel as applicants. They shared a reliance on 
foreign state funds, served a minority population, were both subject to claims of political agenda 
and both encountered minority group objections based on hate speech allegations. These 
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parallels should not obscure some significant differences between the two minority populations. 
Arab communities make up a less substantial portion of the total Canadian population. 
According to government data from the years immediately preceding the AJA decision, the Arab 
population in Canada amounted to 348,000 or 1.2% of the total Canadian population with heavy 
concentrations in Ontario and Quebec (Government of Canada, 2007a). Those reporting Chinese 
backgrounds during the same time amounted to 1,094,700 or 3.7% of the population. Moreover, 
the demographic data shows that, not only was the Chinese community the largest non-European 
ethnicity but also grew at a faster rate (19%) than the general population (4%) over the course of 
the 1990s. As with the Arab population, Chinese populations are concentrated in the two 
provinces (Ontario and British Columbia) and, more specifically, Vancouver and Toronto. 
Likewise, 72% were born outside of Canada compared with 58% of Arab-Canadians with 
foreign-born status (Government of Canada, 2007b). These numbers influence the perceived 
needs of communities and thus the decision to overcome the language barriers through 
facilitating in-language programming. 
CRTC internal reforms represent movement toward greater recognition of linguistic and 
social diversity by allowing foreign content easier entry. Conditioned by its history managing 
U.S. media flows, Canada has a sophisticated set of policies and procedures in place to address 
questions of foreign media and their relationship to Canadian identity.101 Policies derived from 
the 1991 Broadcasting Act supported Canadian media production by curtailing foreign content 
entry. But the same policies came to view foreign content as a means to reflect internal diversity 
                                                 
101 These policies were tested in political battles over multiculturalism, international politics, abusive speech, and 
regulation that punctuated the CRTC’s judgments from 2003 to 2006. The result of these battles was structural 
reorientation to emergent conditions in global media. On the surface, these changes appeared to be an erosion of 
independence from outside communication flows. But Canadian multicultural policies were in tension with policies 
that supported Canadian media industries as protectors of Canada’s unique place among global cultures. 
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through external sources. The policy precedent seemed to view foreign media as both threat and 
opportunity. This contradiction set the stage for the political battles that redefined Canada’s 
relationship to foreign content. 
The CRTC’s Conflicted Opening: 2004-2008 
RAI Denial 
Table 6: Stakeholders 2004-50 RAI Denial 
Supporting RAI 
Entry (335) 
 Resisting RAI  
Entry (235) 
Canadian Cable Telecommunications 
Association 
Canadian Association of Broadcasters 
Rogers Cable Communications, Inc. Telelatino Network 
Association of Italian Writers  Salt and Light TV 
National Congress of Italian Canadians 
– National Chapter  
National Congress of Italian Canadians  
– Toronto Chapter 
Committee for Italians Abroad   
 
RAI’s denial by the CRTC in 2004 was a spark that ignited calls for reform from critics 
of the Commission and staff within the regulatory body itself. The Commission based RAI’s 
denial on regulatory rules prohibiting the entry of broadcasters that would compete directly or 
indirectly with Canadian companies for advertising revenues. In short, the CRTC preferred that 
foreign content, when admitted, funnel through Canadian-owned media companies. The rules 
therefore prohibited duplication of content refusing to grant entry to foreign broadcasters that 
might undermine a Canadian company’s market share. RAI’s bid for entry pitted Canadian 
media industry players against one another and divided Italian-Canadian community groups. The 
reasons for the uproar around the Italian public broadcaster stemmed from three interrelated 
conditions. 
• interest in maintaining the public’s authority over the Canadian media system through the 
CRTC while allowing foreign broadcasters into Canada 
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• conflict of economic interests between distributors and programmers within the regulated 
system 
• political globalization of Italian electoral law that improved the ability of Canadian-
Italians to be represented in Italian governing coalitions 
 
In the following review of the RAI decisions, I will address each of these in roughly the same 
order.  
Canadian distribution company, Rogers Cable Inc. (Rogers), sponsored RAI for 
distribution April of 2003, billing the channel as “a generalist broadcasting service that provides 
a broad range of programs, including dramas, feature films, sports, news and news commentary, 
cooking, human interest programs, entertainment programs, Italian music and dance as well as 
religious programs” (Government of Canada, 2004a, para. 7). Rogers’ interest in offering RAI its 
own channel space triggered the upheaval because the application was a direct threat to an 
existing Italian programmer Telelatino that had been in place for decades. Telelatino was the 
preferred conduit for Canadian access to RAI programming.  
The CRTC’s ability to enforce content standards is limited when it comes to the direct 
broadcasts of foreign channels. In considering RAI, the CRTC had to account for the lack of 
punitive measures that could bring foreign broadcasters in line with Canadian codes. Canadian 
content providers were beholden to members of the Canadian public who could initiate a review 
of the fitness of license holders. Licensed media companies can suffer license revocation or 
probation for violating the CRTC’s standards (Krashinsky, 2010). It is in the interest of licensees 
to preempt regulatory meddling by responding to public criticism.  
Rogers’s proposal, however, meant offering the RAI its own space on cable rather than 
rebroadcast through a Canadian licensee. Where a licensee might respond to the CRTC’s 
warnings in the event that content was found to violate Canadian codes, foreign content 
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providers have little motivation to be so responsive to public will or public policy objectives. An 
approval of RAI for distribution amounted to limiting the extent of the Commission’s 
jurisdiction. Where the CRTC could compel Canadian companies through the license review 
process, the Commission had no jurisdiction or enforcement mechanisms for RAI if the direct 
broadcasts of RAI violated Canadian broadcasting standards. Rogers, by sponsoring RAI’s 
application in 2004, would cut out a licensed Canadian broadcaster and limit the CRTC’s own 
jurisdiction over the content broadcast on that channel. In effect, approving RAI for distribution 
allowed foreign programming to enter Canada through an unregulated circuit that would further 
blunt the CRTC’s ability to exercise authority. 
But economic interests of major distribution companies dovetailed with the public 
interest mandates guiding the CRTC, creating a strong case to dissolve the preference for 
Canadian owners. Rogers rationalized the addition of RAI with arguments taken from pages of 
the Broadcast Act. RAI would contribute to the diversity of Canada’s broadcasting system, bring 
international perspectives to Canadians, and support a minority community. Cable and satellite 
distributors also noted that inclusion would decrease signal theft from US cable and satellite 
providers, a common complaint by Canadian distributors that felt regulatory restrictions on 
programming were pushing potential customers into the black and gray markets for US 
distributors (Taylor, 2006). Rogers cited the lack of specialty or pay television in Italian with a 
public broadcasting mandate.102 A variety of Canadian groups advocating for media diversity 
joined Rogers in supporting the addition for similar reasons (see Table 6).  
                                                 
102 Telelatino had been using programming from a widely available noncommercial broadcaster and repurposed the 
content for commercial use by selling time to Canadian advertisers interested in the Spanish and Italian language 
markets.  
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The request to add RAI garnered 235 opposing comments. Opposition followed two lines 
of thought. First, public comments expressed general apprehension toward eroding the priority 
afforded Canadian media companies. Second, many feared the loss of preexisting Italian 
programming through the Canadian programmer. Chunks of RAI programming had been 
available to the Canadian public through Telelatino, the licensed Canadian channel that 
redistributed programming in Spanish and Italian. By petitioning the CRTC to allow RAI its own 
channel in cable line-ups, Rogers would make Telelatino’s RAI segments redundant and 
undermine its market share of viewers. Not surprisingly, Telelatino opposed the addition and 
made the case that approving RAI was a direct violation of Canadian broadcasting law that 
prohibited foreign services to compete with Canadian media companies. Representing its 
interests before the Commission, Telelatino argued that its financial forecasts based on an 
approval of RAI showed revenue losses of $CAN 3.8 million (Government of Canada, 2004a, 
para. 75).  
But Telelatino’s defense of its role as a Canadian cultural institution appeared to be an 
appeal to national economic protectionism and company self-preservation more than enlightened 
cultural policy. Among the three hundred and fifty-five comments filed in favor of RAI’s direct 
broadcast, many bristled at what they perceived as the Commission’s refusal to “give Italian 
Canadians the same cultural, social, and political opportunities that Italians have in all the other 
countries around the world, and other ethnic communities have within Canada” (Government of 
Canada, 2004a, para. 65–78).  
But other interveners in support of Telelatino made a case that the system of obligations 
associated with Canadian media regulation were beneficial in that it assured Italian-language 
content providers would remain accountable to local communities. Privileging Canadian 
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broadcasters as conduits allowed the provider of Italian programming to remain connected with 
the Canadian community. The National Congress of Italian Canadians’ Toronto chapter, for 
instance, opposed the addition of RAI as an independent channel despite the national chapter’s 
support for RAI.103 If RAI content were to circumvent the regulatory process by avoiding the 
obligations of a licensed broadcaster, the community services performed by Telelatino as a 
locally rooted media company invested in the Italian-Canadian community would also dissipate:   
Telelatino makes a tangible contribution to our community on a grassroots level, 
something RAI International has yet to commit to and will most likely be unable 
to do given the sheer scope of its broadcast audience around the globe. While the 
arrival of RAI International will bring more Italian programming to our 
community, it will ultimately do so at the expense of local content and culture. 
(Government of Canada, 2004a, para. 78) 
 
The question of RAI’s transmission without a Canadian intermediary had pitted industry 
sectors against one another and divided Italian communities. Suspicions circulated publicly that 
the Italian public broadcaster was denying programming to Telelatino as part of Italian media 
mogul Silvio Berlusconi’s plan to replace RAI programming with content from his own media 
empire. Telelatino’s case for denying RAI, however, was unbeatable. Approval would violate the 
broad prohibition on direct or indirect competition for audiences already served by a licensed 
Canadian company. 
Regardless of the CRTC’s vested interest in maintaining its authority, there was broad 
dissatisfaction with the denial in the Italian-Canadian community. Members of the regulatory 
system, though believing the CRTC had followed Canadian law as written, were dissatisfied with 
the outcome too. While Telelatino’s business model was certain to suffer competing with RAI, 
                                                 
103 These divisions in Canadian media activism reflected differing interpretations of Italian politics and the political 
motivations for RAI’s move into Canada, further indication of the relationship between political globalization, 
migration and domestic media activism that must account for global dynamics. 
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proponents of opening to RAI pointed out that the Canadian broadcaster only devoted half its 
airtime to Italian-language programming.104  
The battle between programmer and distributor had implication for the scope of the entire 
regulated system and the relevance of the commission in the expanding multichannel universe. 
Programming battles and challenges to the commission’s limitations on commercial prerogative 
were fairly common in Canadian politics, but a third element, the need for the CRTC to consider 
foreign election law, was new. 
The RAI decision had greater dimensions than the media industry in-fighting over market 
share and interest in multicultural programming. It sparked strong reaction from Canadian-
Italians who had been recently been granted greater right to representation in Italian parliament. 
As the CRTC grappled with the pressing question of granting foreign channels a direct line to the 
Canadian public, the Italian government was taking steps to redefine the election processes by 
further facilitating the representation of Italians abroad.  
Italy had wrestled with the question of extending democratic participation overseas since 
the years following the Second World War. Expatriates have had the “passive” right to vote for 
some time, but this required a return to the country. The way Italy has facilitated the expat 
community changed dramatically in the months preceding the CRTC’s RAI decision, making 
greater allowances for representation of non-resident Italians. Italians would no longer need to 
return to Italy to take part in the democratic process. This broadening of representation in 2003 
                                                 
104 More broadly, there was also mounting dissatisfaction with what the Commission termed unlaunched Category 2 
services. Under the rules favoring Canadian industry, companies could claim competitive disadvantage for 
programming that remained in the planning phase, effectively prohibiting the entry of channels by citing only the 
prospect of competition for target audiences in Canada. 
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offered greater agency to permanent residence of foreign countries, and non-resident Italians had 
a realistic chance to influence the nature of coalitions in upcoming elections.  
Debates in the run up to the CRTC’s decision took on new meaning, adding a sense of 
tangible disenfranchisement to RAI’s potential denial. According to RAI’s corporate sponsors, 
the new election laws had the effect of “heightening the need to bring RAI International to 
Canada” (Government of Canada, 2004a, para. 65). Indeed, elections two years later 
demonstrated the significance of this globalization of Italian democracy. Of eligible voters 
overseas electing 18 parliamentarians to govern from abroad, 40% participated. These elections 
swayed the balance, establishing a center-left coalition (Battiston & Mascitelli, 2008). This 
electoral empowerment of Italian-Canadians led to greater interest in connecting with the home 
country. The Canadian regulated system denied Italians programming essential to their 
internationalized democratic duties. With RAI, the Commission was forced to consider 
something rather novel. To what degree should Canadian media institutions and regulatory 
frameworks be required to provide for political participation in non-Canadian elections as part of 
their public mandate? 
Compounding the sense of pressure on the CRTC’s response to these requests, Italian-
Canadians were watching the decision as an election issue within Canada. When the CRTC’s 
decision was passed down after Canada’s election of Paul Martin’s government, the political 
reaction remained fierce: hundreds of Italian-Canadians protested on Parliament Hill during the 
ceremonies for Martin’s new cabinet (Taber, 2004, pg. A1). These challenges to the regulated 
system with regard to RAI were part of a larger set of problems for the CRTC which was 
suddenly under fire and in the limelight of Canadian political theater. In addition to the apparent 
need for the CRTC to consider Italian elections in their decisions, the number of non-Canadian 
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services seeking space on Canadian dials during this time was as unprecedented. RAI revealed 
the need for a more comprehensive revision of the CRTC’s procedures regarding non-Canadian 
programming. While the RAI decision exemplifies the complications of maintaining national 
regulatory standards in relation to forms of political globalization, the coincident decision to 
approve Al Jazeera Arabic involved more than adjudicating between competing economic 
interests, forcing the Commission to determine the threshold for Canada’s definition of and 
tolerance for hate speech. 
AJA Conditional Approval 
On the same day the CRTC denied Roger’s request to add RAI, the Commission 
announced its conditional approval of Al Jazeera Arabic. The controversies that surrounded the 
Arabic broadcaster were well known, and Al Jazeera’s infamy as a rebellious news organization 
hurt the public perception of the CRTC. One journalist’s account of the set of decisions that 
denied RAI but “opened the way for the Arabic Al-Jazeera,” flippantly criticized the decision by 
describing Al Jazeera as “well known for airing Osama Bin Laden messages and an occasional 
beheading” (Vlessing, 2004).  
The sense that the CRTC was mishandling foreign content was mounting in public 
debates. For the Italian communities advocating greater access to Italian programming, this was 
further evidence of convoluted priorities. Al Jazeera’s conditional approval was roundly 
criticized as well. Despite approval, the Arabic community was dissatisfied due to the treatment 
of Al Jazeera. The CRTC’s conditional approval required distributors of the channel monitor the 
content they transmit if they choose to include Al Jazeera. The condition was a compromise to 
gain the consent of Jewish public-interest groups that had objected to alleged abusive speech on 
the network. The half measure proved to be a failure, satisfying none of the stakeholders: Jewish 
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groups found the approval a threat to Jewish culture; distributors that sponsored the channel for 
approval refused to bear the cost of 24-hour surveillance; Arab-Canadians were not only denied 
in-language programming by the conditional approval, the monitoring itself was the first of its 
kind and mingled with a social environment of distrust for the Arabic population in the post-
September 11th political environment. The decisions coincided with a period Charles Taylor and 
Gerard Bouchard identified as a pivotal point in the public discussion of official minority 
accommodation policies differences in Canada. A growing discontent with cultural 
accommodation policy mounted from 2002 until 2006 during which media coverage and public 
figures criticizing Québec’s government for accommodation excess (Bouchard & Taylor, 2008). 
Much of the controversies centered on questions of Islam’s fit in Canadian society such as the 
application of Sharia law and the allowance of Sikh ceremonial knives in public schools.  
Table 7: Stakeholders 2004-51 Al Jazeera Arabic Conditional Approval 
Supporting AJA Entry (1,200) Resisting AJA Entry (500) 
Videotron Itee Asian Television Network International 
Limited 
Canadian Cable Telecommunications 
Association 
Global Television Network, Inc. 
Reach Media (AJ Agent in North 
America) 
 
National Council on Canadian-Arab 
Relations 
Jewish Women International of Canada 
Canadian Muslim Forum B’Nai Brith Canada 
Canadian Arab Federation Canadian Jewish Congress 
Council on American Islamic Relations 
Canada 
Christian Friends of Israel – Canada, Inc. 
Alternative Perspective Media  
Individual: Mr. David Lidov Individual: Mr. Robert Fattal 
Arab Canadian Civil Liberties Association  
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Table 7 (cont.) 
Canadian Member of Parliament 
Beaumier 
 
Edmonton Council of Muslim 
Communities 
 
British Columbia Civil Liberties 
Association 
 
Muslim Canadian Congress  
Council of Muslim Communities of 
Canada 
 
 
The combination of RAI’s denial and the approval of Al Jazeera had brought unwanted 
attention to the regulator just as Paul Martin’s new government was making regulatory 
appointments. Liza Frulla, recent Martin appointee as Heritage Minister, was confronted with 
these decisions within the first day in her role as minister. The turn in public opinion for the 
regulator was an occasion for more routine critics to fan the flames. Michael Hennessy, president 
of the Canadian Cable Television Association, described the CRTC’s decisions as an indication 
of how out-dated the organization was: “I think they are looking at the world through the 
perspective of their policy: how does the world fit their policy as opposed to how does their 
policy have to change to fit the world.” Hennessy went on to express the distribution industry’s 
primary concern over CRTC restrictions that, he argued, forced 700,000 to 1,000,000 Canadians 
to use the black market in satellite dish service. Italian Members of Parliament, too, weighed in 
to question whether the multichannel universe of the 21st century made an organization of the 
1960s irrelevant (Taber, 2004, pg. A1).  
The heat of the media politics and accommodation policies in 2004 caused the issue of 
ethnic diversity on the dial to break from the confines of obscure CRTC cable policy. The public 
involvement drew attention to the Commission as censor rather than supporter of Canadian 
culture. A national Canadian newspaper captured the public frustration with the regulator: “It’s a 
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courageous agency that manages to anger the Italians, the Jews, the Arabs, the French and the 
Liberals all at the same time. Congratulations, CRTC” (Ibbitson, 2004, p. A4). The combination 
of industry dissatisfaction and the pressure of public protests made the CRTC appear to be a 
political liability for the new Martin administration. Frulla initiated a review of third-language 
programming policy in general.  
The principle form of the Ministry’s initiative was a panel report that offered guidance on 
reinterpreting prohibitions on foreign media had the appearance of being shaped around RAI’s 
acceptance. The Minister’s report, Integration and Cultural Diversity: Report of the Panel on 
Access to Third-Language Public Television Services, recommended lowering barriers in such a 
way as to permit foreign public broadcasters like RAI (Lincoln et al., 2004). The panel’s report 
focused on the competitiveness test that halted RAI’s entry, noting that an overly broad reading 
of the test allowed for strained comparisons that unfairly rejected foreign applicants: “24 hours 
of commercial-free programming compared with an existing service that offers five hours with 
commercials” (2004, p. 10). Mere overlap in content qualified as competition for the same 
audience. The rules, they argued, granted what amounted to a perpetual monopoly to Canadian 
service providers without regard to consumers. To correct for this, the panel suggested a 
partnership model foreign services with Canadian firms but, otherwise, granting distribution 
rights to foreign news organizations.  
The Department of Canadian Heritage’s report suggested embracing foreign public 
broadcasters, but the challenges of defining public broadcaster in global terms was problematic. 
Stemming from the RAI incident, there was broad support for the commission to give favorable 
treatment to foreign public broadcasters, but a definition of public broadcaster in an international 
context was wanting. The term public broadcasters carried with it a set of definitional 
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assumptions rooted in Canadian and Anglo-European media models. The new global scope of 
the CRTC’s task forced the regulator to grapple with reconciling starkly different meanings of 
public broadcaster that carried with them basic assumptions about the role of government in a 
national media system. The rough equivalent in China, China Central Television, was wholly-
owned by the Chinese government with little similarity to media in a democratic society. Such 
examples forced the Commission to recognize the lack of commonality in media institutions 
across nations. The final definition was “the principal, or a significant, broadcaster(s) in a foreign 
country that provides generalist programming culturally relevant to a particular language group 
in Canada” (2004, p. 7). It clarified to a degree but did little to resolve the fundamental tension in 
treating a state-run broadcaster as the equivalent of tax-funded broadcasters with clear firewalls 
to prevent government influence. Lost too was the distinction between public broadcasters as 
commonly conceived in Western contexts and commercial broadcasters that may be “principal 
and significant” in their home national markets. 
Regardless, the CRTC’s efforts were already underway within the year. The Commission 
introduced a notice soliciting public comment on improving the diversity of third-language 
television services. Through these government findings and the CRTC’s own review, a new 
foreign media policy was emerging. The burden of proof was shifted from those advocating for 
foreign channel entry to those objecting. Likewise, the competitiveness test was gutted to make 
frail rationales for rejecting foreign media inadmissible. A year later, RAI’s second attempt to 
enter Canada was approved by a new process that was tailored to foreign public broadcasters 
(Government of Canada, 2005a). But the fundamental tensions over the definition of public 
broadcaster as preferred foreign content would go unresolved and flare up again with the 
application of Chinese-language channels.  
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Table 8: Stakeholders 2005-51 RAI Approval 
Supporting RAI Entry Resisting RAI Entry 
Rogers Cable Communications Inc. Canadian Association of Broadcasters 
Canadian Cable Telecommunications 
Association 
CTV Inc. 
Videotron Itee Community Media Education Society 
(CMES) 
Bell Express Vu  Ontario Confederation of Sicily 
Bell Canada Italian Chamber of Commerce of Toronto 
Foundation Communautaire 
Canadienne-Italienne 
 
Committee for Italians Abroad  
 
Table 9: Stakeholders 2004-96 CRTC Revision to Third Language Assessment 
 
Supporting Relaxation of Rules 
Restricting Foreign Media Entry 
Resisting Full Relaxation of Support for 
Canadian Producers 
Minister of Canadian Heritage Panel Canadian Association of Broadcasters 
Radiotelevisao Portuguesa Internacional Festival Portuguese Television 
RAI Telelatino Network 
Rogers Cable Communications, Inc. Fairchild 
Canadian Cable Telecommunications 
Association 
Reach Media, Inc. 
 Numerous broadcasters, producers, unions, 
and related industry associations 
 Alliance of Canadian Cinema 
 Television and Radio Artists 
 Writers Guild of Canada 
 
Chinese media: A test of the new rules and the Great Wall TV package 
 
With CCTV, the Canadian regulatory encountered public outrage for a second time in as 
many years. As with the decision to deny RAI in 2004, demonstrators rallied around the question 
of CCTV’s bid for entry in 2006. Canada’s Chinese communities showed signs of even greater 
ambivalence about the internationalization of the Canadian media system. Where denial of RAI 
incited public engagement, the chance that the CRTC might approve China’s official news 
broadcaster inspired Chinese-Canadian citizen groups.  
 240 
 
240
The Commission was, once again, forced to consider decisions about domestic media in 
the context of international social and political conflict the same year RAI was granted entry. 
The first challenge to the CRTC’s redesigned procedures for foreign content came with the 
consideration of two Chinese programmers in 2005 (Government of Canada, 2005b). This 
decision approved six non-Canadian channels for carriage and was a first test of the new third-
language policy. It was also a debut of the new procedures for public involvement in that 
standards of evidence for interveners had changed. Since the Commission now automatically 
favored entry, those objecting to additions had the burden of proof. Objections were filed with 
regard to two channels in particular. New Tang Dynasty TV (NTDTV), a New York-based 
channel associated with the religious group Falun Gong, and Phoenix North American Chinese 
Channel (Phoenix) galvanized Canada’s Chinese communities due to perceived biases, causing 
controversy in Canada’s Chinese communities that fell along the growing fault lines of Falun 
Gong and the Chinese Communist Party.  
Perhaps most clearly with NTDTV and Phoenix, the CRTC’s role as the guardian of 
Canadian public sphere functioned as a platform for political competition at the global level. 
These two channels became de facto extensions of the political struggle between the Falun Gong 
and democratization movement against the Chinese Communist Party The CCP had outlawed 
organizations associated with Falun Gong six years. The approvals for both channels were swift 
despite objections from the Falun Gong community that feared PNACC would continue the 
pattern of misrepresentation and demonization members claimed the CCP had initiated after 
banning the spiritual practice in China. The Commission recognized the complaints but also 
noted that those alleging PNACC’s potential to abuse members of the Falun Gong failed to 
provide documentation as evidence for the Commission’s consideration.  
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In these channel applications, we see the opening gestures in a battle to define the 
diasporic Chinese population in Canada. The question of the representational function of the 
Canadian media system became more complex. These media came to represent groups that, in 
turn, sought to define China’s relationship with Tibet, Falun Gong practitioners, and the Chinese 
democracy movement in Canada. The controversy, however, would erupt in a more formal and 
organized way the following year when CCTV sought approval with the Commission. The 
experience of PNACC’s approval alerted oppositional Chinese-Canadian activists groups to the 
new standards of evidence that would be required to keep Chinese state media at bay.  
Table 10: Stakeholders 2006-166 CCTV Approval 
Supporting CCTV Entry (2200) Resisting CCTV Entry (850) 
Rogers Cable Communications, Inc. Fairchild Television 
Canadian Cable Telecommunications 
Association 
Multivan Broadcasting 
Chinese Ambassador Mr. Lu Shumin NTDTV 
Confederation of Toronto Chinese 
Canadian Organizations 
FDAC 
Chinese Travel Services Canadians Against Propaganda 
Multiple Chinese business associations World Organization to Investigate the 
Persecution of Falun Gong 
 Federation of Asian Communities 
 Tibet Centre for Peace 
 Toronto Tibetan Youth Congress 
 Chinese Insight Research Society 
 
CRTC reforms to third-language programming pleased Italians in the country. Allowing 
international broadcasters to have a direct channel presence meant there was no need to arrange 
programming deals with licensed Canadian media companies like Telelatino. There was a 
common perception that the revision to the third-language rules had been tailored to allow RAI 
into the Canadian public sphere and satisfy the media activism that had taken hold in Italian 
communities in 2004. But the decision lowered the barrier to all third-language programming 
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without a more comprehensive policy adjustment for the Commission to distinguish between the 
variety of foreign broadcasters. The Commission’s basis of evaluating foreign media had not 
means of accounting for the political economy of news production. Furthermore, the CRTC did 
not recognize disagreement with political orientation of programming as justification for denying 
programming. As a result, the “Great Wall TV package” proposed by Rogers two years after the 
RAI decision had opened the Canadian media system to China’s state broadcaster with little 
means of distinguishing state-sponsored national broadcasters from state-run broadcasters. 
A coalition of Chinese-Canadian groups organized to oppose CCTV’s entry. Groups like 
Canadian Against Propaganda (CAP) and the Tibet Center for Peace formally intervened, this 
time better organized and prepared with to meet the new standards of evidence required by the 
Commission. In formal filings, CCTV was confronted with charges of bias, propaganda, and 
systematic misrepresentation. Passions ran hot. Outside the headquarters of the cable company 
sponsoring CCTV’s entry, demonstrators smashed a television set while protestors chanted “No 
communist propaganda.” Opponents sought to capitalize on rules governing abusive speech and 
consistently characterized CCTV as a tool of state control. The spokeswoman for Canadians 
Against Propaganda, Elaine Xie, described the CRTC’s decision to approve CCTV as “helping 
to facilitate this regime to spread its message of communism and hatred here in Canada . . .” 
Opposition also networked with preexisting international non-governmental organizations such 
as the World Organization to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong (WOIPFG) as a means 
to provide the Commission with documentation of systematic and coordinated misrepresentation, 
documenting CCTV’s portrayal of Falun Gong and claim protection from such media as a 
Canadian religious minority (World Organization to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong, 
2004).  
 243 
 
243
The Commission’s consideration of CCTV focused on news stories put forward by those 
opposing entry to decide if the content could be officially recognized as abusive, i.e. whether 
news segments submitted were “likely to expose a an individual or a class to hatred or contempt 
in the context of the broadcast.”  The Commission concluded comments were  
clearly abusive, in that they are expressions of extreme ill will against Falun Gong 
and its founder, Li Hongzhi. The derision, hostility and abuse encouraged by such 
comments could expose the targeted group or individual to hatred or contempt 
and . . . incite violence and threaten the physical security of Falun Gong 
practitioners (Government of Canada, 2006, para. 103). 
 
Still, despite coordinated efforts, Canada’s new policy toward foreign media set the bar for 
denying foreign media beyond the reach of Canadians opposing the state broadcaster. The 
Commission reasoned that the examples of abusive speech supplied as evidence dated back to 
1999 and 2001 and were therefore too dated to be taken as representative samples of current 
CCTV news content. The potential for abusive speech was, in effect, tolerable according to the 
Commission. In contrast to Al Jazeera two years earlier, the Commission’s approval of CCTV 
explicitly stated that it was “unnecessary to impose specific conditions on its distribution in 
addition to those usually applicable to such services on such a list” (Government of Canada, 
2006, para. 111).  
Canada’s Open Entry for foreign news 
The opening of Canadian media to foreign news was incremental and steeped in social 
conflict. By 2008, however, the Commission reaffirmed it relaxation of regulatory filters for non-
Canadian services with an unequivocal policy commitment to an “open-entry” approach. The 
onslaught of applications in the first decade of the 21st century had revealed the need for a 
holistic revision of the regulatory posture toward foreign media. Despite the objections of 
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Canadian broadcasters and cultural organizations, the CRTC effectively eliminated 
competitiveness with existing Canadian services as a rationale for denying the entry of news 
programming. This gradual lowering of regulatory boundaries  
Indeed, the prohibition on “non-Canadian services” had been designed around US 
media’s clear potential and actual market domination in North America. Treating all non-
Canadian content with equal prohibitions was unfeasible given the growth of English news 
media producers. A multicultural media policy designed to serve ethnic populations and 
diversify points of view would need to strike a balance between the preservation of Canadian 
culture and making space for new entrants. Protection by denying foreign companies that might 
compete for ad revenue with Canadian media companies, known as the competitiveness test, was 
a principal pillar of support. Modifying the competitiveness test, the commission reasoned, could 
enhance the nation’s internal diversity. The CRTC’s open-entry policy instituted in the 2008 
revised framework sought to achieve this balance by further loosening the test for non-Canadian 
news providers. The Commission ruled: 
. . . absent clear evidence, as determined by the Commission, that a non-Canadian news 
service will violate Canadian regulations, such as those regarding abusive comment, the 
Commission will be predisposed to authorize non-Canadian news services for 
distribution in Canada. This change will be effective as of the date of this public notice 
(Government of Canada, 2008a, para. 245). 
 
The Canadian cable industry as well as telecommunications firms eyeing the media services 
sector have an obvious stake in streamlining the process of channel addition and eliminating 
public interest hurdles. A fully open-entry approach would eliminate all competitiveness tests. 
Companies like Bell Canada and Telus endorsed the maintenance of such tests in the enervated 
forms. Others hoped to shift the focused on the assurance that programming rights would be 
guaranteed to Canadian companies, forcing non-Canadian companies to give up exclusive rights 
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to programming for the privilege of entry. Still, some DBUs, such as Shaw Cable, endorsed the 
removal of all barriers.  
In the process of this final 2008 opening, the Commission did not endorse the erasure of all 
barriers to entry, but it did remove key provisions that had restricted the flow of international 
programming. Significantly weakening the competitiveness test, the CRTC abandoned the 
consideration of unlaunched services in evaluating whether a new entrant would compete with 
existing services. No longer could a Canadian company “squat” on a proposed channel in 
perpetuity. The Commission recognized that protecting unlaunched channels effectively silenced 
entire genres of programming by preferring potential Canadian producers even when Canadian 
companies stalled in production.  
Conclusions: media regulation in a multipolar world 
A significant part of the multipolar economic world will continue to be the refinement 
and expansion of international communication capacities in regions with increasing wealth. As 
circuits of international communication expand, policymakers and regulatory organizations can 
expect to confront new sources of foreign news as networks expand from these formerly less 
visible regions of the globe. China and Qatar are primary examples of this trend as greater 
integration with global capital flows entails more sophisticated integration with communication 
flows.  
Canada’s experience is not unique as communication becomes more dynamic and robust. 
The questions of policy the Canadian regulator confronted in realigning its regulatory posture 
toward a new international communication landscape are questions for national regulation at 
large. With a greater range of news content available, how do regulators justify approval and 
denial for carriage? What are the best measures for judging whether international content is 
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suitable for entry? While the example of Canada illustrates the bureaucratic procedures of a self-
conscious regulator, other countries may choose to let the market decide what is appropriate for 
circulation. The decisions discussed here show the complexity of these choices and the difficulty 
in designing comprehensive foreign media policy for an age in which the perspectives available 
are proliferating and, as diplomacy, clamoring for attention.  
These decisions resulted in policy changes that lowered barriers to entry for foreign 
content providers. But the rationale for lowering these trade barriers in media products was not 
mere concession to external commercial pressure as is sometimes the case with Canadian 
“continental” economic integration. The opening of the Canadian media system unfolded 
through a conflict-driven process with public input. This opening is noteworthy in that the 
conflict was not limited to economic players calling on the state to defend against encroaching 
global competition or fighting one another for a better position within the protected sphere of 
Canadian markets. The introduction of Al Jazeera, RAI and CCTV and the public debates that 
surrounded them triggered a reevaluation of the purpose of barriers to non-Canadian media and 
tested the limits of multicultural policies. The process produced a policy toward foreign media 
that erred on the side of openness to emerging flows and new perspectives, sacrificing some of 
the protectionist measures that had defined the Canadian media regulation for a generation. But 
the change was also gradual and driven by conflict that involved a greater slice of the Canadian 
public than dominant economic interests. While the CRTC public involvement can be faulted for 
privileging industry over public-interest, it provided a forum for open debate. This kind of forum 
is sorely missing in wholly commercial systems in which “citizen” involvement is limited to 
ratings figures and customer surveys.  
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Still, public involvement is not a formula for the fantasy of dialogic international 
communication flows. Canadian broadcasting policy is shaped around the maintenance of 
Canadian identity, and groups that seek to impose limits on foreign media entry have legitimate 
recourse to CRTC procedures. The limitation of foreign media can likewise have a variety of 
motivations, and Canada’s transformation shows the political, economic, and cultural stakes. 
These domestic debates surrounding foreign media validate concerns that media activism in the 
age of globalization can become means to silence dissent that can now come from remote 
corners of the globe. In global media policy, strict definitions of national identity or community 
make calls for protecting media borders suspect since they can mask the maintenance of 
hegemonic power, even if these calls are from “the public.” This is especially relevant when 
examining the North American response to voices from the Global South that mix a plea for 
global communication equality with the needs of foreign government publicity.  
The democratic element of the CRTC’s public participation in evaluating foreign media 
entry discussed in this chapter, while admirable in many ways, also points to potential drawbacks 
of public involvement. As Chakravartty and Sarikakis point out, xenophobic reinterpretations of 
the cultural preservation and diversity arguments common to the NWICO era can legitimate 
inequality at the global scale by strategically using protectionist policies (2006, pp. 43–44). 
Policymakers and those executing policy on global media flows have a significant challenge in 
designing one-size-fits-all statutes. Objections to the entry of a given journalistic organization 
may serve merely to protect regional political power from challenge and maintain the invisibility 
at the national level of political controversy in the global arena. An open-entry policy would 
make attempts to use policy to protect such regional hegemony less tenable. On the other hand, 
the open-entry policy also risks subjecting subnational groups to mediated forms of control and 
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subjugation as state power seeks to regulate foreign public opinion. This is particularly 
problematic in light of the lack of consensus on the definition of “public broadcaster” and the 
apparent reinvigoration of media ownership as a form of state power and other forms of media 
diplomacy.  
The opening of the Canadian media system represented by these decisions points to some 
of the underlying dilemmas facing policymakers aiming to open media systems in such a way as 
to allow national publics to recognize and debate problems of global concern. The global public 
sphere, so often imagined in theoretical accounts of new technology, is premised on the social 
and political world falling in line the technological possibility of radical interconnection. This is 
not guaranteed. The technical possibility, as exemplified by the CRTC’s adjustment to new 
global media flows, may exacerbate tensions rather than offer a fruitful ground for dialog. It was 
a policy of multiculturalism that prompted the lowering of barriers to foreign news. But the 
openness to foreign perspectives also invited challenges to that multiculturalism. Embracing the 
open-entry approach meant tolerating greater risk of discrimination and intolerance.  
While the paradox of multiculturalism in the age of interconnectivity played out in these 
decisions, it also shows a media system that responds to public will when public will is in line 
with commercial interests. The CRTC’s approval process suggests that the needs of the ethnic 
community were more readily heard when industry representatives were advocating for the same 
outcome. The expansion of foreign content could not have gone forward without the commercial 
self-interest of major industry players, particularly the concern that the regulatory limitations on 
content were driving Canadian consumers to U.S. distributors. It was a confluence of the legal 
safeguards for media multiculturalism, public-interest groups and commercial desire that made 
the opening possible. 
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Does the design of the Canadian regulatory system provide the flexibility to respond to 
changes in the emergent multipolar global media landscape and, thereby, provide greater 
“systemic interdependence” that would make media globalization a realistic prospect? Canada’s 
adaptations leave pressing questions unanswered about how media flows will be regulated 
according to the social needs of a given national context. Can an effective means of 
distinguishing between news and public diplomacy be developed and used in the context of a 
multipolar geopolitical world? What obligation does a government have to shield its citizens 
from mediated abuse of a foreign organization? How can regulatory bodies, often overtaxed and 
underfunded, recognize the communication customs of distinct news cultures and distinct 
journalism professionalisms to make competent decisions about permissible media? 
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Conclusions and further research 
In the first decade of the 21st century, there has been a proliferation of news producers for 
international markets, often tapping both state and commercial resources for production and 
distribution (Cushion, 2010; Tunstall, 2008a). This proliferation has had the consequence of both 
decentering dominant players in news media production and forcing once dominant players to 
grapple with appeals to make space for new news producers. Where they were already in 
operation, many foreign news broadcasters seeking North American markets have undergone 
organizational revamping in line with what I call neoliberal contraflow, offering English services 
to become more competitive with western news providers that have held center stage for 
decades. This proliferation prompted journalism and public diplomacy scholar Philip Seib (2005, 
2008) to assert that western media were “hegemonic no more,” citing the diversification of 
voices in pan-regional discursive arenas. 
Can new patterns of news flows foster greater parity in global communication? This 
dissertation offers a tentative yes, but seeks to qualify the vision of organizations like Al Jazeera 
and CCTV as an easy answer to breaking hegemony in global news flows. The neoliberal context 
of global news flows places limits on the challenge foreign news organizations can offer. The 
commercial reconfigurations of both news outlets were strategic sacrifices and adaptations for 
entry into North America. While the challenge to the dominance of western media should not be 
dismissed, it should certainly be qualified. Technology creates the capacity for increased 
international and intercultural dialog. Political and economic conditions of global information 
exchange place clear limits on free flow and access to foreign perspectives. 
Borders are not disappearing but reshaping. After an initial enthusiasm regarding the 
degree to which new communication technologies would reduce boundaries and pave the way 
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for global public spheres, there has been a surge of scholarship seeking to reassert the relevance 
of the state in the analysis of global media flows from a variety of different methodological 
standpoints. Webster, for instance, has challenged the concept of the “information age” as a 
distinctly new social order. While “novel features” of globalization do exist, it is “essential,” he 
insists, “that we appreciate that these are consolidations and extensions of long-established 
principles.” Webster sees those principles expressed in a spreading “business civilization” (2002, 
p. 115). The adaptation to media business models as a necessity of expansion suggests that the 
challenge presented by the rise of new news organizations moves forward within the constraints 
of this commercial orientation.  
On comparing the processes of media distribution in the US and Canada 
The inclusion of diverse stakeholders in decision-making is essential for the legitimacy of 
a given system of governance. Media governance is no exception. The processes governing what 
appears as news on U.S. televisions do not have democratic legitimacy. The legitimacy claimed 
by the apologists for the U.S. commercial media system must use the tortured logic that 
consumer choice provides democratic legitimacy despite citizens being cut out of decisions 
within the corporate boardrooms of major U.S. media corporations. Media governance in the US 
continues to rely on the needs of commercially motivated actors to make democratic decisions 
about what appears on American television and what Americans know about the world.  
There is democratic legitimacy in Canadian processes of media governance. Still, 
Canadian governance of Al Jazeera and CCTV also show patterns of exclusion. These exclusions 
have legitimacy because of the public consultation within the CRTC. I do not argue that these 
limits are inherently unjust or censorial. To dismiss all forms of selection in national processes of 
media globalization would suggest national communication norms are entirely without merit. 
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They have merit. As the Canadian example shows, media governance still functions as a way to 
preserve human rights and protect vulnerable minorities within national settings. However, 
media policy principles must be cognizant of the new forms of inclusion and exclusion in 
regulation of reversed flows of media documented in this research. As this dissertation 
demonstrates, Canada shows signs of shaping a “foreign media policy” through continued 
revisions and public consultations. These procedures of media governance give voice to 
members of the public, affording Canadian citizens a stronger role as stakeholders among 
Canadian media companies. The Canadian system allows the process of media globalization to 
unfold under public scrutiny and makes space for democratic governance to inform Canada’s 
engagement with an increasingly diverse global news landscape. 
On the question of public involvement as isolationist preservation of the status quo 
The question of pluralism in policy decisions is a common concern for critical policy 
studies (Braman, 2006; Freedman, 2005, 2008; Karppinen, 2013; Robert W. McChesney, 1995; 
D. Schiller, 1982). This dissertation illustrates how North American publics are included or left 
out of decisions about their media system. Pluralistic representation of a broad array of social 
interests is the ideal. Pluralism in the policymaking process facilitates pluralism in national 
media itself. Exclusion is a problem when there is a lack of mechanisms for broad participation 
in major decisions about the national media environment. Yet, when public mechanisms are 
available, exclusion can also take place through the inequality of stakeholder power in 
policymaking.  
This research on media policy, I analyze cases of global media integration that incited 
public opposition, but I should note that I do not necessarily agree with or endorse the 
motivations of the groups involved in regulating foreign media. The two of the groups I follow in 
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this dissertation are not darlings of the liberal left, but they do represent activism around issues 
of media globalization and the flow of unfamiliar news perspectives into North America. They 
are conservative by definition since they represent the attempt to prevent change. For example, 
Accuracy in Media (AIM) and related right-leaning organizations reject Islam as antithetical to 
an “American way” as they see it. AIM made a name for itself in the 1970s by criticizing public 
broadcasting for alleged liberal political orientation. The group is associated with criticism of the 
academy and attacks leveled against “liberals in the classroom” among other projects. One of 
these projects, documented in this dissertation, is the campaign to keep Al Jazeera from 
establishing a broadcast presence in the United States.  
The loudest voices in the rejection of foreign media, however, remain the zealot few. The 
conservative media activism against foreign news is fringe by most standards. But they express a 
broader cultural anxiety that accompanies the interconnection of the world through new 
information and communication technologies. AIM is impressive because of the determination 
with which its principle figures like Cliff Kincaid pursue activism by any means necessary. 
Where there was no U.S. governmental organization to curtail offensive foreign broadcasters, Al 
Jazeera’s critics launched a public campaign, organized networks of commentators, held press 
club briefings, petitioned members of Congress and filed grievances with a number of non-media 
governmental bodies. The lack of an effective means to take action against foreign media did not 
stop these activists in opposing new forms of journalism and new political perspectives. They see 
in Al Jazeera the threat of invasion and the transformation of their country into something 
foreign. These activists claim foreign news organizations represent the weakening of white, 
Christian culture and the loss of the liberal, capitalist value system. They attempt to reinforce the 
media borders around American culture that are increasingly porous. For these groups, new 
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international broadcasters are the leaks springing in a damn that has preserved the status quo. 
Though conservative media activism of this sort is a minority, it remains important to recognize 
the underlying rationales for such media isolationism.  
Falun Gong is markedly different from AIM but shares a conservative impulse in a very 
different political setting, one that straddles China and Canada. Groups like the Falun Dafa 
Association of Canada are important stakeholders in decisions about Chinese media entry into 
Canada, and, like AIM, resists the flow of foreign media into the Canadian public sphere. But, as 
Zhao notes in her study of the group, Falun Gong is a “resistance identity” that rejects decadence 
of contemporary Chinese consumerism. She goes on to qualify her attention to Falun Gong and 
media politics within China: 
. . . though Falun Gong is unquestionably symptomatic of the malaise of Chinese 
modernity, and though it won the hearts and minds of many followers, its 
ideological closure and single-mindedness are fundamentally incompatible with 
any notion of democratic discourse. The fact that Falun Gong is the target of a 
repressive Chinese state should not lead to knee-jerk reactions about the 
inherently progressive nature of the movement. (2003a, p. 221) 
 
The cases of conservative isolationism from global flows of news reflect the complex 
nature of public involvement in media policy and the potential for intolerance to guide the ship 
of media policy as it adjusts to tides in global media. As media imperialism theses argue, nations 
have the right to preserve local culture. Sovereign nations have a right to refuse the flood of 
media products from Hollywood, news that broadcasts abusive speech, etc. This reasoning is 
easily appropriated by conservative forces, from those seeking to maintain ethnic purity to those 
benefiting from a hegemonic position within a national polity and seeking to maintain that 
position by silencing oppositional voices. On the other hand, the role of government motivations 
that, in part, define these news flows also complicates broad judgments about the entry of foreign 
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media organizations. The cases of Al Jazeera and CCTV reviewed in this research undermine 
blanket statements about needing to allow all voices into a public sphere. If nations use global 
news as a weapon in informational warfare, a free flow doctrine leaves the door open for 
misrepresentation. CCTV’s reporting on Chinese minorities in Canada most clearly represents 
this use of the widening circuits of global information. Generally, however, the potential for 
wealthy governments to claim limited space in commercial media systems could undermine 
localism; that media space might otherwise go to, for instance, domestic nonprofits or localized 
community organizations. Giving this space to the highest bidder would mean the systematic 
exclusion of those without means.  
Promoting the role of national citizenry in the oversight of media globalization can 
condition media globalization and create a bulwark against the abuse of media power. Despite 
public rejection of foreign media and the use of law and regulation to insulate the U.S. and 
Canadian public spheres from outside media influence, I have faith that increased public 
involvement is a good thing because increased public involvement, despite the tendency toward 
isolationism expressed in these case studies, can enlarge the pool of informed stakeholders in 
media policy and dilute the influence of the radical few that seem to define foreign media 
activism in North America. Public involvement can direct the capacity for intercultural exchange 
along more democratic lines of development. However, this raises a question about media policy 
and the public’s role. If a forum for public deliberation was in place in United States 
policymaking, would it remain a domain of the marginalized zealot and wealthy business 
interests as it currently is? Can procedural reform in the methods of decision-making about 
distribution foster broader engagement? The comparison of Canadian and U.S. policy contexts 
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suggests that the means of public engagement offered by the CRTC would be beneficial in the 
United States. 
Canadian policy, while flawed, possesses democratic legitimacy, but an irony exists in 
Canada’s deliberative model governing Canadian television. While it possesses legitimacy 
through the provision of public debate, it is the U.S. media system that appears beyond reproach. 
This may be precisely because U.S. media is not subject to a high level of public scrutiny. This is 
due, in part, to the historical moment in which the intersecting legacies of the First Amendment, 
free flow of information and free trade create an umbrella of ideological protection for the 
failures of corporate media. The influence of commercial structures in distribution do not factor 
into an understanding of how contraflow must change to gain North American markets. This 
dissertation discusses modes of regulation in a broader sense to begin to critique forms of 
regulation that are less visible. Because they are less visible, it is more important to subject them 
to normative evaluation, to make the process of media globalization more apparent. By contrast, 
the Canadian regulatory role in supporting public interest through transparent procedures makes 
these processes visible. With the rise of a multipolar media world, it has become more urgent to 
create the procedural means to effectively and transparently evaluate foreign media. It is not 
enough for notions of plurality and diversity to act as aspirational truisms in policy documents. 
The case studies of Canada and the U.S. illustrate the consequences of media policy and the 
growing need to draft policy that articulates positions on foreign media entry beyond restrictions 
on foreign ownership and rejectionist censorship.  
A note on limitations of this research 
There were significant limits on research on global news circulation. Two limiting factors 
were most pronounced. First, studying government news production involves seeking 
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information about foreign diplomatic programs. These foreign networks are the product of 
foreign governments and are somewhat cloaked by the lack of transparency associated with the 
investigation of governmental foreign affairs machinery. Though Al Jazeera and CCTV have 
engaged in forms of commercialization and privatization, they do not file financial data with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (as publicly traded companies are required). This makes 
establishing accurate figures for revenues and the allocation of resources difficult. Many aspects 
of Al Jazeera’s 2011 privatization, for instance, remain opaque due to a lack of transparency and 
inconsistent legal frameworks that vary from nation to nation.105  
Second, researching the reception of these organizations presents problems of access as 
well. Reporting requirements for Canadian companies with Industry Canada make some 
information available, but contacting Canadian and U.S. companies was not revealing. The 
“private” nature of commercial distribution made establishing valuable details difficult. For 
instance, distribution negotiations and concessions Al Jazeera and CCTV offered to North 
American companies for access to North American audiences are relevant but not available for 
public scrutiny. This lack of transparency again touches on the thorny problem of public 
oversight. Having access to this information would shed considerable light on the exclusive or 
inclusive nature of conducting foreign news into North America, but this information is only 
available through indirect sources and insider information gleaned from industry trade 
publications and the occasional leaked statement. A stronger policy of disclosure would promote 
informed decisions about foreign media in North America and democratic engagement. 
 
                                                 
105 The definition of “non-profit,” for example, changes according to the national setting in which an organization 
registers.  
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A preliminary sketch of further research on global flows of news online 
The research in this dissertation explores broadcasting and cable policy. A savvy reader 
might note that the World Wide Web will likely play a large role in shaping the future of flows. 
Though this dissertation only touched on the online efforts of Al Jazeera and CCTV, it is worth 
noting future research that can more fully address new media.  
Both Al Jazeera and CCTV, like their more commercial news counterparts, have online 
initiatives with web portals and mobile services. Al Jazeera has taken the Internet’s potential 
seriously. Al Jazeera English found an audience in North America through online content 
offerings when cable and satellite distribution were out of reach.  
The considerable expenditures Al Jazeera has poured into gaining distribution in the 
United States (US $500 million alone to acquire Current TV’s U.S. distribution agreements in 
2013) show the importance the network continues to place on legacy media distribution avenues 
like television. But the forward-looking network is also developing ambitious plans to capture 
online audiences as well. Al Jazeera’s AJ+ is an example of the network’s investment in online 
distribution and hints at the network’s more advanced strategy to capture a new generation of 
news users. Started in 2013, AJ+ is an attempt to do something more than repurposing TV 
content for new media distribution.106 The separate online portal will still make use of Al 
Jazeera’s excess of 80 bureaus worldwide while reaching out to new audiences with different 
content and formats. AJ+ shows how agents of contraflow make use of the web as a means to 
reach new, cord-cutting demographics in advanced media systems that are moving away from 
cable subscription and network news. Interactivity and social media are at the center of this 
                                                 
106 “You don’t want to inherit the legacy of the TV,” Al Jazeera’s new media manager said of AJ’s new media 
strategies (Roettgers, 2013, para. 4). “At the end of the day, we want to be in people’s social streams,” said Bishr 
(Roettgers, 2013, para. 10). 
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experiment in news delivery for a new generation. AJ+ has embraced the rebel image of its 
parent brand, using artistically rendered images of international civil rights leaders from Nelson 
Mandela and to John Lennon, while Al Jazeera America has sought to minimize its anti-
American image.  
What do these renewed moves into web distribution mean for contraflow of news? 
Internet distribution, more than any medium, appears to confirm an era of “media abundance.” If 
network neutrality principles remain the order of the day for North American internet policy, 
many news voices from many regions with varying interpretations of what journalism can be will 
enter this online and global public sphere. Official regulation of this news space is less tenable. 
Indeed Canada’s active regulatory system shows no sign of guarding the online universe as it has 
television and radio. Further research is needed to understand the implications of the unfettering 
of news flows through new media channels.  
Throughout this dissertation, I have pointed to forms of regulation that function beyond 
official regulatory institutions. Internet distribution, too, appears less subject to official modes of 
content governance, making the study of unofficial forces shaping global news discourse more 
important. The relative freedom of internet news circulation entails that a study of web 
circulation would best focus on the less formal, normative dimensions touched on throughout 
this research. Internet applications can offer a means to evaluate global media interconnectivity. 
One model for researching new media connectivity, network diagramming, offers a snapshot of 
the global news network as a whole and new forms of global media interdependence the Internet 
might allow.  
Intercitational patterns are particularly revealing. Using search engine applications, 
network diagrams map how online news organizations refer to other news organizations’ content 
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in reporting and offer some sense of the degree to which global online news organs reference one 
another. Network diagrams can visually illustrate link patters among global news providers using 
web-based metric tools like Web-o-metric software. Intercitational patterns can gauge the 
relationships among news organizations and discern systematic exclusion of regional news 
providers that continue into the digital age (Statistical Cybermetrics Research Group, 2011). 
Initial diagramming of online English news publications suggests that online news organizations 
tend to make reference to other journalistic organizations of the same cultural orientation, 
confirming the normative bias toward western news production and the marginalization of 
nonwestern news producers. This early research suggests that news, in the world of new media, 
may replicate forms of marginalization familiar in the age of legacy media. 
 A variety of methods will be necessary to create a fuller picture of global news flow in 
the 21st century. Mapping the formal and informal means of sorting media abundance for 
national audiences has implications for multiculturalism, democratic pluralism, human rights and 
the ability for citizens to make informed judgments about national foreign policy. Media policy 
research and analysis of existing processes for news exchange are important to ensure patterns of 
exchange made available by technology serve the public interest even as the nature of “the 
public” is in flux as we enter a more multipolar media world.  
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APPENDIX A: List of Approved Non-Canadian Programming, 2012 
 
Following is the revised List of non-Canadian programming services authorized for distribution 
as of 23 January 2012 (Government of Canada, 2012).  
 
Revised list of non-Canadian programming services authorized for distribution (as of 
23 January 2012) 
The notes located at the end of the list form an integral part of the authorization. 
  WCVB-TV Boston/WKBW-TV Buffalo/WVNY Burlington/ 
WXYZ-TV Detroit/WJET-TV Erie/KSTP-TV Minneapolis/ 
KXLY-TV Spokane/KOMO-TV Seattle 
ABC
  WBZ-TV Boston/WIVB-TV Buffalo/WCAX-TV Burlington/ 
WSEE Erie/WTOL-TV Toledo/WCCO-TV Minneapolis/ 
KREM-TV Spokane/KIRO-TV Seattle/WWJ-TV Detroit 
CBS 
  WHDH-TV Boston/WGRZ-TV Buffalo/WPTZ Burlington/ 
WDIV Detroit/WICU-TV Erie/KARE Minneapolis/ 
KHQ-TV Spokane/KING-TV Seattle 
NBC
  WUTV Buffalo/WFFF-TV Burlington/WFTC Minneapolis/ 
WUHF Rochester/KAYU-TV Spokane/KCPQ Tacoma/ 
WFXT Boston 
FOX 
  WGBH-TV Boston/WNED-TV Buffalo/WETK Burlington/ 
WTVS Detroit/WQLN Erie/KSPS-TV Spokane/KCTS-TV Seattle 
PBS 
  KSTW (IND) Tacoma/Seattle 
KTLA Los Angeles 
KWGN-TV Denver 
WGN-TV Chicago 
WPCH-TV Atlanta 
WPIX New York City 
WSBK-TV Boston 
  
  WUAB-TV (IND) Cleveland   
  WWOR-TV New York City   
  Aaj Tak Channel   
  AAJ TV   
  Aapka Colors   
  Aastha Bhajan   
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  Al Arabiya News Channel   
  Al Jazeera*   
  Al Jazeera English   
  American Movie Classics   
  Ariana Television   
  ART America   
  ART Movies   
  The Arts and Entertainment Network (A&E)   
  ARY Musik   
  ARY News   
  ARY Qtv   
  ARY Zauq   
  Asianet Plus   
  ATV Home Channel (America)   
  Azteca 13 International   
  Baby TV   
  BabyFirstTV   
  BBC World   
  Beijing TV   
  Benfica TV   
  Benglavision   
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  Big Ten Network   
  Black Entertainment Television (BET)   
  Bloomberg Television   
  Bridges TV   
  BVN-TV   
  Cable News Network (CNN)   
  Cable Satellite Public Affairs Network (C-Span)   
  Canal 52 MX   
  Canal de las Estrellas Latinoamérica   
  Canal SUR   
  Caracol Television International   
  CaribVision   
  CBS Sports Network   
  CCTV-4   
  CCTV Entertainment Channel   
  Channel-i   
  Channel One   
  Channel One Russia Worldwide TV   
  Channel [V] Taiwan   
  China Yellow River Television Station   
  Cine Bangla   
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  CineLatino   
  CNN Headline News (CNN-2)   
  CNN International   
  Comedy Central   
  Consumer News and Business Channel (CNBC)   
  Court TV   
  Cubavision Internacional   
  Dandana TV   
  Dawn News   
  Dawn News (Urdu)   
  De Pelicula Channel   
  Deutsche Welle   
  Dragon TV   
  Ekushey TV (ETV)   
  El Gourmet.com   
  ET-Global Channel   
  Eternal Word Television Network   
  ETV Bangla   
  Eurochannel   
  EuroNews   
  Eurosportnews   
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  Express News   
  The Filipino Channel   
  Fox Business Network   
  Fox News   
  France 24 (English)   
  France 24 (French)   
  Future Television Channel   
  Game Show Network   
  GEO TV   
  German Kino Plus   
  German TV   
  GMA Life TV   
  GMA News TV   
  GMA Pinoy TV   
  The Golf Channel   
  Gone Viral TV   
  Grandes Documentales de TVE   
  HDNet   
  Headlines Today Channel   
  Hope Channel TV   
  Horizon Channel   
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  HTV   
  Hunan Satellite TV   
  Indus Music   
  Indus Vision   
  ITVN   
  Jewish Life Television   
  Jiangsu International TV Channel   
  KTO   
  LBC America   
  The Learning Channel   
  Lifetime Television   
  LUXE.TV   
  Masala Television   
  MBC Channel (America)   
  Mezzo   
  Military Channel   
  MSNBC   
  Muslim Television Ahmadiyya   
  MyZen.TV   
  NASA Television   
  NDTV GOOD TIMES   
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  NDTV India   
  NDTV Profit   
  Network TEN (Australia)   
  NEW SAT   
  New Tang Dynasty Television (NTDTV)   
  NFL Network   
  NTV Bangla   
  Oxygen Network   
  Paris-Première   
  Phoenix InfoNews Channel   
  Phoenix North American Chinese Channel (PNACC)   
  Planète   
  Planète Thalassa   
  Playboy TV**   
  Polsat 2 International   
  Premiere Futebole Clube (PFC)   
  ProSiebenSat.1 Welt   
  PTV-Prime USA   
  Radio-France outre-mer (RFO1)   
  Radio Television Portugal International (RTPi)   
  RAI International 2   
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  RAINews   
  Ritmoson Latino Channel   
  Romanian Television International (RTVI)   
  RTR-Planeta TV   
  RTV   
  RTV Palma   
  Russia Today   
  Sahara One   
  Sahara Samay   
  The Satellite Channel of Southern Television Guandong   
  SIC Noticias   
  The Silent Network (Kaleidoscope)   
  Sony Entertainment Television Asia (SET Asia)   
  Sony Max   
  Southeast TV Station   
  Speed Channel   
  Spike TV   
  Star Chinese Channel   
  Star Chinese Movies 2   
  Star India Gold   
  Star India News Channel   
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  Star India One Channel   
  Star India Plus   
  Sun TV   
  Supercanal Caribe   
  Suvarna   
  TELEFE Internacional   
  TL Novelas Channel   
  TRACE TV   
  TV Asia   
  TV Chile   
  TVColombia   
  TV Globo Internacional   
  TV Japan   
  TV Land   
  TV Polonia   
  TVE Internacional   
  TV3 Republic of Ireland   
  TV3 Television Network (New Zealand)   
  TV4 Television Network (New Zealand)   
  Turner Classic Movies   
  Utilisima   
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  Vijay Channel   
  The Weather Channel (TWC)   
  WMNB-TV: Russian-American Broadcasting Company   
Notes specific to particular services   
*** On the condition that the licensee has a condition of licence governing the 
distribution of Al Jazeera 
  
**** Playboy TV is only authorized for distribution at the specific request of a subscriber. 
Distributors are not permitted to package Playboy TV in such a way that subscribers 
are obligated to purchase Playboy TV in order to purchase any other programming 
service. Distributors are required to take measures to fully block the reception of both 
the audio and video portions of Playboy TV to subscribers that request it not be 
receivable in their home (in either unscrambled or scrambled analog form). 
  
  Authorization for the services on this list is subject to the following:   
  • Providers of these foreign services must have obtained and must remain in 
possession of all necessary rights for the distribution of their programming in 
Canada. 
  
  • Providers of these foreign services must not hold, nor try to obtain, nor 
exercise, preferential or exclusive programming rights in relation to the 
distribution of programming in Canada. 
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  • Licensees are permitted to distribute to their subscribers no more than two 
sets of U.S. commercial and non-commercial stations, unless otherwise 
authorized by the Commission.  Specifically,  
o licensees not already authorized to distribute to their subscribers a set 
of U.S. commercial stations affiliated with ABC, CBS, NBC and/or 
Fox and a U.S. non-commercial station affiliated with PBS pursuant to 
section 20 or 48 of the Broadcasting Distribution Regulations, may 
distribute to their subscribers two sets of such stations taken from this 
list. 
o licensees distributing to their subscribers one set of U.S commercial 
stations affiliated with ABC, CBS, NBC and/or Fox and a U.S. non-
commercial station affiliated with PBS pursuant to section 20 or 48 of 
the Broadcasting Distribution Regulations may distribute to their 
subscribers one additional set of such stations taken from this list. 
Licensees distributing to their subscribers two or more sets of U.S 
commercial stations affiliated with ABC, CBS, NBC and/or Fox and 
U.S. non-commercial stations affiliated with PBS pursuant to section 
20 or 48 of the Broadcasting Distribution Regulations may not 
distribute an additional set of such signals taken from this list unless 
otherwise authorized by the Commission. 
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APPENDIX B: List of Acronyms 
List of abbreviations: 
AIM: Accuracy in Media 
AJ: Al Jazeera 
AJA: Al Jazeera Arabic 
AJAM: Al Jazeera America 
AJE: Al Jazeera English 
AJI: Al Jazeera International 
CAB: Canadian Association of Broadcasters 
CBSC: Canadian Broadcasting Standards Council 
CCTV: China Central Television 
CRTC: Canadian Radio-Television Telecommunication Commission 
FCC: Federal Communication Commission 
HRC: Honest Reporting Canada 
IMF: International Monetary Fund 
RAI: Radiotelevisione Italiana 
WOIPFG: World Organization to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong 
